ANTHONY LEE JONES AND LUELLA TOOTS, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE HONORABLE FRANCIS X. KNUCK, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA AND PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, RESPONDENTS
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The trial court's action in entering a second summary judgment after the appellate court's mandate constituted a deviation from that mandate and is therefore quashed.
After the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment requiring arbitration and limiting recovery, the trial court entered a second summary judgment w…
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BASKIN, Judge.
In accordance with the rule enunciated in Robinson v. Gale, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), we treat these consolidated cases as a petition for a writ of certiorari and clarify our opinion rendered earlier in this cause. Jones v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 373 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
In Jones v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., supra, we reviewed a summary judgment requiring arbitration of the claims for uninsured motorist benefits of Jones, Toots, and Leonard, another appellant. The summary judgment required arbitration and also limited recovery to the amount of the arbitration award, if any, in excess of the policy limits of the alleged third party tortfeasor. On appeal, we affirmed this summary judgment as to Toots and Jones, noting that there was no error in limiting the amount of recovery because the insureds had allowed the statute of limitations to run against the alleged third party tortfeasor. Jones v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., supra.
After the issuance of our mandate affirming the summary judgment as to Jones and Toots, and without this court’s permission, the trial court entered yet another summary judgment. This second ruling opened the question of coverage for reconsideration and determined that Jones and Toots were not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because they had violated the provisions of their insurance policy by allowing the statute of limitations to run against the alleged third party tortfeasor. We hold that the action by the trial court constitutes a deviation from this court’s mandate. Compliance with our mandate is a purely ministerial act and the trial court may not depart from our mandate without our consent. O. P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1974); Modine Manufacturing Co. v. ABC Radiator, Inc., 367 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Mendelson v. Mendelson, 341 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
The order under review is quashed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Frazier v. State, 467 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…. 2d at 984-85. . Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 328 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla.1975) ("A trial court is without authority to alter or evade the mandate of an appellate court absent permission to do so."): Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla.3d DCA 1980) ("Compliance with [an appellate] mandate is a purely ministerial act and the trial court may not depart from [the] mandate without ... consent.”); Mendelson v. Mendelson, 341 So. 2d 811, 813-14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (“No principl…
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Milton v. R.C. Keith, 503 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…omes purely ministerial; its function is limited to implementing and effectuating the appellate court’s order or decree. O.P. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1974); Berger v. Leposky, 103 So. 2d 628 (Fla.1958); Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Following this court’s mandate affirming the May 12th order, the trial court had no further power over that order except to enforce it. Modine Mfg. Co. v. ABC Radiator, Inc., 367 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA) (general rule is that ju…
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MacKin v. Applestein, 404 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…inly correct. Indeed, the trial court was required to comply with our appellate mandate directing that this be done and had no authority whatever to do otherwise. O. P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla.1974); Jones v. Knuck, 388 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Robinson v. Gale, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Modine Manufacturing Co. v. ABC Radiator, Inc., 367 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla.1979); Mendelson v. Mendelson, 341 So. 2d 811, 813-14 (Fla.…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- O. P. Corp. & Wiggs & Maale Constr. Co., Inc. v. The Vill. OF N. Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1974)
- Modine Mfg. Co. v. ABC Radiator, Inc., 367 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Zoto's Int'l, Inc. v. Pinkus, 341 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Mendelson v. Lavine Mendelson, 341 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Nilza Kallos, M.D. v. Blouin, 380 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Jones v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)