STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RANSEY R. HARVEY, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the dismissal of charges against Harvey for attempted burglary of a conveyance and possession of burglary tools. The appellate court reversed, holding that attempting to remove a starter from underneath a car constitutes an unlawful entry into the conveyance sufficient to sustain attempted burglary charges.
Attempting to remove a starter from a vehicle's engine compartment constitutes an unlawful entry into the conveyance with intent to commit larceny, thereby establishing attempted burglary. Possession of burglary tools charges are sustainable when evidence shows the tools were used to commit or attempt to commit a burglary.
[1] A person commits attempted burglary of a conveyance when they unlawfully enter a conveyance with the intent to commit larceny therein.
[2] Opening the hood of an engine compartment with the intent to remove a part constitutes an unlawful entry for purposes of burglary.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“he is still guilty of attempted burglary. Here, appellee unlawfully entered a conveyance (by attempting to take a portion thereof), the property of another, with the intent to commit larceny therein.”
Establishes the court's holding that attempting to remove a portion of a vehicle constitutes unlawful entry and attempted burglary regardless of the point of entry.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA deputy sheriff observed Harvey underneath a car with the hood closed and doors/windows shut and undisturbed. The bolts holding the starter in place …
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HOBSON, Judge.
Appellee was charged by a two-count information with I) attempted burglary of a conveyance pursuant to sections 810.02 and 777.04, Florida Statutes (1979), and II) possession of burglary tools. Appellee filed a Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss Count I, attempted burglary of a conveyance. The State did not traverse the factual allegations contained in the motion and the trial court dismissed Court I.
Subsequently, appellee filed another Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss Count II, possession of burglary tools, on the ground that the charge would be sustained only where there was evidence that the tools were used to commit or attempt to commit a burglary or trespass. The trial court dismissed Count II and the State appeals both orders. We reverse.
The undisputed facts, as set out in appel-lee’s motion to dismiss, show that appellee was observed underneath a car by a deputy sheriff. The hood had not been opened; the doors and windows were shut and had not been disturbed. The deputy found that the bolts holding the starter in place in the engine compartment had been loosened. Appellee admitted to the deputy that he had attempted to remove what he referred to as the alternator, but which was in fact the starter. The State argues that these facts constitute an attempted burglary under section 810.02, because appellee had “entered” the conveyance within the meaning of the burglary statute. We agree and reverse on the basis of Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), which held that opening the hood of the engine compartment intending to remove a battery is burglary. We see no distinction as to whether appellee came from underneath the engine compartment, from the top, or from the side; he is still guilty of attempted burglary. Here, appel-lee unlawfully entered a conveyance (by attempting to take a portion thereof), the property of another, with the intent to commit larceny therein. See Von Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684 (Fla.1979).
Accordingly we reverse the order granting the motion to dismiss Count I and Count II. The trial court granted the dismissals on the ground that a charge of possession of burglary tools can be sustained only where there is evidence that the tools were used to commit or attempt to commit a burglary. Here, there is such evidence. We remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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Citator
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Drew v. State, 773 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2000)…entry); Greger v. State, 458 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (holding that the loosening and removal of bolts and nuts from the protruding motor at the stern of the boat constituted an entry for purposes of the burglary statute); State v. Harvey, 403 So. 2d 630, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding that defendant’s loosening of the bolts in the engine compartment underneath the car with the intent to remove the alternator was sufficient to constitute an entry); Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 4th DC…
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Greger v. State, 458 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…any portion of the conveyance.” By the plain meaning of the burglary statute, the appellant entered the boat when he removed a portion of the boat, to-wit, the cowling and the bolts. Von Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684 (Fla.1979); State v. Harvey, 403 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We see no distinction between a motor vehicle’s engine compartment and the outboard motor bolted to a boat hull for purposes of defining a conveyance within the burglary statut…
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Braswell v. State, 671 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…eld that lifting a radiator from an engine compartment of a vehicle lacking a hood did constitute burglary of a conveyance, because the statute requires entry of only a portion of the defendant’s body into the vehicle. Similarly, in State v. Harvey, 403 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), the court concluded that taking a starter by entering the engine compartment through the underside of the car was sufficient proof of entry. It appears that courts in only six other jurisdictions have reported decisions on this…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bragg v. State, 371 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Glenwood von Edwards v. State, 377 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1979)