ARTHUR J. GRIFFITH, APPELLANT,
v.
THELMA J. GRIFFITH, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's awards of alimony and property disposition. The appellate court reversed the award of the marital home as lump sum alimony, modified permanent alimony to rehabilitative alimony, and affirmed the denial of special equity in the apartment complex.
The court reversed the lump sum alimony award as unjustified by the evidence, affirmed the denial of special equity in the apartment complex, and modified the permanent alimony award to rehabilitative alimony to continue until the youngest child reaches age 18 or leaves the mother's custody, whichever is earlier.
[1] An award of lump sum alimony is improper without a showing of need by the recipient spouse.
[2] A claim for special equity in marital property requires specific evidence to warrant such an award.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse the award of lump sum alimony as not justified under the evidence in this record.”
The court's holding on the primary issue of whether the marital home award as lump sum alimony was proper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 16 years and had two children, ages 13 and 8. They owned an apartment complex with $50,000 equity and a Coral Gables home…
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellant husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, attacking the awards of alimony and the disposition of property.
The parties were married for 16 years and had two children, ages 13 and 8. They own two major pieces of property; one is an apartment complex with an equity of $50,000.00, the other is a Coral Gables home with an equity of $67,000.00. At the time of the divorce, the husband’s sole job was the operation and maintenance of the apartment complex. The wife is 37 years old; she has never worked outside the home during the marriage, with the exception of assisting her husband with the various apartment complexes they have owned. Before the marriage, she worked for a brief time as a telephone solicitor and, at the time of the final hearing, she expressed her intent to return to school to acquire secretarial skills so that she might get a job.
The final judgment awarded the wife $100.00 monthly for child support, $125.00 monthly permanent periodic alimony and the husband’s half interest in the marital home as lump sum alimony. The judgment also ordered the apartment complex to be held as tenants in common, the cars titled in the husband’s name to be sold and the proceeds divided, and other personal property to be divided.
The appellant contends: that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the marital home as lump sum alimony where there was no showing of need on the part of the wife; that the trial court erred in not awarding the husband a special equity in the apartment complex; that the trial court erred in granting permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony, the wife being able and having expressed her desire to return to the working world.
We reverse the award of lump sum alimony as not justified under the evidence in this record. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Meredith v. Meredith, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1978); Fraser v. Fraser, 368 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). We affirm the denial of the husband’s claim of special equity to the wife’s one-half interest in the apartment complex; his evidence failed to warrant such an award. Gonzales v. Gonzales, 156 So. 2d 206 (Fla.3d DCA 1963); Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976); Evans v. Evans, 337 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We modify the award of permanent alimony to make same rehabilitative. The wife was employable, willing to seek work and not in need of permanent alimony. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Crees v. Crees, 342 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Manning v. Manning, 353 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Zaugg v. Zaugg, 357 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Nott v. Nott, 368 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Therefore, so much of the final judgment as awarded the wife the husband’s interest in the residence as lump sum alimony is reversed. The final judgment awarding permanent alimony is modified by amending it to provide for rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony, the rehabilitative alimony to continue until the youngest child of the parties reaches 18 years of age or leaves his mother’s custody, whichever is earlier. In all other respects the final judgment under review is affirmed.
Reversed in part, modified in part, affirmed in part.
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Citator
Cited By
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Creel v. Creel, 378 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…tify the award as lump sum alimony of the husband’s interest in the marital home, which was the primary asset of the parties. See Meridith v. Meridith, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1978); Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Griffith v. Griffith, 376 So. 2d 418 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Fraser v. Fraser, 368 So. 2d 97 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). I would therefore reverse that provision of the final judgment and remand the cause for consideration of granting the wife the exclusive possession of the home for the period of h…
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Roscoe Eugene Caldwell v. Caldwell, 383 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…estion of the amount of alimony, a review of the evidence reveals that the wife’s age, financial assets, and present capacity to undertake gainful employment amply support the reasonableness of the trial court’s discretion. See Griffith v. Griffith, 376 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); and Bateman v. Bateman, 301 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Finally, with regard to the husband’s obligation to pay for the wife’s indebtedness for necessities, there has been no showing of any abuse of discretion. In conclusion…
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Thomas v. Thomas, 377 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Meredith v. Meredith, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1978); Fraser v. Fraser, 368 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Martin v. Martin, 366 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), opinion filed October 11, 1979; Griffith v. Griffith, 376 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Accordingly, that portion of the final judgment awarding the wife the husband’s one-half interest in the marital home is reversed. We modify the requirement that the appellant supply the cost of private schooling to read that he…
Authorities Cited (13 total)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976)
- Tedford J. Cann v. Margery M. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Meridith v. Meridith, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1978)
- In re the Est. of Philip Siegel, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1978)
- Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 156 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Silas Ray Crees v. Mara King Crees, 342 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Manning v. Manning, 353 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Fraser v. Fay Fraser, 368 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Evans v. Evans, 337 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)