MARK EDWARD HOPKINS, PETITIONER,
v.
FREDERICK N. BARAD, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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Hopkins, a criminal defendant, sought habeas corpus relief arguing he was entitled to discharge under Florida's speedy trial rule because the 60-day period expired without trial. The court denied relief, holding that although Hopkins had a bona fide desire for speedy trial, he failed to satisfy the rule's requirement that he diligently investigate his case and be prepared for trial before filing his demand.
Hopkins was not entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule. Although he demonstrated a bona fide desire for speedy trial, he failed to satisfy the prerequisite requirements of Rule 3.191(c), which requires that a defendant filing a speedy trial demand must have diligently investigated his case and be prepared for trial. The demand was therefore void.
[1] A demand for speedy trial requires the accused to have a bona fide desire for trial, to have diligently investigated the case, and to be prepared for trial.
[2] A defendant's failure to diligently investigate their case prior to filing a demand for speedy trial renders the demand null and void.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A demand for speedy trial shall be deemed a pleading by the accused that he is available for trial, has diligently investigated his case, and that he is prepared or will be prepared for trial.”
Establishes the prerequisites that a defendant must satisfy when filing a speedy trial demand under Rule 3.191(c)
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHopkins was arrested in Pensacola and informed against in Dade County on April 26, 1979, for robbery and kidnapping. While confined in Escambia County…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Hopkins, who is the defendant below in a criminal proceeding, has filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming the right to a discharge under the speedy trial rule. Treating the petition as one seeking a writ of prohibition, we have issued a rule nisi. Upon consideration of the return and response, and after oral argument, we conclude that the petition must be denied.
After being arrested in Pens.acola, Hopkins was informed against in Dade County, on April 26, 1979, on robbery and kidnapping charges. On June 19, 1979, while confined in the Escambia County jail, he filed a pro se demand for a speedy trial pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(2). Although the court immediately entered an order to return the defendant for trial, he was not in fact brought to Dade County until August 25, 1979 and was not arraigned until September 11. Shortly thereafter, he moved for discharge on the ground that the 60 day speedy trial period had already run. This proceeding results from the denial of that motion below.
Under the provisions of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(c), which controls the issue involved in this case:
A demand for speedy trial binds the accused and the State. No demand for speedy trial shall be filed or served unless the accused has a bona fide desire to obtain trial sooner than otherwise might be provided. A demand for speedy trial shall be deemed a pleading by the accused that he is available for trial, has diligently investigated his case, and that he is prepared or will be prepared for trial. . [emphasis supplied]
Based on the acknowledged fact that Hopkins, who was in jail in Pensacola at the time, had done nothing at all to prepare his case, the trial court held that although he had a “bona fide desire” for a speedy trial, he had not “diligently investigated his case” when the demand was made and therefore could not actually have been prepared to go to trial.
We concur with the trial judge that these unchallenged findings preclude Hopkins from successfully relying upon the speedy trial rule. This result is required by the provisions of Rule 3.191(c) itself and by State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1971), where, in interpreting the rule, the supreme court said at 130:
After a demand for speedy trial has been filed, the court should not summarily dismiss a defendant at the expiration of the 60-day period provided in the rule. It is not only appropriate, but necessary, to ascertain whether or not the accused had a ‘bona fide desire’ to obtain the speedy trial and to determine whether or not the accused or his attorney ‘has dili gently investigated his case, and that he is prepared’ for trial. If these prerequisites to the filing of the demand were not met, the demand for speedy trial should be stricken as being null and void, [emphasis supplied]
See also, Turner v. State ex rel. Pellerin, 272 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1973); State v. Acurse, 347 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (dictum); compare State v. Embry, 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla.1975). Hopkins cogently argues that the application of this principle has the effect of denying the benefit of the speedy trial rule to one who may sincerely desire, for his own reasons, to go immediately to trial even without the investigation or preparation which a court might deem reasonably necessary for a proper defense. See the considerations expressed in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). While we recognize the force of this contention, we are unable to accept it. Probably as a means of ferreting out “spurious” speedy trial demands, see State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, supra; State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1973), the supreme court has explicitly conditioned the right to require a speedy trial on demand upon an objective showing that the defendant is “really” ready for trial.1 Unless and until the rule is changed, the courts are bound by its clear terms. State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1973); State v. Battle, 302 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
Petition denied; rule nisi discharged.
. Hopkins relies only on the rules of criminal procedure and presents no claim either that they are invalid as applied to his situation or that he is entitled to discharge because of a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Compare Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Winford Dickey v. Honorable Raymond T. McNEAL, 445 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…ntly investigated his case, and that he is prepared” for trial. If these prerequisites to the filing of the demand were not met, the demand for speedy trial should be . stricken as being null and void. 253 So. 2d at 130. See also: Hopkins v. Barad, 380 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (defendant seen as unprepared and demand deemed invalid where complete lack of preparation present). In State v. Kaufman, 421 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), as in the instant case, the issue was whether the demand for speedy tri…
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State of Fla. ex rel. Michael T. Furland v. The Honorable Virgil B. Conkling, 405 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…tigated his case, and that he is prepared’ for trial. If these prerequisites to the filing of the demand were not met, the demand for speedy trial should be stricken as being null and void. (Emphasis added.) 253 So. 2d at 130. In Hopkins v. Barad, 380 So. 2d 1166 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), the Third District explained that in order to ferret out spurious speedy trial demands, the supreme court has explicitly conditioned the right to require a speedy trial on demand upon an objective showing that the defendant is rea…
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State v. Ferrante, 561 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…al court erred by failing to grant an earlier motion for discharge and thus the trial court orders should be affirmed on alternative grounds. On the facts here presented we conclude that the earlier motion was correctly denied. See Hopkins v. Barad, 380 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We therefore reverse the orders of discharge and remand for further proceedings. * Renumbered as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(3) (1990). See In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 (Speedy…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Terry Michael Hanks & Rudolph Frank Seymour v. The Honorable Murray Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1973)
- Honorable Jack M. Turner v. State ex rel. Michael J. Pellerin, 272 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1973)
- State of Fla. ex rel. George Ranalli v. The Honorable William Clayton Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Glenwood Perry, 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975)
- State v. Embry, 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975)
- Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- State v. Acurse, 347 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Holton v. Atl. Dep't Stores, Inc., 302 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)