LOIS WHITE, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
ROUNDTREE TRANSPORT, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1980-08-12
Nos. 79-1229, 79-1361
Before BARKDULL, HUBBART' and BASKIN, JJ.
386 So. 2d 1287 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1980) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The court reversed a trial court order that allocated a portion of attorney's fees earned by the Talburt firm to the Magill firm for legal services rendered to minor children in a wrongful death action. The court held that the Magill firm was not entitled to any portion of fees earned on behalf of the children because it labored under an undisclosed conflict of interest that it knew or should have known about from the outset.


Holding

The Magill firm is not entitled to any portion of the fee earned by the settlement on behalf of the children because it represented clients with conflicting interests without proper disclosure and ethical compliance. An attorney's right to a fee terminates when the attorney realizes or should realize that he cannot ethically represent his client's interests.


Headnotes

[1] An attorney's right to a fee terminates when the attorney realizes or should realize that they cannot ethically represent their client's interests.

[2] A law firm is not entitled to a portion of a fee earned from a settlement on behalf of minor children when the firm knew or should have known of a conflict of interest fr…

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Key Quotes

“An attorney's right to a fee terminates when the attorney realizes or should realize that he cannot ethically represent his client's interests.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that an attorney forfeits the right to fees when continuing representation violates ethical duties.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lois White retained the Magill firm to represent her in a wrongful death action; Sam Bloom also assisted as co-counsel and pursued a worker's compensa…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal challenges an order distributing attorney’s fees between two law firms involved in representing the estate and the survivors of Johnny Clayton White. We reverse.

Lois White, the widow of the deceased and the personal representative of the estate, retained the law firm of Magill, Sevier & Reid, P.A.,1 to represent her in a wrongful death action. Another attorney, Sam Bloom, pursued a worker’s compensation claim on behalf of Mrs. White and also acted as co-counsel on the wrongful death claim. At the initial meeting with her counsel, Mrs. White advised the attorneys that there were two surviving minor children from a prior marriage of Mr. White. The complaint that Bloom and Magill filed in the wrongful death action sought damages on behalf of Lois White and the minor children.

In the meantime, Catherine Hulett, the mother of the two children and former wife of the deceased, retained the law firm of Talburt, Kubicki & Bradley on a 40% contingent fee contract to pursue any claims Hulett or her two children might have as a result of White’s death. The Talburt firm pursued a worker’s compensation claim on behalf of the children and ultimately intervened in the pending wrongful death action.

Eventually, the Magill firm obtained summary judgments establishing liability against the defendants in the wrongful death action and settled Mrs. White’s claim for damages. In resolving the claim of the children, the Talburt firm obtained a settlement of $125,000. Under the 40% contingent fee contract, Talburt had earned a fee of $50,000.

Mrs. White then petitioned the trial court for an allocation of attorney’s fees payable to Magill out of the $50,000 contingent fee as compensation for the services Magill performed for the children. After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered an order to distribute a portion of the fee accruing to Talburt, Kubicki to Magill as the “fair and reasonable value of legal services rendered by Magill on behalf of the minor children.” The trial court awarded Magill “50% of the earned fee of the first $50,000 or the sum of $10,000.00 and 25% of the earned fee on the balance of $75,000.00 or the sum of $7,500.00 making a total fee of $17,500.00.” The Talburt firm takes this appeal from that order. An attorney’s right to a fee terminates when the attorney realizes or should realize that he cannot ethically represent his client’s interests. See Hill v. Douglass, 271 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972). At the hearing on attorney’s fees, Mr. Bloom and an attorney from the Magill firm conceded that there was a conflict in the positions of Mrs. White and the children concerning the division of the worker’s compensation award2 and that a similar conflict became apparent in the wrongful death action as it progressed. There was also evidence that the Magill firm knew or should have known of this conflict from the commencement of the wrongful death action.

The Magill firm is not entitled to any portion of the fee earned by the settlement on behalf of the children. Fla.Bar Code Prof.Resp., Canon 5 and DR5-105.

In light of our disposition of the first issue raised, we need not address the merits of any other points raised on this appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, the order on distribution of fees is reversed.

. This firm is now known as Lanza, Sevier & Womack, P.A. . See § 440.16(2), Fla.Stat. (1975).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Adams v. Montgomery, Searcy & Denney, P.A., 555 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …hearing, ap-pellees argued that appellant should receive nothing. An attorney’s right to a fee terminates when the attorney realizes or should realize that he or she cannot ethically represent his or her client. White v. Roundtree Transport, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The conflict arose before appellees made appellant part of their client’s lawsuit and continued thereafter. After the conflict, no attorney-client relationship could have been ethically established between appellees and appellant…
  • Ballard v. Honorable Frank N. Kaney, 397 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …uted a waiver.- Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Llanusa v. Glickstein, 376 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); White v. State, 338 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Hammock v. State, 330 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), and State ex rel. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cited by respondent, are distinguishable because in those cases the plea was entered before the speedy trial rule period had expired. This court has held th…
  • State v. Rosenfeld, 467 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …nce the motion to withdraw the plea was granted, the case was outside the ambit of rule 3.191 and all that was left to do was set the case for trial within a reasonable [*733] time. Wehrle v. State, 414 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The failure to file the perjury count was clearly a feature of the negotiated plea. The defendant cannot defeat the state’s opportunity to charge her by negotiating a plea and then obtaining a favorable ruling, after the speedy t…

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