RUSSELL NEWSOME, JOHN E. WALSINGHAM, BROWN FINCH, D. C. FINCH, AS TRUSTEES OF THE INDEPENDENT BAPTIST CHURCH OF SUNNY HILL AND FORTUNE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIE R. FINCH, D/B/A SAMSON RADIO AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, AND WEST FLORIDA NATURAL GAS COMPANY, AND WEST FLORIDA GAS AND FUEL COMPANY OF DEFUNIAK SPRINGS, APPELLEES
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Fortune Insurance Company paid a fire-loss claim to a church and obtained a release purporting to discharge all claims against Fortune and any other parties responsible for the fire. When Fortune later sued third parties (the gas companies) for negligently installing heating/cooling equipment that caused the fire, those defendants claimed the release barred the suit. The court reversed summary judgment, holding that a general release of one tortfeasor does not bar a negligence action against separate, unrelated tortfeasors.
The court held that the release does not bar Fortune's negligence action against the third-party defendants. While Florida law permits a release to one joint tortfeasor to release all joint tortfeasors, such a release can only relieve persons other than the named party if a jointly held underlying obligation exists. Here, no joint obligation existed because Fortune's obligation was purely contractual while the defendants' potential liability was tort-based, and the two obligations arose from separate and distinct transactions.
[1] A release given to one party does not discharge the liability of another party unless there is a jointly held underlying obligation between them.
[2] The release of one joint obligor does not release other joint obligors unless a jointly held underlying obligation exists.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida law is clear that a release given to one joint tortfeasor stating that it releases all other firms, corporations, and individuals does release all joint tortfeasors. This is so despite the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act because the wording of the Act excludes releases which so state.”
Establishes the general rule that a release to one joint tortfeasor can release all joint tortfeasors under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFortune Insurance paid a fire-loss claim to the Independent Baptist Church of Sunny Hill and obtained a release that purported to discharge all action…
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PER CURIAM.
Summary judgment was entered for appellees on their argument that a release given by appellant church (church) to appellant Insurance company (Fortune) barred Fortune’s negligence action against them. Fortune argues this was error. We agree and reverse.
Fortune paid a fire-loss claim to the church and obtained a release. The release acknowledged receipt of payment in
“. . . final release and discharge of, all actions, claims and demands whatsoev er that now exist, or may hereafter accrue against Fortune Insurance Company and any other person, corporation, association or partnership charged with responsibility for injuries to the person and property of the Undersigned, and the consequences flowing therefrom . .
Fortune then filed a tort action against the appellee alleging negligent installation of the heating and cooling system in the church which resulted in the fire. Appellee after answering, raised by motion for summary judgment the release, claiming that the release operated to bar suit against them for any negligence associated with the fire.
Florida law is clear that a release given to one joint tortfeasor stating that it releases all other firms, corporations, and individuals does release all joint tortfeasors. This is so despite the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act because the wording of the Act excludes releases which so state. Quarterman v. City of Jacksonville, 347 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). It is also clear that the release of one joint obligor is the release of all other joint obli-gors, Penza v. Neckles, 344 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1977). However, for such a release to relieve anyone other than the named person, there must first exist some jointly held underlying obligation from which the person claiming the benefit of the release may be relieved. The obligation should arise out of a unitary or related transaction such as a joint contract obligation, Penza, supra a joint judgment obligation, or a tort with more than one tortfeasor, Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In the instant case, that joint underlying obligation does not exist.
Fortune had a contract obligation to the church which it fulfilled. Fortune was not a joint tortfeasor with appellees; Fortune and the appellees did not have any joint contractual obligation. Therefore, the law as to general releases does not apply.
We find no support for appellees’ position that the release of Fortune on its contract obligation should release them from any potential tort liability. The obligations are separate and distinct; the facts creating the obligations and the law governing them are different and we decline to apply the concept of general releases to the factual situation herein.
Due to our ruling on appellants’ first point we do not reach the procedural point raised.
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Lapidus v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 389 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…n law rule that the release of a joint and several obligor releases all others, since the co-defendant contractor and engineer, whom Citizens Federal released, were not obligors on the contract between Lapidus and Citizens Federal, Newsome v. Finch, 375 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); compare Penza v. Neckles, supra. Affirmed. . In pertinent part, the trial court’s instruction read: “I instruct you that the Plaintiff, Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association, is not entitled to recover from the Defend…
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Mack Indus. Div. OF Hollywood Land Co., Inc. v. Frank J. Baker Gen. Contractor, Inc., 456 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…h no record support exists. Joint obligors are those who share an obligation arising out of a unitary or related transaction such as a joint contract obligation, a joint judgment obligation, or a tort with more than one tortfeasor. Newsome v. Finch, 375 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Appellee presented no evidence that Sunshine had undertaken any obligation on the contract for materials, nor is Sunshine a joint judgment debtor — it has never been a party to the action sub judice. Accordingly, we reverse and…
Authorities Cited
- Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Penza v. Neckles, 344 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1977)
- Theo Miller v. State, 347 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Quarterman v. City OF Jacksonville, 347 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)