ALFRED M. SCATTERGOOD, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGUERITE S. SCATTERGOOD, APPELLEE
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In this divorce case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an award of attorney's fees to the wife while affirming other aspects of the final judgment. The court held that because both parties had substantially equal net worth and the wife had independent income, she did not meet the legal standard for an attorney's fee award in dissolution of marriage proceedings.
The wife was not entitled to attorney's fees because she had the same financial ability as the husband to obtain legal representation. The purpose of attorney's fee awards in dissolution of marriage cases is to ensure both parties have reasonably equal ability to secure competent counsel, which was not met here.
[1] Periodic alimony may be awarded based on the parties' lavish lifestyle and other usual considerations.
[2] An award of attorney's fees is improper when a party has the financial ability to pay for their own legal counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the new dissolution of marriage law has not changed, in our view, from the purposes contemplated by its predecessors; that purpose is to insure that both parties will have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel.”
Establishes the legal standard for attorney's fees awards in divorce proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband (realtor with $440,000 net worth and ~$20,000 income) and wife (~$300,000 net worth and $19,500 income) were both in their early fifties a…
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DOWNEY, Chief Judge.
The wife had a net worth of approximately $300,000 when these proceedings were commenced; that estate produced income in the amount of $19,500. The husband’s net worth was approximately $440,-000 and his reported income for 1976 was approximately $20,000. After the final -judgment the parties’ net worth was approximately equal. The husband is a realtor owning an active successful real estate agency. Both parties were in their early fifties and in bad health.
The parties lived rather lavishly and that factor, along with the other usual considerations, supports the trial judge’s award of periodic alimony. However, different considerations pertain in determining an award of attorney’s fees. Since the parties stand on an equal footing as far as their net worth is concerned and the wife has income of approximately $19,500 per annum (not to mention the $600 per month alimony) she does not meet the test for an allowance of attorney’s fees. As the Supreme Court stated in Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla.1976):
“ ‘. . . the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the new dissolution of marriage law has not changed, in our view, from the purposes contemplated by its predecessors; that purpose is to insure that both parties will have reasonably the same ability to secure competent legal counsel. Here, the wife is clearly on equal if not superior footing with the husband to secure such counsel. . . .
In a very recent ease1 the First District Court of Appeal followed the Cummings rule, saying:
“Although there are conflicting estimates of the parties’ respective net worths, the record reveals that both parties have substantial assets. This court has held consistently that when a party has been shown to have the ability to pay for the services of his or her attorney, it is improper to require the other party to pay for those services, even though he or she may have the ability.”
See also Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
Unquestionably the wife here had the same financial ability to obtain legal representation as did the husband.
Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed as to the award of attorney’s fee to the wife and in all other respects the final judgment is affirmed.
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
CROSS and BERANEK, JJ., concur. . Butts v. Butts, 362 So. 2d 349, 1st DCA Opinion filed August 10, 1978.
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Lawrence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…n award is discretionary. The purpose of an award of attorney’s fees is to insure that both parties will reasonably have the same ability to secure competent legal counsel. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976); Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The record supports an award in the instant case and the amount is within the bounds of the trial court’s discretion. We have considered the other points raised by appellant but find them to be without merit. The order appeale…
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Earlene P. Bullard v. Bullard, 380 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…rther imbalance in her favor. Thus, there is no basis for the requirement that the husband pay or contribute to Mrs. Bullard’s attorney’s fees, and that provision must be stricken from the final judgment. See also, e. g., Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), and cases cited. [*1093] It was also error to require the husband to file a separate action for partition of the parties’ home.4 Bullard’s amended complaint properly prayed for partition under Sec. 64.041, Fla.Stat. (1977), and…
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Golden v. Zina Golden, 410 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…t necessary that a spouse be completely unable to pay attorneys’ fees in order to be entitled to receive them. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Patterson v. Patterson, 399 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Scattergood v. Scattergood, 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The effect of the majority opinion is to diminish the alimony award, Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Wilds v. Wilds, 399 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), a result not contemplated by the trial court. If that is the intent of the m…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976)
- Hernandez v. Hernandez, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Colman v. Colman, 314 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Elliot W. Butts, Jr. v. Butts, 362 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)