ANTHONY WALTER CAPPETTA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Cappetta appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss a conspiracy charge, arguing the information was vague and overbroad for alleging the conspiracy occurred over a 29-day period without specifying whether it was continuous or when it commenced and concluded. The court reversed, holding that conspiracy charges must allege the conspiracy either continued throughout the specified period or commenced at the beginning and was not accomplished until the end.
The information was insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege either that the conspiracy continued through the entire May 1-29 period or that it commenced on May 1 and was not accomplished until May 29, as required by Florida law for conspiracy charges. Therefore, Cappetta's motion to dismiss should have been granted.
[1] An information or indictment charging conspiracy must state, with as much certainty as the nature of the case permits, the facts constituting the crime.
[2] When alleging a conspiracy occurred between specified dates, the information or indictment must state that the conspiracy was continuing throughout that period or commenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Conspiracy is an offense which especially demands the application of the rule that an information or indictment state, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will permit, the facts which constitute the crime intended to be charged.”
Establishes the heightened pleading standard for conspiracy charges
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCappetta was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery and/or burglary alleged to have occurred between May 1 and May 29, 1979. The information and th…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Anthony Cappetta, appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss information as being vague, indefinite and over-broad.
Cappetta was informed against for conspiracy to commit robbery and/or burglary. The information alleged that the conspiracy occurred “between the 1st day of May, 1979 and the 29th day of May, 1979”. Subsequently, the prosecution filed a statement of particulars pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(n) and again stated “the alleged offenses occurred between May 1 and May 29, 1979”. Cappetta moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the time period in which the alleged conspiracy occurred as set forth in both the information and statement of particulars was so vague, indefinite and overbroad as to mislead and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense. Following a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. Thereupon, Cappetta entered a plea of nolo con-tendere and reserved his right to appeal.1 The trial judge accepted the plea, placed him on probation and imposed a $1,000 fine. Cappetta then filed the instant appeal from the order denying his motion to dismiss the information.
Conspiracy is an offense which especially demands the application of the rule that an information or indictment state, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will permit, the facts which constitute the crime intended to be charged. See 16 Fla.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1553 (1979) and cases cited therein. The law has therefore become well established that if the crime of conspiracy has been alleged to have occurred between certain specified dates (as in the instant case between May 1 and May 29) then the information or indictment must allege that the conspiracy was continuing throughout that specified period or that the conspiracy commenced at the beginning of that period and was not accomplished until the end. See State v. Dayton, 215 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Glasgow v. State, 292 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); and State v. Barnett, 344 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). See also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(d)(3). The information in the case at bar fails to allege either that the conspiracy continued through the period of May 1st— May 29th or commenced on May 1st and was not accomplished until May 29th. Thus, we conclude the information was insufficient as a matter of law and Cappetta’s motion to dismiss should have been granted.
Accordingly, the information is hereby dismissed and the order placing Cappetta on probation and fining him $1,000 is revoked.
Reversed.
. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.172(C)(iv).
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State v. Kopulos, 413 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…ge M. Kopu-los, Steven J. York, and Daniel S. Bonk, in Pasco County, conspired to possess cannabis “between the 9th day of December, 1980 and the 21st day of December” 1980. The trial court dismissed this count on the authority of Cappetta v. State, 380 So. 2d 1303 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), ruling that the charging language was impermissibly overbroad. We reverse. In Cappetta, the third district held that if the crime of conspiracy has been alleged to have occurred between certain specified dates (as in the instant…
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York v. State, 432 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1983)…e conceded unlawful vagueness as to the conspiracy count, but sought leave to file an amended information. Although leave was granted, the amended information was never filed. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on Cappetta v. State, 380 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The state appealed and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed sub nom. State v. Kopulos, 413 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bonk v. State, 419 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.1982).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to…
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State v. Cappetta, 395 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…PER CURIAM. The order under review which dismisses the state’s new information filed subsequent to, and in purported compliance with, our decision reversing the defendant’s prior conviction in this cause, Cappetta v. State, 380 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings upon a holding that: (a) the said information was not barred by double jeopardy because the defendant’s prior successful appeal in this cause waived…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Barnett, 344 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- State v. Dayton, 215 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Glasgow v. State, 292 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)