STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
CHARLES A. BASSHAM, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1977-09-15
No. 50387
OVERTON, C. J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
352 So. 2d 55 Florida Supreme Court (1977) Negative Treatment
Cited by 53 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts over whether a detainer placed by one county on a prisoner held by another county starts the speedy trial clock. The Court held that a detainer does not constitute custody for speedy trial purposes, and that the 180-day period begins only upon formal arrest on the charges for which the detainer was issued.


Holding

The Court held that a detainer placed by one county on a prisoner held by another county does not constitute custody for speedy trial purposes. The 180-day speedy trial period commences only when the defendant is formally arrested on the charges for which the detainer was issued, not when the detainer is placed.


Headnotes

[1] A detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the ru…

[2] The 180-day time period for speedy trial commences to run when a defendant is formally arrested on the charges giving rise to the speedy trial demand.

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Key Quotes

“The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.”

The controlling statutory language requiring custody to be as a result of the specific conduct giving rise to the crime charged.

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Facts & Procedural History

Bassham was in custody of the Hillsborough County Sheriff when Pasco County placed a detainer on him on July 28, 1975. After being transferred to Polk…

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Opinion of the Court
KARL, Justice.

KARL, Justice.

This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in State v. Bassham, 336 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), which directly conflicts with State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) and O’Bryan v. State, 326 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), certiorari denied 336 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1976).

While respondent was in the custody of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, a detainer was placed on him by the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office on July 28, 1975. After having been transferred to Polk County as a result of a detainer filed by the Polk County Sheriff’s Office, respondent was delivered to the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office on March 1, 1976, at which time he was served with a capias for his arrest. He was arraigned, and trial was set for April 1, 1976, more than 180 days after the formal arrest of respondent. Relying on State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), the trial court granted respondent’s pro se motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule, although he recognized that Sutton, supra, conflicts with State ex rel. Williams v. Eastmoore, supra.

The sole question before us for review is whether a detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule from which time speedy trial time commences to run.

We do not agree with the District Court’s affirmative response to this issue, but rather, we would adopt the rationale of the District Court, First District, in Eastmoore, supra, and O’Bryan, supra.

Rule 3.191(a)(1), Fla.R.Crim.P., provides in pertinent part:

“The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.”

Relator, in Eastmoore, supra, sought to prohibit his trial on three counts of armed robbery on the ground that he had been denied his right to speedy trial. Awaiting trial on charges unrelated to the armed robbery offenses, relator had been confined in the Palm Beach County jail during October, 1973. While he was confined there, officials from Putnam County, in October of 1973, placed a detainer against him oh the basis of the armed robbery charges which arose in Putnam County. The District Court denied the suggestion for writ of prohibition and explained:

“At the time the detainer was issued against relator he was not in custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode arising in Putnam County but rather was in custody exclusively on the charges in Palm Beach County. The detainer did not place relator in custody as a result of his conduct in Putnam County. He was not placed in custody as a result of his alleged criminal episode in Putnam County until he was freed on the-Palm Beach charges and formally arrested on the Putnam County charges.

“We hold that under F.R.Cr.P. 3.191(a)(1) the 180-day time period in which the state had to bring relator to trial commenced to run when he was formally arrested on the Putnam County charges. . . . ”

In O’Bryan, supra, the First District Court of Appeal reiterated the proposition that “[t]he detainer warrant is not equivalent for purposes of speedy trial considerations, to an arrest on indictment or information.” This Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of this decision. Accordingly, we hold that a detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the running of the speedy trial time.

To the extent that Hargrove v. State, 281 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), and State v. Sutton, supra, are inconsistent herewith, they are overruled.

The decision of the District Court under review is quashed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (24 total)

  • Gaskins v. State, 415 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
    …roposition that placing a detainer upon a defendant already in custody for one offense precipitates the running of the speedy trial period for the second offense giving rise to the detainer. This is clearly contrary to Florida law. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Cameron v. State, 376 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). The main thrust of the appeal is the argument that a trial judge cannot retain jurisdiction over “the first third of the maximum sentence imposed” under section 947.-16(3), Florida S…
  • Cameron v. State, 376 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979)
    …but more than 180 days after April 5. The appellant claims speedy trial time should be measured from April 5, when a detainer was requested by Orange County, rather than from April 8 as ultimately determined by the trial court. In State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977) the Supreme Court held: . a detainer placed by one county for a prisoner held by another county is not considered custody within the contemplation of the speedy trial rule so as to commence the running of the speedy trial time. The appe…
  • State v. Michaela Fives, 409 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
    …in Dade County on October 16, 1980, that amounted to his arrest and custody for the criminal episode that gave rise to the Broward charges and commenced the passage of time for trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Williams v. Eastmoore, 297 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In any event, on February 12, 1981, a capias was issued on the Broward charges and served on appellee in Dade County and she…

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