PATRICIA A. HILL, APPELLANT,
v.
JESSIE PARKS, APPELLEE
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In this paternity and child support case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant was the natural father of her child. The appellate court found that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, and that the defendant failed to offer competent evidence to contradict her claim.
The appellate court held that the evidence presented by the plaintiff, uncontradicted except by inadmissible hearsay from the defendant, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of the child's legitimacy. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for entry of an order declaring the defendant to be the father and awarding child support, attorney's fees, and court costs.
[1] The presumption of legitimacy of a child is rebuttable.
[2] Evidence of a father's acknowledgment of paternity, visits with the child, and financial contributions can be sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the testimony and evidence offered, taken as a whole, fails to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of the child herein”
The trial court's reasoning for denying the plaintiff's paternity and child support claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePatricia Hill, who was married at the time of conception but had not lived with or had sexual relations with her husband for over seven years, met Jes…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant filed a complaint against appel-lee alleging that he was the natural father of her infant child and seeking child support. Appellee in his answer denied that allegation. After hearing, the trial court found “that the testimony and evidence offered, taken as a whole, fails to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of the child herein, Eldridge v. Eldridge [153 Fla. 873], 16 So. 2d 163 (Fla.1944); Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla.1976) . . . ” and denied the relief sought. This appeal followed timely. We reverse.
We are well aware that there exists a strong presumption of the legitimacy of children. Gammon v. Cobb, supra; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944). Nevertheless, the presumption is rebuttable. Williams v. Estate of Long, 338 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Appellant was married at the time of conception, but had neither lived nor had sexual intercourse with her husband for over seven years. During most of that time she was unaware of his whereabouts. She met appellee in July, 1973, and began dating and having sexual relations with him. Approximately one year later the child was born. Appellant testified that she did not have sexual intercourse with any other man during this period of time.
The witnesses for appellant testified that on at least one occasion appellee acknowledged that he was the father of the child. He signed a statement filed with the Florida Department of Welfare agreeing to provide milk and food for the child, although he testified that he did not recall signing it. The evidence also shows that appellee brought his mother over to appellant’s home to see the child.
At the time his deposition was taken he testified that he did not know of any other men with whom appellant had had sexual intercourse during the pertinent time period, and he conceded that he could be the father of the child. At the hearing, however, he denied he was the father and asserted that other men had told him they were having sexual relations with appellant during the time period concerned. He did not name these other men. He admitted having given appellant money from time to time after the child was born, but said it was not for the support of the child, but to enhance his romantic relationship with appellant.
We disagree with appellee’s contention that this case is nothing more than a swearing match between the parties. Appellant presented more than simply her own testimony in support of her claim, while appel-lee failed to offer even a scintilla of competent, substantial evidence to refute the evidence adduced by appellant.
The trial judge, as trier of fact, had the right to reject the evidence presented by appellant and disregard it if he found it unbelievable and lacking in credence. Firstamerica Development Corp. v. County of Volusia, 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 755 (Fla.1975); Williams v. Canal Insurance Co., 177 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). However, there is no indication that the trial judge found this evidence unworthy of belief; rather, he concluded that it was insufficient. While the judgment of a trial court comes to an appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, reversal is nevertheless required where it is clear that the trial court misapplied the law to the facts before it, see Becklin v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 263 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), or that its ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence, see Roe v. Macy, 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We hold that the evidence presented by appellant, uncontra-dicted except by inadmissible hearsay on the part of appellee, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of the child’s legitimacy.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of appellee. On remand the trial court is directed to enter an order declaring appellee to be the father of the child and awarding support, attorney’s fees, and court costs to appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur.
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Tri-State Sys., Inc. v. Dep't OF Transp., 500 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…JOANOS, Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion. The trier of fact, the hearing officer in this case, has the right to reject evidence if he finds it unbelievable and lacking in credence. See Hill v. Parks, 373 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979). I do not construe the hearing officer’s ruling that the testimony of Tri-State’s witnesses was “self-serving and uncorroborated, and thus ... not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact” as being a determination tha…
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Lander v. Smith, 906 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…ng the relationship with his child unimpugned.” Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla.1993)(internal citation omitted). To this end, “there exists a strong presumption of the legitimacy of children.” Hill v. Parks, 373 So. 2d 376, 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163, 163 (1944); Casbar v. Dicanio, 666 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Dep’t of Revenue v. Cummings, 871 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), rev. granted, 895…
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Greco v. Tampa Wholesale Co., 417 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…g Court has not only the authority and power, but it is its duty, to reverse. (Emphasis added) Dixson v. Kattel, 311 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Hamilton v. Title Insurance Agency of Tampa, Inc., 338 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Hill v. Parks, 373 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In this case, the findings are contrary to the legal effect of the evidence. The evidence conclusively shows that the purpose of section 607.247(10) was fully realized. We find that appellants showed good and sufficient cause w…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873 (Fla. 1944)
- Becklin v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 263 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v. Cnty. OF Volusia, 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Alphonso A. Dozier v. State, 312 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1975)
- Shadrock Williams v. Est. of J. D. Long, 338 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- ROE v. Macy, 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Williams v. Canal Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)