THE SEASONS FROM SARASOTA (FOUR SEASONS APTS.) AND CONTINENTAL NATIONAL AMERICAN GROUP, APPELLANTS,
v.
MICHAEL JOSEPH O'DAY, SUNRISE COVE CONDOMINIUMS AND FLORIDA FARM BUREAU, APPELLEES
PER CURIAM.
The employer/carrier appeals a worker’s compensation order wherein the judge divided the responsibility for medical benefits between two carriers. The claimant had sustained multiple accidents, with different carriers “on risk.” While § 440.-02(18), Fla.Stat., indicates that medical benefits are not apportionable, this provision governs disputes between a claimant and an employer/carrier, and does not apply to disputes between multiple carriers. Rowe and Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1 DCA 1979). Disputes between carriers are governed by § 440.42(3), Fla.Stat., which empowers the judge to divide medical costs according to each carrier’s responsibility. Id.
In the present case, the judge required the first carrier to pay for medical costs which the record indicates were attributable to the first injury independent of the subsequent injury. Such etiological responsibility comports with Rowe and Mitchell v. Rodgers, supra.
Accordingly, the order appealed is hereby affirmed.
ERVIN, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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Broward Indus. Plating, Inc. v. Weiby, 394 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…Finally, we note that if the Deputy should rule in favor of the claimant on remand, he should also determine the respective responsibilities and duties of the two insurance carriers in this case. See § 440.42(3), Fla.Stat. See also Seasons v. O’Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). SHIVERS and SHAW, JJ., concur. * The Deputy based his determination of occupational diseases on the finding that the claimant’s exposure to the chemical fumes exceeded “that of the general public so as to constitute a particu…
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Flagship Nat'l Bank OF Broward Cnty. & Peninsular Fire Ins. Co. v. Hinkle, 479 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…ensation statutes as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments have held that a deputy is authorized to apportion medical benefits between carriers. Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); The Seasons from Sarasota v. O’Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Neff v. Britto, 404 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Bell Rentals & Sales v. Harvey, 405 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Prior to 1979, section 440.-02(18), defining “accident,” provided in part that compensation for temporary di…1 / 2
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U. S. Elec. Co. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sisk Elec. Serv., Inc., 417 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…t causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of that from the first compensa-ble accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy to divide liability according to each carrier’s responsibility. Seasons From Sarasota v. O'Day, 379 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In the instant case, although the deputy found that the claimant sustained a compensable accident, he also specifically found that the second accident “did not re…
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- Rowe & Mitchell & Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 378 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)