ANN GROSS, APPELLANT,
v.
ASPHALT MATERIAL & PAVING CO., INC., AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, APPELLEES
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Ann Gross appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim against Asphalt Material & Paving Company for injuries from a trip and fall on a street being repaved. The court reversed, finding that a triable issue existed regarding whether the contractor remained liable under the Slavin doctrine because the project had not yet been formally accepted by the Florida Department of Transportation at the time of the accident.
The contractor remains liable for defects it created in the roadway until formal acceptance of the entire project by the owner, regardless of partial inspections or approvals by the owner's employees. The question of whether formal project acceptance had been completed when the plaintiff was injured presented a triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
[1] A contractor remains liable for defects in its work until the project is formally accepted by the owner, even if portions of the work have been inspected and approved.
[2] A contractor is considered the "possessor" of a roadway and remains liable for defects until the work is completed and turned over to and accepted by the owner.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Slavin doctrine serves to relieve a contractor from liability for obvious defects when the work has been completed and turned over to and accepted by the owner.”
Establishes the foundational principle that contractor liability depends on formal project acceptance by the owner, not partial inspections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn April 11, 1976, plaintiff Gross tripped and fell while crossing Collins Avenue near 67th Street on Miami Beach. The defendant contractor was engage…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
On April 11, 1976, the plaintiff-appellant tripped and fell while crossing Collins Avenue (State Road A1A) near its intersection with 67th Street on Miami Beach. Ms. Gross sued the present appellee, Asphalt Material & Paving Company, Inc., which was engaged in repaving the area under a contract with the Florida Department of Transportation. She claimed that it had created a “bump” or “rise” in the street which had caused the accident. The trial judge granted summary judgment for the defendant, which we reverse.
The primary basis of the ruling below seems to have been the conclusion that the appellee was not liable for the injury under Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1959). The Slavin doctrine serves to relieve a contractor from liability for obvious defects when the work has been completed and turned over to and accepted by the owner. See El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and cases cited. In this case, the record shows that the project in question was not completed and accepted by the D.O.T. until April 22, 1976, eleven days after the accident. There was therefore an unresolved issue as to whether “the work remained in [the defendant’s] charge,” so as to render it liable as the “possessor” of the roadway at the time of the fall. Cockerham v.
R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla.1955).
Specifically, we reject the defendant’s contention that the mere inspection and approval of the work in a particular portion of the street by a D.O.T. employee would serve, as a matter of law, to exonerate the asphalt company from responsibility for that area. Until formal acceptance of the entire project by the owner, the contractor remains in control of the work and thus responsible for the correction of any defect it has created. Its liability, in other words, does not cease until the owner’s begins. See Lubell v. Roman Spa, Inc., 362 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1978).
The question of whether that process had been completed when Ms. Gross was hurt was not properly resolved by summary judgment. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966).
Compare Leveridge v. Lapidus, 105 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
Since we also find that the defendant did not conclusively establish its non-liability for the accident on any other basis, see Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla.1977), the summary judgment under review is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
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Conley v. Coral Ridge Props., Inc., 396 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…in Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla.1958), relieves the contractor from liability to third persons for obvious defects when the work has been completed, turned over and accepted by the owner. See also Gross v. Asphalt Material and Paving Company, 382 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In the instant case the owner had taken possession of the unit and had leased it out. There was clear evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Conley were totally aware that the a…
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Ortiz v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 541 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…[*118] PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Coudry v. City of Titusville, 438 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); see Gross v. Asphalt Material & Paving Co., Inc., 382 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).…
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State Paving Corp. v. Tauna Zebrowski, 544 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…r denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict on the contention that the work had been completed and surrendered to the control of the county. The trial court properly treated this as an issue of fact. Cf. Gross v. Asphalt Material & Paving Co., 382 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). It is not necessary to comment on any of the other issues raised. Therefore, the judgment is reversed and we remand for a new trial. WALDEN, J., and WESSEL, JOHN D., Associate Judge, concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Wills v. Sears, 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977)
- Slavin v. Sanford KAY, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958)
- Cockerham v. R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955)
- Russell v. State of Fla. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Lubell v. Roman SPA, Inc., 362 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1978)
- Leveridge v. Lapidus, 105 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)