HAROLD HERBERT DREBLOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harold Dreblow was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under section 316.193, with supplementary reference to section 322.262. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, holding that the charging information properly identified the offense and complied with constitutional requirements regarding statutory titles.
The information was properly titled under section 316.193, the appropriate charging statute for DUI, and the supplementary reference to section 322.262 did not create a constitutional defect. Section 322.262 merely restates the unlawfulness established in section 316.193 and provides chemical test presumptions, not an independent offense.
[1] A charging information titled with the primary statute for driving under the influence, which also references a supplementary statute establishing presumptions for intoxi…
[2] A reference to a supplementary statute within the body of a charging information does not alter the nature of the charge if the primary statute is clearly indicated in th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 316.193 is the prime and appropriate charging statute for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The reference to section 322.262 in the body of the information does not alter the nature of the information; rather, this reference was of a supplementary nature.”
Establishes that the primary charge was properly under 316.193 and the reference to 322.262 was merely supplementary, not a separate charge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDreblow was charged on December 22, 1978, with driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage to the extent that his normal faculties were…
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OVERTON, Justice.
Appellant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol. The charging information was titled: “Driving while under the influence of alcohol, 316.193, F.S.,” and contained the following allegation: “Harold H. Dreblow on December 22, 1978 in said County and State did drive or be in the actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired, contrary to Section 322.262, Florida Statutes.”
The appellant moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the scope and application of section 322.262(1), Florida Statutes, were broader than the title of the enabling act, chapter 67-308, contrary to the requirements of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution.1 The trial court denied the motion. Appellant thereupon pleaded nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. We have jurisdiction.2
The information in this case clearly referred to section 316.193 in its title. Section 316.193 is the prime and appropriate charging statute for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages. The reference to section 322.262 in the body of the information does not alter the nature of the information; rather, this reference was of a supplementary nature. Section 322.262 restates the unlawfulness of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages as set forth in section 316.193 and establishes the presumptions for intoxication as a result of chemical tests. The defendant was on notice of the provisions of both sections.
The allegations in the information made clear all relevant facts necessary to support the offense. Appellant’s assertion that he was charged solely under section 322.262 is unfounded. He was charged under section 316.193, or arguably under both sections. The appellant advances no argument that a charge for the instant offense under section 316.193 is erroneous. We find the information sufficiently and properly charges an offense under the laws of this state and further find there is no constitutional title defect in section 322.262. See State v. Lee, 156 Fla. 291, 22 So. 2d 804 (1945).
The appellant’s conviction is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. . Art. Ill, § 6, Fla.Const.:
Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. LEE, 156 Fla. 291 (Fla. 1945)
- State v. LEE, 156 Fla. 291 (Fla. 1945)