WILMER H. MCDONALD, PETITIONER,
v.
EDNA FAY MCDONALD, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court has inherent authority to award exclusive possession of a marital home to a spouse when it serves as rehabilitative alimony or to effectuate a support obligation owed to that spouse, rejecting the narrower holdings of two district court decisions that limited such awards to lump sum alimony or child support situations.
A court has inherent authority to award exclusive possession of a marital home as rehabilitative alimony where need is demonstrated, and not only when it takes the form of lump sum alimony or is awarded to the custodial parent for child support purposes. The trial court's awards were proper and not an abuse of discretion.
[1] A court has inherent authority to award exclusive possession of a jointly owned marital home to a party having custody of children as an incident of the other party's sup…
[2] Exclusive possession of a marital home may be awarded to a spouse as a form of rehabilitative alimony when a need for such support has been demonstrated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the exclusive use and possession of marital property may be awarded as a form of rehabilitative alimony where a need has been demonstrated”
Establishes the court's holding that exclusive possession can serve as rehabilitative alimony, not just child support or lump sum alimony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage after 22 years, the parties had grown children. The former wife had been seldom employed and possessed extremely limited …
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BOYD, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the district court of appeal, 346 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), because of conflict with Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) and Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. In Saviteer, a party to a divorce proceeding was awarded exclusive possession of the marital home, previously held as an estate by the entireties. After dissolution of the marriage the parties became tenants in common pursuant to statute. In holding that the trial court erred in awarding exclusive possession to one of the parties, the district court of appeal said that such an award is only proper where it takes the form of lump sum alimony or where it is awarded to the party having custody of children in order to effectuate the other party’s child support obligation. In Ranes, an award of exclusive possession of the jointly held marital home was held to be error because it did not take the form of lump sum alimony nor was it based on a child support obligation.
In the instant case the former wife was awarded exclusive possession of the marital home for a period of two years following the decree of dissolution. The children of the marriage are grown. The parties were married for twenty-two years, during which the wife has seldom been employed. Her education and skills are extremely limited.
Petitioner asserts that the award of exclusive possession was error. He also contends that the trial court erred in awarding respondent a one-half interest in the same marital home, in dividing equally the separate savings accounts of the parties, and in awarding the wife permanent alimony of $350.00 per month.
In a dissolution proceeding, the court has inherent authority to award exclusive possession of a jointly owned marital home to the party having custody of children as an incident of the other party’s support obligation. McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908 (Fla.1951); Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253 (1947); Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Berger v. Berger, 182 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). The opinions in Ranes and Saviteer neglect to mention that exclusive possession can also be proper when the support obligation in question is owed to the wife alone. Banks v. Banks, 98 So. 2d 337 (Fla.1957); Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Coggan v. Coggan, 230 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). In a proper case the exclusive use and possession of marital property may be awarded as a form of rehabilitative alimony where a need has been demonstrated. Cf. Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (special circumstance of wife’s mental illness held to justify exclusive award). The award of use and possession for two years was proper and reasonable in this case.
Having resolved the issue of the court’s authority, we turn to the petitioner’s other contentions. In essence he argues that taken together, the property division, temporary support, and permanent periodic alimony provisions of the trial court’s decree constitute an excessive provision in favor of the wife.
Because the trial court judge is in much better position than we to assess the needs and capabilities of the parties, his determinations should be upheld unless they are not supported by competent evidence, so that the provisions based thereon constitute an abuse of discretion. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976). Upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the provisions of the decree are improper using this standard.
The decision of the court below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. ENGLAND, C. J., and SUNDBERG, J., dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (23 total)
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Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)…arital home as lump sum alimony may be coupled with other lump sum alimony or permanent periodic alimony awards if justified by the evidence. The collective use of such alimony awards has been approved recently by this Court in McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979), and by the Third District Court of Appeal. See Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 300 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Although the award of lump sum alimony is not dependent upon a finding of a…
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Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)…s v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), concerning the award of exclusive possession has been resolved in part by our express disapproval of Saviteer and Ranes in McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979). Conflict remains with Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976), on the issue of what spousal contributions establish a “special equity.” We have jurisdiction.1 There is a need to define those circumstances in domestic relations proceedings…1 / 2
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Franz Edward Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…the award to Ms. Mitchell of the home’s exclusive use and possession. A court may award exclusive possession of a jointly owned marital home to the custodial parent as an incident of the other party’s child support obligation. McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283, 1284 (Fla.1979). This authority does not extend to nonmarital real property absent a finding pursuant to section 61.30(13) that the noncustodial parent’s recurring income is insufficient to meet his child support obligation. Dyer v. Dyer, 658 So. 2…
Previewing 3 of 23 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Solomon Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224 (Fla. 1947)
- McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1951)
- Saviteer v. McADOO, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Luvenia F. Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Percival M. Banks v. Frances L. Banks, 98 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1957)
- Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Berger v. Berger, 182 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)