AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM C. DEWBERRY, JR., AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICK JOSEPH DEWBERRY, DECEASED, AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THOMAS MICHAEL DEWBERRY, DECEASED, AND WILLIAM C. DEWBERRY, JR., INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1980-05-07
No. OO-301
LARRY G. SMITH, and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
383 So. 2d 1109 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1980) Caution
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Auto-Owners Insurance Company appeals a judgment awarding $400,000 in uninsured motorist coverage for deaths of two minor children, arguing the award should be reversed due to improper references to policy limits during trial. The court agrees that repeated mention of policy limits by appellees' counsel improperly influenced the jury to award the exact policy limit rather than fairly assess damages.


Holding

The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that references to policy limits in uninsured motorist coverage actions are prejudicial and inadmissible, regardless of whether the action is characterized as contractual rather than tortious. Policy limits are not a proper issue in either negligence actions or uninsured motorist coverage actions, and their injection into the case improperly influenced the jury to award the exact policy limit rather than fairly assess damages.


Headnotes

[1] References to insurance policy limits are generally inadmissible and prejudicial in an action arising from an automobile accident, even when brought under the uninsured m…

[2] The prejudicial effect of mentioning policy limits in an uninsured motorist case is equivalent to that in a direct negligence action against the tortfeasor, as the core i…

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Key Quotes

“While this case is based on contract, it has its underpinnings in tort liability. Before appellee could recover under the contract, he was required to prove that the underinsured motorist was negligent. The prejudicial effect upon the jury of references to policy limits in an action brought against one's own insurer upon the uninsured motorist coverage of the insured's policy is no different than in a direct negligence action against the tortfeasor.”

Establishes that despite contractual characterization, uninsured motorist cases are fundamentally tort actions and policy limit references are equally prejudicial as in direct negligence cases

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Facts & Procedural History

William C. Dewberry, Jr. held an auto insurance policy with Auto-Owners Insurance Company that included uninsured motorist coverage with policy limits…

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Opinion of the Court
McCORD, Judge.

McCORD, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment awarding $400,000, the full amount of the policy limits,1 to appellees pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage contained in appellee William C. Dewberry, Jr.’s, automobile insurance contract. The award was for the damages, resulting from the death of his two minor children, caused by an accident involving an underinsured' motorist. Appellant urges that the award should be reversed because of repeated references by counsel for appellees to the amount of the policy limits during voir dire, opening argument, and closing argument. We agree and remand for a new trial.

Appellees c'ontend that this is an action on an insurance contract and, therefore, the policy limits of the contract are admissible into evidence and may be freely commented upon to the jury. We disagree. While this case is based on contract, it has its underpinnings in tort liability. Before appellee could recover under the contract, he was required to prove that the underinsured motorist was negligent. The prejudicial effect upon the jury of references to policy limits in an action brought against one’s own insurer upon the uninsured motorist coverage of the insured’s policy is no different than in a direct negligence action against the tortfeasor. The issues in both actions are negligence, and policy limits are not normally an issue in either proceeding. These limits were not an issue in the case sub judice. The effect of injecting them into this case was to influence the jury to award the policy limits to appellees rather than to fairly assess the damages.

The Supreme Court in Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla.1971), listed four items for consideration when determining whether or not the mention of policy limits was error. While not exhaustive, these items are: (1) the size of the verdict in relation to the policy limits; (2) the nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries; (3) the amount of damages originally sought by the plaintiff; and (4) any exchanges with the jurors which on their face may reveal influence.

In the case below, the damages awarded were the exact amount of the policy limits. Also, remarks to the jurors by appellee’s counsel2 during closing argument leave little doubt that his emphasis upon the policy limits had an improper influence on the jury’s verdict. Appellees’ counsel repeatedly told the jury that they should find no less than this amount for the death of the two minor children. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant a new trial.

LARRY G. SMITH, and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. . Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 363 So. 2d 1077 (Fla.1978).

. “We’re limited to two hundred thousand dollars per child or a total of four hundred thousand dollars, but as I stated to you, the mere fact that there’s two hundred thousand dollar policy limits doesn’t automatically mean we’re entitled to it, because that policy says that we will pay you up to two hundred thousand dollars for any injury or death. And, if the child broke his leg, ten to fifteen thousand dollars. Or, if the child had lost his leg, probably an obvious two hundred thousand dollars. Or, say, Mr. Dewberry had been injured and had lost an arm and a leg in an accident. That would be an obvious two hundred thousand dollar case. We think the loss of a child is an obvious two hundred thousand dollar case. But, we’re at a disadvantage because this is an uninsured motorist case, and I can’t ask you for more than two hundred thousand dollars. .

I’m confident it will come back over two hundred thousand dollars, but then you’re limited to bringing in a total of two hundred thousand dollars for each child. I’m going to submit to you that it should be a hundred thousand for each parent for each child. 1-don’t think that either one loved a child any more than the other. If you return a verdict in this case for a total of two hundred thousand dollars, you’re not telling these people that’s all those children are worth. You’re telling those people, ‘We gave all that we could under the law.’ ”


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Citator

Cited By

  • Mercury Ins. Co. OF Fla. v. Moreta, 957 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …l’s assumption, an action to recover UM benefits is not an action for the breach of a contract of insurance. An action to recover UM benefits is based on a contract, but “it has its underpinnings in tort liability.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); see also Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Graci, 849 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (stating that an action on a contract to recover UM benefits “is not an action for a breach of that contract; rather, it is an action filed p…
  • Melara v. Cicione, 712 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …ver the defendant’s standing objection, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce pervasive and extensive evidence of the existence and amount of the defendant’s insurance coverage in a breach of contract action) and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (repeated references by the insured’s counsel as to the amount of the policy limits during voir dire, opening argument and closing argument constituted reversible error) and Levin v. Hanks, 356 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1…
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Carroll Wood, 535 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …that prejudicial error occurred. Johnny Roberts, Inc. v. Owens, 168 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1964). We agree that Allstate has failed to demonstrate clear and patent prejudicial error. On appeal, Allstate relies on Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), for reversal. This court’s Dewberry decision is easily distinguishable as there, not only did counsel mention the existence of insurance but also the extent thereof, and the jury returned a verdict in the exact amount of the pol…

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