EMMA L. ROE, APPELLANT,
v.
VERNON FREDERICK MACY, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-10-31
No. II-22
ERVIN, J., and MITCHELL, HENRY CLAY, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
363 So. 2d 616 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Emma Roe appeals a judgment dismissing her paternity claim against Vernon Macy. The appellate court reversed, finding that competent blood type evidence conclusively established Macy as the father and that the trial court's judgment was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.


Holding

The trial court's judgment for the appellee was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and must be reversed. The scientific evidence conclusively established that the putative father, not the alternative man with AB blood type, must be the father of the child.


Headnotes

[1] A judgment for a putative father in a paternity action is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when competent expert testimony, admitted without objection or e…

[2] Blood type evidence, when admitted without objection or exclusion, can be determinative in paternity actions, particularly when it excludes a putative father's paternity.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Expert testimony received by the court was to the effect that appellant's other consort, having AB type blood, could not possibly have been the father of a child having 0 type blood, born to a mother having 0 type blood.”

Establishes the uncontroverted scientific evidence that excluded the alternative father and supported appellant's claim

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Roe and appellee Macy had sexual relations from January through March 1976. Roe gave birth to a child on November 27, 1976. Macy admitted th…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SMITH, Acting Chief Judge.

SMITH, Acting Chief Judge.

Emma Roe appeals from a judgment entered for the defendant after a nonjury trial before the court on appellant’s claim that appellee is the father of and is responsible for the support of the child born to appellant on November 27, 1976. Chapter 742, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant urges that the trial court’s judgment for appellee is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that a judgment for appellant or a new trial should be ordered.

Appellee, the putative father, admitted numerous sexual encounters with appellant from January through March 1976, but he denied that he was the child’s father. The theory of his defense was that appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with another man in January 1976, and that there was no competent medical or other scientific evidence supporting appellant’s claim that he, not the other man, was the child’s father. On the contrary, there was competent expert testimony, admitted at the trial, that the other man was of blood type AB. Hospital records received in evidence without objection as well as the mother’s testimony which was objected to but not excluded from consideration, tended to prove that both mother and child were of blood type 0. Appellee likewise admitted by deposition introduced into evidence that he was of blood type 0. No countervailing evidence was offered by appellee. Expert testimony received by the court was to the effect that appellant’s other consort, having AB type blood, could not possibly have been the father of a child having 0 type blood, born to a mother having 0 type blood.

Appellee’s only theory of defense at trial was that appellant may have conceived as a result of sexual relations with another named man who, the evidence shows, could not have been the child’s father. The critical medical or scientific evidence, though objected to in some respects by appellee, was neither excluded nor stricken by any ruling appearing in the record. It appears, therefore, that the trial court’s unexplicated judgment for appellee is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence before the court. Contrast Yarmark v. Strickland, 193 So. 2d 212 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1967), in which medical or scientific evidence was lacking. Nor is this a case in which the putative father asserted that the mother may have had sexual relations with others unnamed, and the trial court found that her testimony denying it was unworthy of belief. E. g., Connor v. Jablonski, 254 A. 2d 763 (R.I.1969).

The judgment for appellee is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for a new trial. Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees is DENIED without prejudice to renew it in the trial court should appellant ultimately prevail.

ERVIN, J., and MITCHELL, HENRY CLAY, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hill v. Parks, 373 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
    …equired where it is clear that the trial court misapplied the law to the facts before it, see Becklin v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 263 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), or that its ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence, see Roe v. Macy, 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We hold that the evidence presented by appellant, uncontra-dicted except by inadmissible hearsay on the part of appellee, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of the child’s legitimacy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgmen…
  • …k court itself limited the effect of its decision by distinguishing it from a case in which “identification of the father is indicated by some admissible test which may be furnished by advancing medical knowledge.” Id. at 215. Later, in Roe v. Macy, 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), this court pointed out this distinguishing feature of Yarmark, that is, in Yarmark, “medical or scientific evidence was lacking.” Id. at 617. There can now be little doubt that medical knowledge has advanced far beyond that gen…
  • …ant as the father. Rather, the court was left to speculate which of the two men was the father of the child, which it may not do. Yarmark v. Strickland, 193 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1966), cert. denied 201 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1967). Compare Roe v. Macy, 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). [*693] Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed. DOWNEY, C. J., and LETTS, J., concur.…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw