TAYLOR JOSEY, PETITIONER,
v.
ROBERT BURNETT FUTCH, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the District Court of Appeal to clarify whether it applied the correct harmless-error standard regarding the mention of insurance policy limits to a jury, in light of the Court's recent decision in Stecher v. Pomeroy establishing that such error is harmless only if the record shows the jury was uninfluenced.
The Supreme Court held that the mention of insurance policy limits is not automatically harmful error; rather, harmfulness must be determined through a fact-specific review of the record. The Court remanded to the District Court to clarify which approach it used and, if it applied the fact-specific test, to explain how the record demonstrates harmful error.
[1] The mention of insurance policy limits to a jury can constitute harmless error if the record reveals the jury was uninfluenced by the mention.
[2] Determining whether the mention of insurance policy limits to a jury constitutes harmful error is a factual question to be determined by a review of the record in each ca…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although it was error to mention insurance policy limits to the jury, the error was harmless because the record revealed that the jury was uninfluenced by the mention of insurance”
Establishes the Court's holding in Stecher that mention of policy limits is not per se harmful error but depends on whether the jury was actually influenced.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA jury verdict was rendered in a case where the trial court mentioned insurance policy limits to the jury. The District Court of Appeal reversed based…
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By petition for writ of certiorari, we are asked to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District [Futch v. Josey, 247 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.2d, 1971)] which allegedly conflicts with this Court’s opinion in Beta Eta House Corp. Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So.2d 163 (Fla.1970).
We find that the case is controlled by our recent decision in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla.1971), Supreme Court opinion filed October 20, 1971. In Stecher, we held, inter alia, that although it was error to mention insurance policy limits to the jury, the error was harmless because the record revealed that the jury was uninfluenced by the mention of insurance.
In the instant case, the District Court concluded that the mention of policy limits was harmful error which required reversal. However, that decision was rendered prior to our pronouncement in Stecher and it is unclear from a reading of the opinion whether it comports or conflicts with Stecher.
*787Prior to Stecher one school of judicial thought held that the mention of policy limits to a jury constituted harmful error as a matter of law. A second school of thought, represented best by Stecher itself, adhered to the position that the question of harmful error in relation to the mention of insurance policy limits was a factual- question to be determined by a review of the record in each case. In this Court’s Stecher opinion we adopted the second of these approaches as being the most appropriate in light of Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969), and Beta Eta House Corporation, Inc. v. Gregory, supra.
It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain which approach was taken by the District Court in the instant case in order to determine whether conflict with Stecher exists. Since the opinion is unclear in this regard, we deem it appropriate to temporarily relinquish jurisdiction of the cause to the District Court for clarification in light of Stecher.
If the District Court did intend to adhere to the “review of the record” approach announced in Stecher, we hope that on remand the District Court will consent to clarify where and in what way the record shows that harmful error was indeed committed. This would be helpful not only to this Court in reaching its jurisdictional determination in this case but additionally would serve, along with Stecher, as the basis for a developing body of law on harmless error as it relates to the mention of policy limits.
For this latter purpose, we note that the size of the jury verdict in relation to the policy limits is only one of several factors to be considered in determining whether the jury was influenced by the mention of policy limits. Additional factors which may be appropriate in a given case are the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, the amount of damages originally sought by plaintiff, and any exchanges with jurors which may on their face reveal influence. These considerations are not intended to be exhaustive or to exclude other relevant factors, and indeed, are only mentioned here to emphasize that the essential consideration is evidence of influence on the jury, and that the amount of the verdict is only one method of ascertaining this.
Accordingly, because this Court is in doubt as to the rationale of the District Court in rendering its decision, jurisdiction of the cause is temporarily relinquished to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, for clarification in light of Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra. Upon clarification the District Court is directed to return the record in the cause here for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and ERVIN, CARLTON and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
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Special v. Ivo Baux, M.D., 79 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…r civil cases applying the outcome oriented analysis are Rance v. Hutchinson, 131 Fla. 460, 179 So. 777, 780 (1938); Herman v. Peacock, 103 Fla. 438, 137 So. 704 (1931); Routh v. Richards, 103 Fla. 757, 138 So. 72 (1931). . See also Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786, 787 (Fla.1971) (following Stecher) ("[T]he essential consideration is evidence of influence on the jury....”). . In 1985, the year before DiGuilio, Justice Overton noted that the Florida Supreme Court had "never expressly set forth a harmless erro…
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Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1991)…een paid by insurance. In the analogous situation in which there had been an erroneous mention of the defendant’s insurance policy limits, this Court held that the harmfulness of the error should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla.1971). GTE’s best argument for harmless error is that the jury found against the Gormleys on their personal injury claims. However, these claims involving smoke inhalation were not significant. The focus of the lawsuit was on the claim for pr…
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Odoms v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976)…the jury. If such is done, the jury should be instructed to disregard such evidence. However, the mention of policy liability limits is harmless error where it has no adverse effect upon the jury’s verdict. Stecher v. Pomeroy, supra; Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla.1971). The trial judge in the case sub judice held that the insurance policy’s liability limits should be considered as an “asset” of the defendant and admitted the evidence on the theory that the policy limits could be considered in assessing…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970)
- In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971)
- Futch v. Josey, 247 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)