CLARENCE E. OWEN, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES E. OWEN, APPELLEE
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In this guardianship appeal, Clarence Owen challenged his guardian's approval of attorney fees paid to Frank Byron for criminal defense and competency restoration services. The court held that fees for the original criminal defense contract were proper since Owen was competent when he contracted, but reversed the approval of fees for competency determination services that lacked documentation of reasonable value.
Fees paid pursuant to the original criminal defense contract entered while Owen was competent were properly approved without documentation of services, as Owen's subsequent incompetency did not retroactively void the contract and the guardian's ratification was sufficient. However, the $1,440 in fees for competency determination services must be disallowed because the guardian failed to present evidence of their reasonable value.
[1] A party's prior adjudication of temporary insanity for committing a crime does not retroactively render them legally incompetent to enter into a fee contract for legal se…
[2] A guardian's ratification of a previously executed fee contract and payment of fees pursuant to its terms obviates the need to present evidence of the reasonable value of…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The court's acceptance of Owen's plea that he was temporarily insane at the time he committed the crime did not have the retroactive effect of making him legally incompetent to enter into the fee contract.”
Explains why fees for the original criminal defense contract were valid despite Owen's subsequent incompetency
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClarence Owen contracted with attorney Frank Byron to defend him against criminal charges while competent. Owen was later declared incompetent and his…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellant Clarence E. Owen, contracted with his attorney, Frank B. Byron, to defend him against criminal charges. Owen was subsequently declared incompetent and his brother, Charles E. Owen, was appointed his legal guardian. Attorney Byron was then retained by the guardian to represent Owen in defense of a civil suit and in later proceedings which led to judicial restoration of Owen’s competency.
Following the restoration of Owen’s competency, the guardian submitted his final accounting to the court and sought approval of all fees paid to Byron from the guardianship account. Owen objected on the ground that he was not competent at the time he contracted for Byron’s services in the criminal ease, and that the guardian had not presented evidence to support the reasonable value of the services rendered on any of the matters. The court overruled the objection and entered an order approving payment of all fees. This appeal ensued.
On oral argument, Owen conceded that the award of fees in conjunction with Attorney Byron’s defense of the civil litigation cannot now be contested since those fees were judicially approved during the civil litigation and no appeal was taken from that order. He does, however, challenge fees paid in conjunction with the contract for representation against the criminal charges and in proceedings which led to restoration of his competency. As to the fees paid pursuant to the contract, we find no error. Owen entered into the contract to pay Byron a fixed fee for specified legal services while he was legally competent. The court’s acceptance of Owen’s plea that he was temporarily insane at the time he committed the crime did not have the retroactive effect of making him legally incompetent to enter into the fee contract. Subsequent to the adjudication of incompetency, Owen’s guardian ratified the contract and paid Byron pursuant to its terms. Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the guardian to document the services performed by Byron or to present evidence on the reasonable value of the services.
As to the remaining attorney’s fees, we think Owen’s contention has merit. The guardian paid Attorney Byron $1,440 in addition to expenses in connection with services rendered to determine Owen’s legal competency. The court erred in approving this payment without evidence of the reasonable value of the services. Consequently, such award cannot stand. Lucom v. Atlantic National Bank of West Palm Beach, 97 So. 2d 478 (Fla.1957); see also Dierickx v. Wisehart, 195 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
Accordingly, we direct the trial court to enter an amended order disallowing $1,440 of the fees paid to Attorney Byron. Otherwise, the order appealed from is affirmed.
GRIMES, C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
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Cilley v. The First Nat'l Bank OF Mount Dora, 396 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…ERSED. DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . Appellant’s verified petition specifies the services performed with more particularity than the affidavit approved in In re Guardianship of Berg, 348 So. 2d 361 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). . Owen v. Owen, 376 So. 2d 26 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). . Many of the documents listed in appellant’s exhibit A “schedule of services” can also be found throughout the record, for example, preparation of various oaths of guardians, designation of resident agents and acceptance, and th…
Authorities Cited
- Virginia Willys Lucom (Formerly Virginia Willys de Landa) v. Atl. Nat'l Bank OF W. Palm Beach, 97 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1957)
- Dierickx v. Wisehart, 195 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- VAN Voorhis v. Gutman, 195 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)