LOYE C. BRYANT ET AL, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHNNY L. BRYANT ET AL, APPELLEE
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Appellants challenged a warranty deed executed by their father, J. Buford Bryant, to his son Johnny for 318 acres valued at $145,150 but conveyed for only $79,500. The court reversed the trial court's judgment quieting title in Johnny Bryant, finding that the combination of inadequate consideration, the confidential relationship between father and son, and medical evidence of the decedent's mental incapacity warranted cancellation of the deed.
The deed must be vacated and reversed because the inadequate consideration, confidential relationship, and medical testimony regarding the decedent's mental incapacity establish grounds for equitable interference. Johnny Bryant failed to meet his burden of providing a reasonable explanation for the transaction. Additionally, the $15,000 withdrawn from the joint checking account must be returned, and the $6,000 check must also be returned if the decedent lacked mental capacity to execute the deed.
[1] Inadequacy of consideration, coupled with a grantor's mental weakness, may warrant equitable interference to set aside a deed.
[2] A confidential relationship between parties to a transaction, combined with inadequate consideration and evidence of mental weakness, can shift the burden of proof to the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Inadequacy of consideration, coupled with such a degree of mental weakness as would justify the inference that advantage had been taken of that weakness, [would] furnish sufficient ground for equitable interference.”
Establishes the legal standard for equitable interference in transactions involving inadequate consideration and mental weakness
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ. Buford Bryant, age 71, illiterate, and in poor health (hospitalized 16 of 19 days before the transaction), executed a warranty deed in January 1975…
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PER CURIAM.
J. Buford Bryant, since deceased, executed a warranty deed in January 1975 to his son, Johnny, conveying 318 acres of land for $79,500. The land was subsequently appraised at a fair market value of $145,-150. The terms of the mortgage, moreover, allowed Johnny Bryant to pay an amount that was less than the yearly interest, so that the principal would never be paid out.
After decedent’s death, appellants sued to cancel the deed. The trial court quieted title in appellee/Johnny Bryant, and this appeal followed. We reverse.
Buford Bryant was in poor health when he executed the deed and had been in the hospital 16 of the 19 days immediately preceding the transaction. He had been taking about a dozen different medications which could alter his mental ability. He was 71 years old and illiterate. Many of these facts were established by medical testimony. Just prior to the transaction, Johnny Bryant moved in to live with his father. Here there was an obvious confidential relationship between the father and his son. That fact, as well as the inadequate consideration and medical testimony as to decedent’s mental state, mandates reversal:
[Inadequacy of consideration, coupled with such a degree of mental weakness as would justify the inference that advantage had been taken of that weakness, [would] furnish sufficient ground for equitable interference.
Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42, 85 So. 243, 244 (1920). See Hartnett v. Lotauro, 82 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1955).
The beneficiary of a will is faced only with the burden of coming forward with a reasonable explanation for his actions vis-a-vis the decedent. In Re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1971). This rule applies to transactions other than testamentary ones. Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). Johnny Bryant, however, called only one witness, the attorney who handled the transaction for him. The attorney’s statements amounted to no more than that, having talked briefly a few times to Buford Bryant, he thought the decedent knew what he was doing. In light of the confidential relationship, the inadequate consideration, and testimony by the treating physician that decedent displayed “continuing evidence of brain dysfunction” at the time the deed was executed, Johnny Byant failed to meet his burden.
The trial court must also be reversed in part as to another of his rulings, which involved Buford Bryant’s bank account. Four days before the deed was executed, decedent allowed Johnny Bryant’s name to be added to his checking account, which at the time had an $18,000 balance. Over the next twelve months, decedent wrote one $6,000 check to Johnny Bryant, and the latter withdrew $15,000 himself.
The judge ordered Johnny Bryant to return the $15,000 he had withdrawn but allowed him to keep the $6,000 from the check decedent wrote. The trial judge was correct as to the $15,000, but erred regarding the $6,000; if decedent lacked mental capacity to execute the deed, he lacked capacity to change his bank account and write the check.
We reverse in part and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The deed should be vacated and the $6,000 returned, but the trial judge may consider whether Johnny Bryant is entitled to an offset for any payments he may have made for the property.
McCORD, LARRY G. SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Cripe v. Atl. First Nat'l Bank OF Daytona Beach, 422 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1982)…proof required of the moving party being the preponderance (greater weight) of the evidence. Id. at 701-04. The rule of Carpenter is properly applied to inter vivos transfers. Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Bryant v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). We believe that the agreement between Mrs. Hare and the Cripes, pertaining to the management of her properties and…
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Maudie Mae Jordan v. Essie Lee Noll, 423 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…r daughters. Moreover, appellant took her mother to the attorney and was present when the deeds were signed. Appellant knew the contents of the deeds and kept them secret. See Williamson v. Kirby, 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Bryant v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Carpenter, supra, 253 So. 2d at 702. The record shows also, however, that the trial court did not consider the reasonableness of appellant’s explanation for her active role in her mother’s affairs. The explanation given by the d…1 / 2
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Atl. First Nat'l Bank of Daytona Beach v. Cripe, 389 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…at a presumption of undue influence arose. The next question is whether appellees met their burden of coming forward with a reasonable explanation for their active role in Mrs. Hare’s affairs. Carpenter, at 704; Williamson at 695; Bryant v. Bryant, 379 So. 2d 382 (Fla.lst DCA 1980); Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla.lst DCA 1973). Appellees explain their involvement was based on their friendship with Mrs. Hare between 1949 and 1966. They also poin…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Est. of Coketine Bray Carpenter v. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971)
- Douglas v. Ogle, 80 Fla. 42 (Fla. 1920)
- Hattie Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Lennie Elizabeth Pate v. Mellen, 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Hartnett v. Lotauro, 82 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1955)