ROBERT CUEVAS, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY ELLEN CUEVAS, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenges the trial court's award of $100 per week permanent alimony, property transfers including real estate in two states, and reservation of jurisdiction for attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed, finding the awards supported by the wife's need, the husband's financial ability, and proper application of equitable distribution principles.
The court affirmed all aspects of the judgment. The $100 per week permanent alimony was proper based on the wife's need and the husband's financial ability. The property award was proper as lump sum alimony for equitable distribution since the wife had no separate property and the husband could convey the property without endangering his economic status. The reservation of jurisdiction for attorney's fees was within the trial court's discretion because the wife lacked complete ability to pay her attorney.
[1] A trial court may award permanent periodic alimony based on the needs of one spouse, the financial ability of the other spouse, and other relevant circumstances.
[2] A trial court may award title to marital property as lump sum alimony when one spouse has no separate property and the other spouse has the ability to convey the property…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Considering the needs of the wife, the financial ability of the husband and other relative circumstances, we find no error in the award of $100 per week permanent alimony to the wife.”
Establishes the court's standard for reviewing alimony awards and affirms the trial court's award based on need and ability to pay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties married in 1962 with no children of the marriage. The wife became a homemaker at the husband's insistence to raise her two children from a…
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NESBITT, Judge.
The husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution which awarded the wife: (1) $100 per week as permanent alimony; (2) fee simple title to a home in Highlands County, owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety, and real estate in the State of Georgia, titled solely in the name of the husband; additionally, the court expressly reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and awarding attorney’s fees to the wife’s counsel. The husband contends here that the record does not demonstrate the wife’s need for permanent periodic alimony nor attorney’s fees and further the court abused its discretion in making an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage. We disagree and affirm.
The parties were married in 1962, There were no children born of the marriage but the wife, at the insistence of the husband, became a homemaker to rear her two children by a previous marriage. The parties resided in a home, located in Dade County, which had been purchased by the husband prior to the marriage, which was not affected by the final judgment. In 1975, the parties separated but later effectuated a reconciliation which failed in 1976. Thereafter, in 1978, the husband filed a petition for dissolution which was met by the wife’s counter-petition for dissolution.
The wife was employed in 1977, after the separation, as a barmaid and admitted earnings of $3,200 plus tips. Her earning capacity is limited due to a lack of skills and her present physical condition which prevents her from standing on her feet for long intervals. She has spent most of her years as a homemaker and is now in her fifties. She has no separate property, assets or savings. Her expenses for the bare necessities, food and lodging, exceed $200 per month. Since the time of the separation, she has lived without any assistance from her husband on her meager earnings and with some assistance from her daughter. Her husband is a co-owner of a cabinet manufacturing company which has a gross aggregate value of approximately $300,000, from which he realizes a net take-home salary of $290 per week. In the two years prior to final hearing, he received an additional bonus of $1,200 per annum.
Considering the needs of the wife, the financial ability of the husband and other relative circumstances, we find no error in the award of $100 per week permanent alimony to the wife. McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976).
That part of the judgment which awarded the husband’s joint interest in the Highlands County home and his sole interest in the Georgia real property to his wife does not disclose thé theory upon which it was made. It is fairly inferable from the record, however, that the trial judge awarded the husband’s interest as lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage. This was proper in that the wife had no separate property, assets or savings of her own and the husband had the ability to make such a conveyance without substantially endangering his economic status. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
The reservation of jurisdiction to determine and award counsel fees to the wife was within the trial court’s discretion because the wife did not have complete ability to pay her attorney. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla.1976) and Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra.
Affirmed.
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Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…fairness generated by changing social conditions and needs. See text discussion, supra. As- members of the legal profession, we all have reason, in the most basic sense, to be proud of these decisions. . As Cowan v. Cowan, supra; Cuevas v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and other cases indicate the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets contemplated by Canakar-is may, in the light of their respective earning capacities and eligibility for other benefits, call for an award of more than hal…
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Locke v. Locke, 413 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…in essence, directed each party to bear its own costs and, instead, instruct the trial court to follow Canakaris and award attorney’s fees to the wife. Canakaris, supra at 1205; Dominik v. Dominik, 390 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). It necessarily follows that the charging lien on the marital property is not enforceable as against the wife. Conroy v. Conroy, 392 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Barranco, Darlson, Daniel & Bluestein v. Winner, 386 So. 2d 1277 (…
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Hague v. Hague, 382 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…e husband’s interest in the marital home] which it announced in Meridith v. Meri-dith, 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla.1978), and Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976) . . .” See also the discussions of Canakaris in our opinions in Cuevas v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). As to the award of permanent alimony, we also affirm. In light of the 31-year duration of the marriage, the age of the wife upon dissolution, the nominal amount of the award, t…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976)
- Wilmer H. McDONALD v. McDONALD, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979)