EUGENE L. CAMERON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cameron appealed his conviction, claiming he was entitled to discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule because the 180-day period should have commenced on April 5 (when Orange County placed a detainer) rather than April 8 (when Orange County actually took custody). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that a detainer does not start the speedy trial clock running.
The 180-day speedy trial period is measured from the date of actual custody (April 8), not from the date a detainer is placed (April 5). A detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county does not commence the running of the speedy trial time under the rule.
[1] A detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county does not commence the running of the speedy trial time.
[2] The speedy trial rule's time period begins to run when a defendant is taken into actual custody by the jurisdiction seeking to prosecute, not when a detainer is merely lo…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the running of the speedy trial time.”
This quote from State v. Bassham establishes the controlling legal standard that the court applied to reject Cameron's argument that the speedy trial period should begin on April 5.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCameron was arrested on April 5, 1977, in Escambia County as an escapee from a South Carolina prison. On the same day, Orange County officials were no…
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ANSTEAD, HARRY LEE, Associate Judge.
At issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191.
The trial court concluded that appellant was arrested on April 5, 1977, in Escambia County as an escapee from prison in South Carolina. On the same day Escambia County officials notified Orange County officials of appellant’s arrest and thereafter appellant was also detained for charges pending in Orange County. The parties agreed that Orange County would be given priority in taking custody of and trying appellant on state charges before he would be released to South Carolina. Orange County officials actually took appellant into custody on April 8, 1977. Thereafter, appellant was brought to trial on the charges involved herein within 180 days of April 8 but more than 180 days after April 5. The appellant claims speedy trial time should be measured from April 5, when a detainer was requested by Orange County, rather than from April 8 as ultimately determined by the trial court.
In State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977) the Supreme Court held:
. a detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the running of the speedy trial time.
The appellant contends that Bassham should not apply since it is undisputed that appellant would be tried on the Orange County charges before being tried on the South Carolina charges. We fail to see how this makes a difference. Bassham, supra, clearly holds that a detainer does not start the 180 day speedy trial time running as provided for in Rule 3.191(a)(1). We cannot depart from the Supreme Court’s mandate.
The appellant further contends that such a holding may well lead to abuse by the state since the state may unreasonably delay in taking custody of the appellant while he is detained in another county. Again we must disagree. First, there is no claim or showing of such abuse here. Indeed, Orange County officials took custody of the appellant within three days of receiving notice of his arrest. More importantly, the state is prohibited by the Constitution from unreasonably delaying in bringing the appellant to trial. Hence, if in fact the state is guilty of unreasonable delay in securing the custody of a defendant once a detainer is lodged, and such delay ultimately results in a deprivation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, such defendant will be entitled to discharge.
The judgment on appeal is hereby affirmed.
MOORE, JOHN H. II, and WARREN, LAMAR, Associate Judges, concur.
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Holmes v. The Honorable Kenneth M. Leffler, 411 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…DAUKSCH, Chief Judge. It is ordered that the Motion for Rehearing and Motion for Rehearing En Banc filed by Respondent are denied. The instant case and Cameron v. State, 376 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979), are clearly not in conflict. In the instant case the time for speedy trial began running at the time of Petitioner’s arrest in Seminole County, which was before he was detained by Orange County. In Cameron, this court held, prop…
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Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…fendant already in custody for one offense precipitates the running of the speedy trial period for the second offense giving rise to the detainer. This is clearly contrary to Florida law. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Cameron v. State, 376 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). The main thrust of the appeal is the argument that a trial judge cannot retain jurisdiction over “the first third of the maximum sentence imposed” under section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), when that sentence is life, b…
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State v. Dukes, 443 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…ody under the Du-val County charges. The capias was treated as a detainer which is not the equivalent of an arrest, and which does not commence the running of the speedy trial period. See State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Cameron v. State, 376 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979); State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In Grace, the court held that when Grace was imprisoned in Walton County while under a charge in Okaloosa County and did not demand trial, the State had a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977)