THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICIA ROSENFELD, APPELLEE
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Patricia Rosenfeld was arrested for official misconduct and perjury but negotiated a plea to misconduct alone. After withdrawing her guilty plea, she moved to dismiss the misconduct charge as unconstitutionally vague and challenged the perjury charge on speedy trial grounds. The Florida appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the misconduct charge but reversed the discharge on the perjury count, holding that the speedy trial rule did not apply after plea withdrawal.
The court affirmed that section 839.25(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution, warranting dismissal of the misconduct charge. However, the court reversed the discharge on the perjury count, holding that the speedy trial rule did not apply after the plea withdrawal, and the defendant could not defeat the state's opportunity to prosecute by strategically timing a plea withdrawal motion.
[1] A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution.
[2] A defendant cannot defeat the state's opportunity to charge them by negotiating a plea and then obtaining a favorable ruling on a motion to withdraw the plea after the sp…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 839.-25(l)(a) is so vague as to violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution”
Establishes the court's holding that the official misconduct statute is unconstitutionally vague and must be dismissed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRosenfeld was arrested on May 24, 1983, for official misconduct and perjury. In June 1983, she negotiated a plea agreement whereby the state would acc…
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NESBITT, Judge.
Patricia Rosenfeld was arrested on May 24, 1983, for the crimes of official misconduct, in violation of section 839.25(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1981),1 and perjury, in violation of section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1981). In early and mid-June 1983, the parties negotiated a plea under which the state agreed to accept a guilty plea to a one-count information charging misconduct. It was understood that if the plea was not accepted, the state would file both the misconduct and perjury charges.
On June 23, 1983, the state filed the one-count information charging official misconduct. On September 22, 1983, Ro-senfeld pled guilty to the charge and a presentence investigation was ordered. The defendant, on October 25, 1983, filed a motion to withdraw the plea. That motion was granted on December 14, 1983, more than 180 days after Rosenfeld's arrest. On January 20, 1984, Rosenfeld filed a motion to dismiss the official misconduct charge on the ground that section 839.25(l)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The state responded by filing a new information charging both official misconduct and perjury. Ro-senfeld replied with a second motion to dismiss the misconduct charge and with a motion to discharge on the perjury count on the ground that the speedy trial period had run. The trial court granted both motions. The state has appealed those rulings. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The trial court dismissed the official misconduct count on a finding that section 839.25(l)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm the trial court’s finding and align ourselves with our sister court in State v. Jenkins, 454 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), in holding that section 839.-25(l)(a) is so vague as to violate the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution.
The trial court discharged Rosen-feld on the perjury count finding that she was deprived of her right to a speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1). We disagree and reverse. Once the motion to withdraw the plea was granted, the case was outside the ambit of rule 3.191 and all that was left to do was set the case for trial within a reasonable time. Wehrle v. State, 414 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). The failure to file the perjury count was clearly a feature of the negotiated plea. The defendant cannot defeat the state’s opportunity to charge her by negotiating a plea and then obtaining a favorable ruling, after the speedy trial time has passed, on a motion to withdraw the plea which is filed shortly before the speedy trial time has run.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
. 839.25 Official misconduct.—
(1) "Official misconduct" means the commission of one of the following ácts by a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to cause unlawful harm to another:
(a) Knowingly refraining, or causing another to refrain, from performing a duty imposed upon him by law ...
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Geiger v. State, 532 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ee Fairweather. Likewise, there is not a violation of the speedy trial rule. This court’s direction to the trial judge to permit Geiger to withdraw her pleas causes this case to be outside the ambit of the speedy trial rule. See State v. Rosenfeld, 467 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA), ‘petition for review denied, 476 So. 2d 675 (1985). The dismissal of these charges clearly was a part of the “entire package” of the negotiated plea. Geiger cannot thwart the state’s opportunity to try her on these charges by negotiat…
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Rosenfeld v. Crim. Just. Standards & Training Comm'n, 541 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…eld’s law enforcement officer certification. AFFIRMED. . Rosenfeld had earlier been charged with the crimes of official misconduct and perjury. This court declared the official misconduct statute to be unconstitutionally vague, State v. Rosenfeld, 467 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and a jury acquitted Rosenfeld of perjury.…
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State v. Bulgin, 858 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)…al rule because the delay in proceeding was caused by the defendant’s announcement of an intent to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, although he was not brought to the court for plea purposes until the deadline expired); State v. Rosenfeld, 467 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(reversing a discharge based on the speedy trial rule, the court ruled that “[t]he defendant cannot defeat the state’s opportunity to charge her by negotiating a plea and then obtaining a favorable ruling, after the speedy tri…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- White v. Roundtree Transp., Inc., 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Exon v. Stockton, 454 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Davis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Brown v. State, 414 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)