LEON L. SHORE, D.O., PETITIONER,
v.
DIANNE ABBAZIA, PAUL S. GLASSMAN, D.O. AND OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL HOSPITAL, RESPONDENTS
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The court held that a medical malpractice mediation panel lost jurisdiction when it conducted only a preliminary 'commencement' hearing before the statutorily mandated 180-day period expired, without commencing a true hearing on the merits. Party stipulation cannot extend the panel's authority beyond the six-month jurisdictional deadline.
The mediation panel lost jurisdiction when the six-month period expired without a true hearing on the merits having commenced. Party stipulation cannot serve effectively to extend the panel's authority or cure this jurisdictional defect.
[1] A medical mediation panel loses jurisdiction over a proceeding if a final hearing on the merits has not commenced within the statutorily mandated period.
[2] A preliminary hearing at which only a single exhibit is introduced and nothing else occurs does not constitute a commencement of a final hearing on the merits for the pur…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no such agreement may serve effectively to extend the authority of the panel to proceed”
Establishes that party stipulation cannot extend mediation panel jurisdiction beyond statutory limits
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBefore expiration of the 180-day period required by Florida Statute § 768.44(3) for commencing a final hearing on the merits, the medical mediation pa…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Prior to the expiration of the 180 day period after the filing of the claim provided by § 768.44(3), Fla.Stat. (1977), the only proceeding held before the medical mediation panel in this case was a so-called “commencement” or “start-up” hearing at which a single medical exhibit was introduced into evidence and nothing else occurred. In Hewitt v. Caffee, 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), this court held that such a “hearing” did not toll the statutorily mandated period for the commencement of a final hearing on the merits and that the panel therefore lost jurisdiction over the proceeding when the six month period expired without a true hearing having begun. See also Grossman v. Duncan, 371 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Although it appears that, in this case, the parties stipulated to this process, it is established that no such agreement may serve effectively to extend the authority of the panel to proceed. Cohen v. Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Diggett v. Conkling, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Raedel v. Watson Clinic Foundation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
We are unimpressed with the plaintiff-respondent’s attempt to distinguish this situation, which is characterized as involving merely an agreement concerning procedure or the manner in which the final hearing was to be conducted, from what is called a “real” jurisdictional defect involving the absence of one or two of the panel members, with which the court was concerned in the Dig-gett case. Our holding in Hewitt was that no “hearing,” within the meaning of the statute, had commenced before the 180-day period expired.
Thus, the panel in this case thereafter proceeded without jurisdiction just as the panels in both Cohen and Raedel in which nothing at all, not even a thus-totally-ineffective “commencement” hearing, had taken place before the running of the six-month period. The determinations in the Cohen and Raedel cases that this jurisdictional defect could not be cured by stipulation are therefore directly controlling.
For these reasons, as we did in per cu-riam decisions involving identical factual situations in Wickers v. Schwartz, 372 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) and Kuba v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc., 371 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), we grant the petition for certiorari and remand the cause with directions that the clerk issue a notice of termination of the mediation proceedings, pursuant to Fla.R.Med.P. 20.190(e).
Certiorari granted.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Roberts v. Casey, 413 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…DCA 1979); Cohen v. Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hirsch v. Kleinman, 375 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Hewitt v. Caffee, 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Diggett v. Conkling, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Shore v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Raedel v. Watson Clinic Foundation, Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Ballard v. Curatolo, 363 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). . It is ironic to have the time period of section 768.44(3), which was intended for the plainti…
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Parker v. Keith Knorr, M.D., 383 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…n Aldana. . Hewitt v. Caffee, 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), where only medical records were introduced. See also: Wright v. Ratnesar, 373 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Hirsch v. Kleinman, 375 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Shore v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).…
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Serrill v. Hilderbrand, 382 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…d the hospital’s dilatory tactics, the decision was grounded on the failure of the parties, for whatever reason, to present evidence, make opening statements, or do any of the other things provided for in Section 768.44(6). Accord, Shore v. Abbazia, 375 So. 2d 354 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Wright v. Ratnesar, supra. The fact that the parties may have stipulated to a continuance beyond the six-month deadline does not compel a different result. Failure to commence a hearing within the six-month deadline is a jurisdic…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Raedel v. Watson Clinic Found., Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Hewitt v. Henry Caffee, M.D., 368 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Boston Invs., Inc. v. Horowitz, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Diggett v. Honorable Virgil B. Conkling, 368 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Murray Cohen, M.D. v. The Honorable William Clayton Johnson, 373 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Grossman v. Honorable Gordon A. Duncan, Jr., 371 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Boehme v. Boehme, 371 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Stewart v. Roslyn Debs Goldberg, 372 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Slattery v. State, 372 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)