GLORIA PARKER, ETC. ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
KEITH KNORR, M.D., APPELLEE
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This case addresses whether a medical malpractice mediation panel properly commenced its hearing within the six-month statutory period required by Florida law. The court held that only the presentation of opening statements does not constitute a "hearing" and reversed the trial court's dismissal, finding the mediation panel lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
The mediation panel lacked jurisdiction to proceed because no hearing was commenced within the six-month period. The presentation of opening statements alone does not constitute a "hearing" as required by the statute, and therefore the panel's decision rendered after the six-month deadline was void.
[1] The six-month time limit for commencing a medical mediation hearing under Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (1977), is jurisdictional.
[2] A medical mediation hearing is not commenced within the statutory six-month period if only opening statements are presented.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear by now that the time limitations of the medical mediation statute were jurisdictional and if no hearing at all was begun within the six-month period, the panel's jurisdiction terminated.”
Establishes that the six-month requirement is jurisdictional, not merely procedural
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA judicial referee scheduled a final mediation hearing just before the six-month deadline but, due to missing expert witness names, prohibited substan…
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ORFINGER, Judge.
We are asked to determine if a medical mediation hearing was properly commenced within the six month period prescribed by Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (1977), so as to permit the mediation panel to conclude its hearing and render a decision within the statutory ten-month period. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla.1980) makes it necessary for us to decide the question because the mediation panel filed its written decision prior to Aldana. The judicial referee had set the matter for final hearing just a few days before the expiration of the six-month period, but because the names of some expert witnesses had not been supplied to defendants, he prohibited the presentation of anything other than opening statements and continued the hearing until a date beyond six months, but before ten months from the date the claim was filed. No other “hearing” was held within the six-month period.
Contending that the jurisdiction of the mediation panel had terminated, plaintiff then filed this action for damages. The trial court dismissed the action on motion because the mediation proceeding had not been concluded and plaintiff appealed. Thereafter, the mediation panel rendered its decision.
It is clear by now that the time limitations of the medical mediation statute were jurisdictional1 and if no hearing at all was begun within the six-month period, the panel’s jurisdiction terminated. Raedel v. Watson Clinic Foundation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). A “hearing” is synonymous with trial, and includes reception of evidence and argument thereon. The presentation of opening statements only does not constitute a “hearing”2. Since no final hearing was commenced within the six-month period, the mediation panel had no jurisdiction beyond that time. The purported hearing thereafter and the decision of the panel were void and of no effect. Cohen v. Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
The order dismissing the cause is reversed for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . We use the past tense because of the holding in Aldana.
. Hewitt v. Caffee, 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), where only medical records were introduced. See also: Wright v. Ratnesar, 373 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Hirsch v. Kleinman, 375 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Shore v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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Roberts v. Casey, 413 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…s from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discovered within the exercise of due diligence; . . . . Art. I, § 21, Fia.Const. .See Parker v. Knorr, 383 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Serrill v. Hilderbrand, 382 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wright v. Ratnesar, 373 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Cohen v. Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hirsch v. Kleinman, 375 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hewi…
Authorities Cited
- Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980)
- Raedel v. Watson Clinic Found., Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Hewitt v. Henry Caffee, M.D., 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Murray Cohen, M.D. v. The Honorable William Clayton Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Wright v. Viajaya J. Ratnesar, 373 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Leon L. Shore, D.O. v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Herman and Helen Hirsch v. Steven Z. Kleinman, M.D., 375 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)