CELESTINA PEREZ AND ARMANDO PEREZ, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
MIAMI DADE WATER & SEWER AUTHORITY, A SUB-DIVISION OF METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1979-06-19
No. 78-1560
Before PEARSON and KEHOE, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
372 So. 2d 185 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The appellants sued Miami-Dade County and its Water and Sewer Authority after the plaintiff was injured by a defective water meter cover on a sidewalk. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with a local 60-day notice requirement, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the local notice provision conflicted with and was preempted by state law allowing a three-year notice period.


Holding

The 60-day notice provision of Section 2-2 of the Metropolitan Dade County Code is invalid because it conflicts with Section 768.28(6) of the Florida Statutes, which provides a three-year notice period for claims against the state and its subdivisions. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal for failure to comply with the local notice requirement must be reversed.


Headnotes

[1] A local ordinance requiring notice of a claim within 60 days is invalid when it conflicts with a state statute providing a three-year notice period for claims against sta…

[2] A plaintiff is not required to comply with a local notice provision that is preempted by a conflicting state statute.

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Key Quotes

“the 60 day notice provision of Section 2-2 of the Code is in conflict with the three year notice period provided by Section 768.28(6)”

Establishes the fundamental conflict between local and state law that invalidated the local provision

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Facts & Procedural History

Celestina Perez was injured when she stepped on a concrete water meter cover on a sidewalk, and the cover gave way, causing her to fall. She filed sui…

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Opinion of the Court
KEHOE, Judge.

KEHOE, Judge.

Appellants, plaintiffs below, bring this appeal from an order entered by the trial court dismissing their complaint with prejudice. We reverse.

Appellant Celestina Perez was injured while walking on a sidewalk when she stepped on a concrete cover of a water meter. The cover allegedly gave way causing her to-fall and incur personal injuries. Subsequently she filed suit against the City of Miami, Metropolitan Dade County (County), and the Miami Dade Water and Sewer Authority (Authority). Pursuant to its motion for summary judgment, the City of Miami was eliminated from the action and is not a party to this appeal. Thereafter, the remaining parties, appellees Dade and the Authority, filed motions to dismiss contending that appellants’ amended complaint failed to state a cause of action because it failed to show compliance by them with Section 2-2 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County (Code), i. e., the giving of the required notice of claim within 60 days after the accident. This Section provides as follows:

“SEC. 2-2. SUITS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST COUNTY, NOTICE.

“No suits shall be maintained against the county for damages to persons or property or for wrongful death arising out of any tort unless written notice of claim shall first have been given to the clerk of the commission, 240 Dade County Courthouse, within sixty (60) days after the date of receiving the injury or damage alleged, specifying the name and address of the person injured or of the owner of the property damaged, the date, time, place and circumstances of the injury or damage, the nature of the injury or damage and the amount claimed as damages.”

After a hearing, etc., the trial court entered an order granting the motions to dismiss. From this order appellant appeals.

Appellants sole point on appeal is that they were not required to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2-2 because of the following provision of Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1977):

“(6) An action shall not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality, presents such claim in writing to the department of insurance, within three years such claim accrues and the department of insurance or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing. The failure of the department of insurance or the appropriate agency to make final disposition of a claim within six (6) months after it is filed shall be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted by counterclaim pursuant to section 768.14, Florida Statutes.”

In our recent opinion in Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), this court reasoned that the 60 day notice provision of Section 2-2 of the Code is in conflict with the three year notice period provided by Section 768.28(6).

Based upon such conflict, this court held the 60 day notice provision of Section 2-2 to be invalid.

Because the Scavello case is on point with the issue presented by this appeal, the order entered by the trial court dismissing appellants’ complaint with prejudice must be reversed.

Reversed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Cooper v. Dade Cnty., 373 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …PER CURIAM. Reversed. Scavella v. Fernandez, 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Perez v. Miami Dade Water & Sewer Authority, 372 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).…
  • Cooper v. Dade Cnty., 384 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …e-enacted as Art. VIII, § 6(e), Fla. Const, of 1968). Accord, Baradat v. Metropolitan Dade County, 377 So. 2d 256 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Verhunce v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So. 2d 640 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Perez v. Miami Dade Water & Sewer Authority, 372 So. 2d 185 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). Because Section 768.28 did not become effective until January 1, 1975, 15 days after the accident in question, the holding in Scavella is not directly controlling. Its reasoning, however, is. Section 768.28(6) provides that no to…

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