ANTHONY LEE JONES, LUELLA TOOTS AND FANNIE MAE LEONARD, APPELLANTS,
v.
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., APPELLEE
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Three plaintiffs sought to enforce arbitration of uninsured motorist insurance claims against Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. The court affirmed a summary judgment limiting their recovery to amounts exceeding the tortfeasor's available policy limits, but reversed the dismissal of one plaintiff's claim for lack of evidentiary support.
The court held that limiting recovery to the excess over the tortfeasor's available policy limits was proper, and that the statute of limitations running on plaintiffs' claims against the tortfeasor did not shift liability to the insurer. However, the summary judgment dismissing Leonard's claim was improper because the record contained no proof supporting the claimed policy violation.
[1] An insurance company is not responsible under uninsured motorist coverage for any portion of an arbitration award that is not in excess of the total available policy limi…
[2] A party's claim may be dismissed if the record does not support the summary final judgment entered against them.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in the event there is an arbitration award to the plaintiffs, the defendant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, shall only be responsible under their uninsured motorist coverage for that portion of the arbitration award, if any, which is in excess of the total available policy limits afforded to the alleged third party tortfeasor.”
The limiting language of the summary judgment that restricted recovery to amounts exceeding the tortfeasor's available policy limits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnthony Lee Jones, Luella Toots, and Fannie Mae Leonard filed a declaratory action against Progressive Casualty Insurance Company to enforce arbitrati…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, Anthony Lee Jones, Luella Toots, and Fannie Mae Leonard were plaintiffs in a declaratory action to enforce arbitration of their claims for uninsured motorist benefits. An order granting summary judgment was entered requiring arbitration, but limiting recovery as follows:
“[I]n the event there is an arbitration award to the plaintiffs, the defendant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, shall only be responsible under their uninsured motorist coverage for that portion of the arbitration award, if any, which is in excess of the total available policy limits afforded to the alleged third party tortfeasor.”
After the filing of a motion for rehearing by Progressive, rehearing was granted upon the claim of Leonard. The motion shows that the ground for the rehearing was a claimed violation by Leonard of the policy in that she had released the tortfeasor’s insurance company in return for a settlement. No proofs of the claimed violation appear in the record. The subsequently-entered summary final judgment conformed to the prior order except that the claim of Leonard was dismissed.
The parties agree that the statute of limitations has run upon the claims of Jones, Toots and Leonard against the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Under these circumstances there was no error in limiting the recovery in arbitration against Progressive to the excess over the total available policy limits afforded to the alleged tortfeasor. Appellants suggest that the onus of having allowed the statute of limitations to run should be shifted from them to the defendant insurance company because the company contested their claims. We know of no authority for this position. Cf. DuPont v. Parker & Co. of Florida, 190 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
Because the record does not support the summary final judgment for Progressive against Leonard, that portion of the judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings as to that plaintiff. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed as to plaintiffs Jones and Toots, and reversed as to plaintiff Leonard.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded.
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Cited By
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Jones v. The Honorable Francis X. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…the rule enunciated in Robinson v. Gale, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), we treat these consolidated cases as a petition for a writ of certiorari and clarify our opinion rendered earlier in this cause. Jones v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 373 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In Jones v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., supra, we reviewed a summary judgment requiring arbitration of the claims for uninsured motorist benefits of Jones, Toots, and Leonard, another appellant. The summary judgment req…
Authorities Cited
- DuPONT v. Parker & Co. OF Fla., Inc., 190 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)