STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JAMES CURRIE, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court order discharging defendant James Currie under the speedy trial rule. The appellate court held that the 180-day speedy trial clock began when Currie was returned to Palm Beach County custody on charges for which he had not previously been in custody, not when the information was originally filed, and therefore reversed the discharge order.
The 180-day speedy trial period begins when the defendant is actually returned to custody in the jurisdiction where the trial will occur for the specific charges at issue, not from the date the information is filed if the defendant is in custody elsewhere at that time. On these facts, the 180-day period for the two new counts began on October 15, 1979, when Currie was returned to Palm Beach County custody, making his December 13, 1979 motion for discharge premature.
[1] The speedy trial period begins to run when a defendant is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.
[2] A capias issued for a defendant already in custody in another jurisdiction serves only as a detainer and does not commence the speedy trial period for the new charges.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a person charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 180 days after the person "is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged."”
Establishes the statutory requirement that the appellate court must interpret regarding when the speedy trial clock begins to run.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCurrie was taken into custody in Palm Beach County Jail on March 23, 1979 on one forgery charge. On April 9, 1979, he was transferred to Miami on vari…
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HERSEY, Judge.
The state appeals from an order discharging appellee under the “speedy trial” rule. We conclude that the time within which appellee could have been brought to trial had not expired at the time appellee filed his motion for discharge and we therefore reverse.
Rule 3.191(a)(1), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a person charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 180 days after the person “is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged.” The issue in this case is when the 180 days began to run.
Appellee is charged in three counts with three separate and distinct episodes involving uttering a forgery.
As to one instance of uttering a forgery appellee was taken into custody and put in the Palm Beach County Jail on March 23, 1979.
After some intervening events not pertinent to the issue on appeal, appellee, on April 9, 1979, was taken to Miami on various warrants issued there, where he was again incarcerated.
On that same day, April 9th, an information was filed in Palm Beach County containing three counts of uttering a forgery, only one of which was related to the earlier incarceration in Palm Beach County. A capias then issued on the two new charges, which capias was executed and filed with the clerk’s office on April 17, 1979.
Subsequently appellee’s pro se motion for transfer back to Palm Beach County was granted and on October 15, 1979, he was returned to the Palm Beach County Jail where he was later arraigned.
On December 13, 1979, appellee filed his motion for discharge which was granted on January 15, 1980.
Appellee was originally in custody in Palm Beach County on only one of the three counts eventually lodged against him. When the capias was issued and executed on the two additional counts appellee was in custody in Dade County. The capias therefore acted only as a detainer and appellee could not be considered in the custody of Palm Beach County authorities with reference to these two later counts. Under these circumstances the speedy trial time of 180 days is computed from the time appel-lee was returned to custody in Palm Beach County, or October 15,1979. State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla.1977); Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). His motion for discharge was therefore premature and should have been denied.
The order granting the motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LETTS, C. J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Nieman, 433 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…iminal action); State v. Vakojevich, 392 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (reversing order discharging defendant on speedy trial grounds when defendant had moved for continuance rendering time limits in speedy trial rule inapplicable); State v. Currie, 386 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (reversing order granting motion for discharge under speedy trial rule because the motion was filed prematurely); State v. Rollins, 386 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (applying law of the case in reversing order discharging defend…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Bassham, 352 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1977)
- Eaddy v. State, 352 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)