PLOYER P. HILL, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA O. HILL, APPELLEE
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In a Florida divorce appeal, the court reversed an order requiring the husband to pay the wife's $3,500 in attorneys' fees and $452.80 in costs. The court held that attorneys' fees in dissolution cases should only be awarded when necessary to equalize the parties' ability to secure legal counsel, and the financial record showed the wife was in an equal or better financial position than the husband.
The court reversed and remanded, holding that attorneys' fees in dissolution cases should only be awarded to ensure that both parties have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel, and that such fees are inappropriate when the payee spouse is in an equal or superior financial position.
[1] The purpose of awarding attorney fees in dissolution of marriage proceedings is to ensure that both parties have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal cou…
[2] In dissolution of marriage proceedings, a party with assets and income equal to or greater than the other party may not be awarded attorneys' fees and costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the new dissolution of marriage law has not changed, in our view, from the purposes contemplated by its predecessors; that purpose is to insure that both parties will have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel.”
Establishes the foundational purpose of attorneys' fee awards in dissolution cases—to equalize the parties' ability to afford counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing dissolution of marriage, the wife possessed assets worth $73,000 to $96,000 and had income from the husband of approximately $10,400, with e…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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HERSEY, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order directing the husband in a dissolution of marriage proceeding to pay the wife’s attorneys’ fees in the sum of $3,500 and her costs of $452.80. The sole issue on appeal is the appropriateness of this order. The record discloses that subsequent to dissolution of the marriage the wife had assets in the range of $73,000 to $96,000, the difference resulting from conflicting estimates of value. The wife had income from the husband of approximately $10,400, and could reasonably expect a small return from her own investments. The husband has assets worth $7,800 and income of $32,000, from which he was required to pay the wife’s alimony.
The social utility behind the no-fault divorce law is expressed in the following language of Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973):
The new concept of the marriage relation implicit in the so-called “no-fault” divorce law enacted by the legislature in 1971 [Chapter 71 — 241, Laws of 1971; Chapter 61, F.S.] places both parties to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing equal burdens in the event of dissolution.
In augmentation of the same social philosophy, the Supreme Court, quoting from Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1973), held in Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla.1976):
. the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the new dissolution of marriage law has not changed, in our view, from the purposes contemplated by its predecessors; that purpose is to insure that both parties will have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel. The foregoing rule was adopted by this Court in Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So .2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
The record discloses that the wife was in an equal or perhaps better position financially to pay attorneys’ fees and costs than was the husband.
Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that an amended judgment be rendered consistent with this holding.
For the same reasons we deny appellee’s Motion For Attorneys’ Fees on this appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DOWNEY, C. J., and LETTS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Burton A. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 397 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ty of the wife to pay her own attorney’s fees. Johnson v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Deatherage v. Deatherage (Fla. 5th DCA) (opinion filed February 25, 1981); Hill v. Hill, 376 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Ritter v. Ritter, 362 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Butts v. Butts, 362 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). A…
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Yates v. Yates, 442 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…han is the husband. Carangi v. Carangi, 441 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); Greer v. Greer, 438 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983); Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); Epstein v. Epstein, 386 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980); Hill v. Hill, 376 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Bucci v. Bucci, 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. LARRY G. SMITH, WENTWORTH and JO ANOS, JJ., concur.…
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Epstein v. Epstein, 386 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…as on this record the wife is in a significantly superior financial position, when compared to the husband, to pay her attorneys fees and costs given the highly favorable financial result she has achieved by the final judgment herein. Hill v. Hill, 376 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Bucci v. Bucci, 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Affirmed in part; reversed in part.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976)
- Manly W. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Hernandez v. Hernandez, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)