TURNER STREET AND DAVID STREET, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Turner Street and David Street appealed their convictions for battery upon a law enforcement officer under Florida Statute Section 784.07. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed their convictions, rejecting constitutional challenges to the statute based on equal protection, vagueness, and overbreadth grounds.
The statute does not violate equal protection, does not fail to provide sufficient notice of proscribed conduct, and does not violate due process through overbreadth. The statute's scienter requirement—that the accused know the victim is a law enforcement officer—provides adequate constitutional protection, and the phrase 'engaged in the lawful performance of his duties' is sufficiently definite under common understanding.
[1] A contention regarding improper jury instructions will not be considered on appeal if no objection or request for instructions was made in the trial court.
[2] A statute that provides enhanced penalties for battery upon a law enforcement officer does not violate equal protection by affording special treatment to police officers…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute, however, has a scienter requirement. State v. Bailey, 360 So. 2d 772 (Fla.1978). It requires that the accused know that his victim is a law enforcement officer or firefighter.”
Establishes that the statute contains a scienter requirement addressing the appellants' vagueness concerns
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants Turner Street and David Street were convicted by jury of battery upon a law enforcement officer, a felony under Florida Statutes Section 78…
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BOYD, Justice.
The appellants were convicted, following jury trial, of the offense of battery upon a law enforcement officer, a felony under Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court passed upon the constitutional validity of the statute when it denied the appellants’ motions to dismiss, so their appeal lies to this Court. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. The appellants argue that improper instructions were given to the jury with regard to what the state was required to prove, but since there was no objection or request for instructions by the defense below, this contention will not be considered now.
The appellants contend that the statute violates equal protection by the special treatment it gives to police officers as victims of batteries. This issue has been resolved in favor of the statute’s validity. Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269 (Fla.1978).
The appellants contend that as a matter of law the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. Our review of the record reveals that this contention is without merit.
Appellants contend that the-statute fails to give sufficient warning as to what, conduct will render a person liable to prosecution for the felony created thereby as opposed to prosecution for ordinary battery. The statute, however, has a scienter requirement. State v. Bailey, 360 So. 2d 772 (Fla.1978). It requires that the accused know that his victim is a law enforcement officer or firefighter. Appellants argue that the phrase “engaged in the lawful performance of his duties” is vague and raise the question of whether a policeman who is using excessive force is so engaged. But the use of unlawful force by a police officer, giving rise to a right of self-defense, would not relate to the matter of sufficient notice but would be a defense to the battery charge itself. As a matter of common understanding and practice, the statute conveys sufficiently definite warning as to what is proscribed. Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla.1972).
Finally, appellants argue that the statute violates due process by overbreadth, in that it could be applied to conduct that should only be punished as a misdemeanor. Overbreadth attack is only proper when the statute could be applied to innocent, protected activity, which does not include battery. Pruitt v. State, 363 So. 2d 552 (Fla.1978); State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9 (Fla.1977).
The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
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Terence A. Baker v. State, 466 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…rime being elevated to a higher degree, see, e.g., Ex parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72 (Ala.1984) (murder of police officer capital offense), and affords a rational basis for the reclassification of a crime to a higher offense, see, e.g., Street v. State, 383 So. 2d 900 (Fla.1980) (Section 784.07, Florida Statutes, making battery upon a law enforcement officer a felony, does not violate equal protection clause by the special treatment it gives to police officers as victims of batteries); Landrau v. State, 365 So. 2…
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State v. Nelson, 577 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…llows: (Emphasis added). Once more, the word “knowingly” is employed and in this context has been interpreted by our supreme court as requiring “that the accused know that his victim is a law enforcement officer or a firefighter.” Street v. State, 383 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla.1980). In the case of policemen and firefighters, the requirement of having to know makes sense. Police are usually in uniform and firefighters attired in classic garb that un [*973] mistakably puts the attacker in the know. However, thes…
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Wilkerson v. State, 401 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1981)…ion of the definition of animal may include certain life forms not contemplated by the legislature. But since appellant’s conduct was clearly proscribed by the statute, appellant does not have standing to make an overbreadth attack. Street v. State, 383 So. 2d 900 (Fla.1980); State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284 (Fla.1979). Appellant has raised some difficult questions concerning the applicability of this statute to hunters, fishermen, and pest exterminators. We believe that these hypothetical questions are more…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carmelos Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1977)
- Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972)
- Pruitt v. State, 363 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1978)
- Shaw v. State, 360 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 1978)