MARY E. POLING, FORMERLY KNOWN AS MARY E. TRESIDDER, APPELLANT,
v.
HERBERT R. TRESIDDER, APPELLEE
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In this interlocutory appeal from a divorce-related property dispute, the court reversed a trial court judgment that awarded the ex-husband credit for home improvements made after the parties sold their marital residence and divided the proceeds equally. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the ex-husband's petition for enforcement because the original divorce judgment did not retain jurisdiction over post-dissolution property matters.
No. The trial court lacked authority to entertain the petition for enforcement because the original final judgment of dissolution did not retain jurisdiction. The court rejected the argument that the husband was simply asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction in determining the manner of enforcing the final judgment, as any events occurring after the final judgment without retained jurisdiction could not give the court new jurisdictional authority.
[1] A trial court lacks authority to entertain a petition seeking to determine an interest in a tenancy in common when the original final judgment of dissolution of marriage…
[2] A trial court's jurisdiction over a final judgment of dissolution of marriage is not revived by subsequent events affecting property rights, absent express retention of j…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The original final judgment of dissolution of marriage did not retain jurisdiction in the trial court. Absent such retention of jurisdiction, the trial court was without authority to entertain the "Petition for Enforcement"”
Establishes the core holding that lack of retained jurisdiction deprives the court of authority to entertain post-judgment enforcement petitions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced in 1973 pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated into the final judgment. The husband received exclusive pos…
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MOORE, Judge.
The parties to this interlocutory appeal were divorced in 1973. Pursuant to a property settlement agreement which was incorporated into the final judgment dissolving the marriage, the appellee, husband, was given exclusive possession of the marital residence for as long as he lived therein. Upon sale of the residence, the agreement provided for the parties to share equally the net gain from such sale.
In 1975 the residence was sold by mutual agreement of the parties and the net proceeds were equally divided between them. Claiming he had expended $2,243.54 on improvements for an increase in fair market value of $3,000.00, the appellee filed a petition for enforcement of the final judgment, seeking credit for his improvement expenditures. After a motion to dismiss was denied, issue was joined and the matter was tried on stipulated facts. The final judgment now under review awarded appellee $1,500.00. We reverse.
The original final judgment of dissolution of marriage did not retain jurisdiction in the trial court. Absent such retention of jurisdiction, the trial court was without authority to entertain the “Petition for Enforcement” which was not for enforcement but rather seeking to have the court determine an interest in a tenancy in common. See Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); McEachin v. McEachin, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). We reject appellee’s contention that he was simply asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction in determining the manner of enforcing its final judgment.
The property rights of the parties were determined by the final judgment of dissolution of marriage without retention of jurisdiction. Whatever subsequently transpired to affect those rights could not breathe new jurisdictional life into that final judgment. See Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So. 2d 423 (1948).
The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Deciding as we do, we find it unnecessary to discuss the second point on appeal dealing with the rights of cotenants.
The final judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for entry of an order granting appellant’s motion to dismiss.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD and LETTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…492 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The rule applies with equal force to a petition which is labelled as one for enforcement but which is, in actuality, an attempt to have the court determine an interest in a tenancy in common. Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), and cases there cited. The question is whether application of these principles precludes appellant from obtaining reimbursement for one-half of the expenses incurred in maintaining the former marital home where both the propert…
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Mandy v. Williams, 492 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982); Horton v. Horton, 330 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). We find particularly applicable to the present facts this court’s decision in Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cited to us by appellant, in which the parties’ property settlement agreement, incorporated into the final judgment, gave the husband exclusive possession of the marital home and provided that when the residence was sold the par…
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Garcia-Roque v. Roque-Velasco, 855 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…ppellant was seeking to enforce an oral agreement made subsequent to the dissolution of the marriage, the family division trial judge properly found lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). The majority then cites Poling v. Tresidder, 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). The Poling case, however, held that, because the original final judgment of dissolution of marriage did not retain jurisdiction in the trial court, the trial court was without authority to entertain the “Petition for Enforcement…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roslyn S. Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935 (Fla. 1948)
- Melvyn B. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- McEACHIN v. Dalton H. McEACHIN, 154 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- James W. Church v. Josephine Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)