STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN BUFFORD, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida's appeal of a trial court order discharging a defendant for speedy trial violation was successful. The court held that both defendant-requested and state-requested continuances remove a case from the operation of Florida's 180-day speedy trial rule, and a defendant can only invoke the rule again by filing a motion for discharge.
Both defendant-requested and state-granted continuances remove a case from the operation of the 180-day speedy trial rule. Once a continuance is granted, a defendant can only invoke the rule again by filing a motion for discharge, requiring trial within 90 days of that motion or 180 days from initial custody, whichever is later. Constitutional speedy trial protections under Barker v. Wingo apply between continuances.
[1] A defendant who requests and is granted a continuance is no longer entitled to a speedy trial under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, except as provided in…
[2] A state's properly granted motion for continuance removes a case from the operation of the Speedy Trial Rule.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when either the defendant or the state is properly granted a continuance then the matter is taken out of the operation of the Speedy Trial Rule and the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial only within the constitutional guidelines as expressed, for example, in Barker v. Wingo”
Establishes the primary holding that continuances suspend the statutory speedy trial rule
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Bufford was taken into custody and a case was filed against him. The trial court granted a continuance in the case and subsequently discharge…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discharge cases and more on FLexlaw
DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
The order discharging appellee is reversed because no violation of the Speedy Trial Rule was committed by failing to bring the appellee to trial within 180 days of having been taken into custody. Rule 3.191, Fla.R.Crim.P. (1977). Even though appellee was not tried within the 180 days, his case was taken out of the operation of that rule by his having moved for and obtained a continuance. State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied 360 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.1978). The appellee was also not entitled to a discharge because the trial court had earlier properly granted a continuance requested by the appellant. Kurtz said:
We also hold that the State’s proper Motion for Continuance, which was granted, also took this matter out of the strict operation of the Speedy Trial Rule.
Id. at 892.
In granting the appellee’s motion for discharge in this case, the trial court relied upon State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied 365 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1978), which is apparently in conflict with Kurtz and Coppola v. State, 318 So. 2d 181 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), aff’d 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976).
While we agree confusion has naturally resulted from the Kurtz and Reese decisions, we will attempt to clear up the matter. We agree with Kurtz which says when either the defendant or the state is properly granted a continuance then the matter is taken out of the operation of the Speedy Trial Rule and the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial only within the constitutional guidelines as expressed, for example, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The only manner in which the Speedy Trial Rule is brought back into operation is if the defendant files a motion for discharge and then the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after that motion is filed. This is in accordance with, and within the limits defined in, State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971), and Coppo la v. State, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976). Rule 3.191(d)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1977), is the applicable rule and it provides the framework within which the foregoing cases rest.
It is our holding that if a defendant requests and is granted a continuance, he can no longer claim entitlement under Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1977), except within the limited circumstances in Rule 3.191(d)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1977).
We also hold that the state’s properly granted motion for continuance takes the matter out of the operation of the Speedy Trial Rule. Additionally, we hold that if after the later of either the foregoing circumstances occur the defendant files a motion for discharge, then the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days of the filing of the motion to discharge or within 180 days from when the defendant was first taken into custody”, whichever is later. This decision is in direct conflict with State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
-
State v. W. A. M., 412 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…t a defendant waives his right under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 by moving for and obtaining a continuance. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971); State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We agree and hold that discharging appellee was error because he had waived his rule rights by moving for a continuance of his adjudicatory hearing and because he has demonstrated no violation of his constitutional speedy trial…
-
Luhrs v. State, 394 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…er out of the operation of the speedy trial rule and a defendant is entitled to a speedy trial only within constitutional guidelines as expressed, for example, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The only manner by which the rule is brought back into operation is if the defendant files a motion for discharge; in that event, he must be brought to trial within ninety days after that motion is filed. Bufford at 930. See als…
-
State v. Brown, 394 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…d REMANDED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COBB, JJ., concur. . Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971); State v. Register, 380 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). . State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). . Rule 3.191(h)(2), Fla.R.Cr.P.; Wright v. State, 387 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Coppola v. State, 318 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Coppola v. State, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1976)