CARL LOUIS COPPOLA, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that there was no conflict of decisions to establish jurisdiction, and discharged the writ of certiorari.
A criminal defendant waived his speedy trial rights to obtain a continuance. After more than 90 days, he moved for discharge, which was denied by the …
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PER CURIAM.
We tentatively granted certiorari and dispensed with oral argument in this case in order to resolve an apparent conflict between the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 318 So. 2d 181, and the decision of this Court in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974). After reviewing the matter we have concluded that there is no decisional conflict to vest this Court with jurisdiction under Article V, § 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
In this case, a criminal defendant requested and was granted a trial continuance in a motion which specifically waived his right to a speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. After the passage of more than 90 days, defendant filed a motion for discharge which the trial judge denied. The district court affirmed the trial judge’s denial, holding that Rule 3.191(d)(3) did not entitle defendant to an immediate discharge.
In Negron, the State was granted a continuance without any waiver by the defendant of speedy trial rights under the Rule. We there held that a motion for discharge must be granted after the passage of 90 days. In Negron, the Court had under consideration a motion for discharge which fell within the mandate of Rule 3.191(d)(3) and beyond any of the exceptions contained therein. In this case there was a waiver within Rule 3.-191 (d) (2) (i) and the exception contained in Rule 3.191 (d) (3) (i) applied. The writ of certiorari is discharged.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, SUND-BERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. Rehearing denied;
OVERTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
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State v. Bufford, 383 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…r discharge in this case, the trial court relied upon State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied 365 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1978), which is apparently in conflict with Kurtz and Coppola v. State, 318 So. 2d 181 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), aff’d 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976). While we agree confusion has naturally resulted from the Kurtz and Reese decisions, we will attempt to clear up the matter. We agree with Kurtz which says when either the defendant or the state is properly granted a continuance then the…1 / 2
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State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…e argues that, neither the district courts, nor the Supreme Court, have followed Negron. To this end, the State eites State ex rel. Gadson v. Tyson, 334 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) and Coppola v. State, 318 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1975) affirmed, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976). In Gadson, supra, we had a similar sequence of events to those now before us, except for the vitally important distinction that the motion for discharge was filed only 173 days after the custody date. We agree with and reaffirm Gadson,…
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Thompson v. State ex rel. George Mitchell, 353 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…ohibition, which was granted. Relator contends that Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974), requires affirmance of this case. However, the defendant in Negron had not specifically waived her speedy trial rights under the rule. Coppola v. State, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976). Here a specific and unconditional waiver of speedy trial was made in writing. We think this case falls within the rationale of State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971). That case held that when the time limitations set…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ozzie Joseph Negron and Teresa Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974)
- Coppola v. State, 318 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)