ROWE & MITCHELL AND SHELBY MUTUAL INS. CO., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
JIMMIE L. RODGERS, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLEE, AND BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, SARASOTA COUNTY AND EMPLOYERS SERVICE CORPORATION, CROSS-APPELLANTS AND APPELLEES
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In this workers' compensation appeal, the court affirmed an industrial claims judge's order apportioning psychiatric medical benefits between two employers whose successive industrial accidents both contributed to the claimant's need for treatment. The court held that Section 440.42(3) authorizes apportionment of medical costs between multiple carriers based on their responsibility, distinguishing this inter-carrier dispute from the employee-employer apportionment prohibited by Section 440.02(18).
The court held that Section 440.02(18) does not prohibit apportionment of medical costs between multiple carriers in inter-carrier disputes. Rather, Section 440.42(3) empowers the judge of industrial claims to apportion medical costs between employers/carriers according to their responsibility. Section 440.02(18) was enacted to prevent apportionment between employee and employer/carrier, not between carriers themselves.
[1] A judge of industrial claims has jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies between carriers regarding liability for workers' compensation benefits.
[2] When multiple carriers are liable for workers' compensation benefits, the judge of industrial claims can order reimbursement from the ultimately liable carrier to the car…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits provided by this chapter shall not be subject to apportionment under this subsection.”
Quote from Section 440.02(18) which Rowe & Mitchell argued prohibited any apportionment of medical costs; the court interpreted this to apply only to employee-employer disputes, not inter-carrier disputes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClaimant Jimmie L. Rodgers sustained compensable injuries from two successive employers: first while employed by Rowe & Mitchell, and later while empl…
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ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Acting Chief Judge.
Two successive employers of claimant Rodgers, and the employers’ carriers, appeal from an order of a judge of industrial claims on several issues pertaining to Rodgers’ benefits payable under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1977). The case previously was pending before the Industrial Relations Commission and was transferred here pursuant to Chapter 79-312, Section 1, Florida Laws.
No reversible error of law appears in the order of the judge of industrial claims, and his findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence. One issue, raised by appellants Rowe & Mitchell and its carrier, requires brief discussion. They assert that Rowe & Mitchell, in whose employ Rodgers first sustained a compensable injury, before his Sarasota County employment in which he sustained another compensable injury, is not responsible for any portion of the psychiatric medical benefits which the judge of industrial claims ordered paid one-half by Rowe & Mitchell and one-half by Sarasota County. Rodgers’ need for that medical treatment was attributed by the judge of industrial claims, by a finding we here sustain, to both industrial accidents. Nevertheless, Rowe & Mitchell and its carrier urge that Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), forbids this apportioning of medical costs:
Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable with respect to permanent disability or death. Compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits provided by this chapter shall not be subject to apportionment under this subsection. (Emphasis added.)
The quoted statute governs issues between the employee and his employer/carrier. Disputes between carriers concerning “the obligations and duties of one or more employers”, or between self-insured em ployers on the same subject, are governed rather by Section 440.42(3), which provides in part:
When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatment or other benefits under this chapter, the judge of industrial claims shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such controversy; and if . it is finally determined that another carrier is liable for all or any part of such obligations and duties with respect to such claim, the carrier which has made payments either voluntarily or in compliance with a compensation order shall be entitled to reimbursement from the carrier finally determined liable, and the judge of industrial claims shall have jurisdiction to order such reimbursement
Thus the judge of industrial claims was empowered to apportion the medical costs awarded between the employers/carriers according to their responsibility. Section 440.02(18) previously Section 440.02(19), Florida Statutes (1973), was written and amended for another purpose entirely, to end apportionment of temporary disability and medical benefits from as between employee and employer/carrier. Shores Development, Inc. v. Carver, 164 So. 2d 803 (Fla.1964); Chapter 65-184, Florida Laws; Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So. 2d 859 (Fla.1968).
The order is AFFIRMED. Claimant is awarded, on account of his attorney’s services on this appeal, fee money in the amount of $1,500.00, payable by appellants Rowe & Mitchell and Shelby Mutual.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents with an opinion.
BOOTH, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from this court’s retention of jurisdiction in this case, which arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See Crews v. Town of Bay Harbor, 378 So. 2d 1265, Case No. QQ-76, opinion filed December 27, 1979 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
On the merits, I would concur in the majority’s opinion.
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Flagship Nat'l Bank OF Broward Cnty. & Peninsular Fire Ins. Co. v. Hinkle, 479 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…s court construing sections 440.02(18) and 440.42(3) of the workers’ compensation statutes as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments have held that a deputy is authorized to apportion medical benefits between carriers. Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); The Seasons from Sarasota v. O’Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Neff v. Britto, 404 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Bell Rentals & Sales v. Harvey, 405 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Prior to 1979, section 440.-02(18),…1 / 3
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U. S. Elec. Co. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sisk Elec. Serv., Inc., 417 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…hat from the first compensa-ble accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy to divide liability according to each carrier’s responsibility. Seasons From Sarasota v. O'Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In the instant case, although the deputy found that the claimant sustained a compensable accident, he also specifically found that the second accident “did not result in any additional permanent disability, permanent aggravatio…
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The Seasons From Sarasota (Four Seasons Apts.) & Cont'l Nat'l Am. Grp. v. O'Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…hile § 440.-02(18), Fla.Stat., indicates that medical benefits are not apportionable, this provision governs disputes between a claimant and an employer/carrier, and does not apply to disputes between multiple carriers. Rowe and Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1 DCA 1979). Disputes between carriers are governed by § 440.42(3), Fla.Stat., which empowers the judge to divide medical costs according to each carrier’s responsibility. Id. In the present case, the judge required the first carrier to pay f…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Emerson Crews v. Town OF BAY Harbor Islands & Metro. Dade Cnty. Self Ins. Fund, 378 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1968)
- Shores Dev., Inc. v. Carliss Carver & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 164 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1964)