HAROLD J. COOPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cooper appealed the summary denial of his motion to reduce his 1966 sentence for breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. The court held that an indigent defendant who was unable to post bond must receive credit for pre-sentence jail time to ensure total imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence.
An indigent defendant who cannot post bond during pre-sentence incarceration must be given credit for jail time so that total imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum, regardless of whether the maximum or lesser sentence was imposed. The summary denial of Cooper's petition was erroneous.
[1] A defendant who was indigent and unable to post bond during the term of incarceration prior to sentencing must be given credit for jail time when the maximum sentence was…
[2] Even if a defendant is sentenced to less than the maximum, the inability of an indigent criminal defendant to make bond should not result in extending the duration of imp…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant who was indigent and unable to post bond during the term of his incarceration prior to sentencing must be given credit for jail time when the maximum sentence was imposed.”
Establishes the core rule that indigent defendants unable to post bond must receive credit for pre-sentence jail time against maximum sentences.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1966, Cooper received an indeterminate sentence of six months to fifteen years for breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. He wa…
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COBB, Judge.
This appeal is from a summary denial of a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for reduction of sentence. Cooper alleged that in 1966 he was given an indeterminate sentence of six months to fifteen years for the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny, that his sentence did not include credit for 170 days served prior to sentencing, and that he was held in jail the entire period solely because of indigency.
A defendant who was indigent and unable to post bond during the term of his incarceration prior to sentencing must be given credit for jail time when the maximum sentence was imposed. Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F. 2d 414 (5th Cir. 1972); Cf. Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F. 2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972) (non-bailable offense affords no constitutional right for credit where indigency is irrelevant). Even if a defendant is sentenced to less than the maximum, the inability of an indigent criminal defendant to make bond should not result in extending the duration of his imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum. Matthews v. Dees, 579 F. 2d 929 (5th Cir. 1978) (held petitioner entitled to credit for portion of pre-sentence confinement so that total incarceration would not exceed twenty years, where petitioner was sentenced to nineteen years, twenty years being the maximum); see also Ham v. State of North Carolina, 471 F. 2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973). There is a federal constitutional right not to be subjected to imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely because of indigency. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, at 241-242, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). “[I]t is the excess of total imprisonment over the statutory maximum with which the courts are concerned.” Matthews v. Dees, supra at 931; see also Wilson v. State, 358 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Gelis v. State, 287 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
We hold that the summary denial of Cooper’s petition for postconviction relief was erroneous. Accordingly, the order denying hearing is vacated and this cause is remanded with directions that the trial court, within thirty days from the date hereof, determine the indigency issue and, if appropriate, correct the sentence by crediting the 170 days.
VACATED and REMANDED.
UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Vanderblomen v. State, 709 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…3.850. See, e.g., Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Woullard v. State, 420 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Mendenhall v. State, 419 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Wargo v. State, 393 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Cooper v. State, 379 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Wright v. State, 355 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Giles v. State, 350 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In fact, at one point this court had to clarify that while such jail or prison credit claims were authorized in motions filed…
Authorities Cited
- Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (U.S. 1970)
- HAM v. State OF N.C., 471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973)
- Hill v. Louie L. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1972)
- Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972)
- Cummings v. Cummings, 287 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Matthews v. Hayden J. Dees, 579 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1978)
- The Est. of James A. Allen v. Duval Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 358 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Wilson v. State, 358 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)