STUART A. MCDONALD, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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An insurance company sought to deny uninsured motorist coverage to its named insured for injuries sustained while operating a motorcycle not listed on the policy. The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment, holding that exclusionary clauses reducing uninsured motorist coverage scope are impermissible under Florida statutory law.
An insurer cannot insert exclusionary provisions that reduce the scope of uninsured motorist coverage required by statute with respect to persons insured under the policy. The exclusionary clause at issue is impermissible and has no effect on McDonald's claim for coverage.
[1] An automobile liability insurance policy's exclusionary clause that reduces the scope of uninsured motorist coverage required by statute is impermissible and has no effec…
[2] An automobile insurer cannot insert exclusionary provisions in a policy which reduce the scope of uninsured motorist coverage required by statute with respect to "persons…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in not less than the limits of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured for bodily injury... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles”
Establishes the statutory mandate for uninsured motorist coverage that protects 'persons insured thereunder' without distinction based on vehicle type
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcDonald held an automobile liability policy with Southeastern Fidelity that listed only his Volkswagen as an insured vehicle, though he also owned a …
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
The trial court upheld the validity of a clause in an automobile liability policy ex- eluding uninsured motorist benefits for injuries to an insured while operating a vehicle not listed in the policy. We reverse.
Appellant, Stuart A. McDonald, Jr. (McDonald), was the named insured under an automobile liability policy issued by appel-lee, Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company (Southeastern). McDonald’s Volkswagen was the only vehicle listed as insured in his policy although McDonald also owned a motorcycle. The policy provided uninsured motorist protection which included specific coverage for bodily injury caused by a “hit-and-run automobile.” The policy, however, expressly excluded coverage for “bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured
On May 7, 1976, while riding his motorcycle, McDonald was struck and injured by a hit-and-run automobile. McDonald claimed under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy. Southeastern denied coverage, whereupon McDonald filed a demand for arbitration. Southeastern responded by petitioning the circuit court for declaratory relief to the effect that McDonald’s claim was excluded from coverage because, when injured, he was “occupying an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by [him].” The court entered summary judgment in favor of Southeastern stating that “the motor vehicle which (McDonald) was operating at the time of the accident was not listed on said policy as an insured vehicle . . . .” This appeal by McDonald ensued.
Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1975) (amended 1976) provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in not less than the limits of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured for bodily injury, [or such lower limits complying with the company s rating plan as may be selected by the named insured,] under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom
(Emphasis added.)
In Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971), the supreme court held that an automobile insurer cannot insert exclusionary provisions in a policy which reduce the scope of coverage required by the statute with respect to “persons insured thereunder.” See also Lee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 339 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Accordingly, the exclusionary clause upon which Southeastern relied is impermissible and has no effect on McDonald’s claim for uninsured motorist coverage. Consequently, the trial judge erred in upholding the validity of the exclusionary clause.
We vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We grant appellant’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal; conditioned, however, on appellant’s ultimate recovery in the trial court. § 627.428, Fla. Stat. (1977); Dixie Farms, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 343 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Hart v. Bankers Fire and Casualty Co., 320 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Dawson v. Blue Cross Association, 293 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Should appellant recover a judgment, then the trial judge shall, on appropriate notice, assess reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered on this appeal.
OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
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Wen-Dic Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mainlands Constr. Co., Inc., 463 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…think that is within the statutory purpose. [*1190] Accordingly, I would grant appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees on appeal, conditioned on its ultimately prevailing in the trial court. See, e.g., McDonald v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Co., 373 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Segelstrom v. Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 233 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). I concur in the majority’s decision in all other respects.…
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Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. ST. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007)…his case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also GRANT the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees on appeal, conditioned, however, on appellant’s ultimate recovery in the trial court. See McDonald v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 94 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). I. BACKGROUND The procedural history, facts, and issues of this case are summarized in our previous opinion, published at 383 F. 3d 1273 (11th Cir.2004). For purposes of background, this appeal arises out of a lengthy and c…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971)
- LEE v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Bell v. State, 293 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Dawson v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 293 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Dixie Farms, Inc. v. The HERTZ Corp., 343 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Lafayette Hart, Jr. v. Bankers Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)