LONNIE RUBEN EADY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the juvenile's sentences were invalid due to the trial court's failure to follow statutory sentencing procedures for juveniles and that one sentence was excessive.
[1] A trial court must make findings of fact and evaluate a juvenile based on statutory criteria when imposing adult sanctions.
[2] Failure to comply with statutory safeguards when imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile constitutes harmful error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA juvenile was charged with armed robbery and attempted armed robbery, pled nolo contendere, and was sentenced as an adult. The trial court did not ma…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Lonnie Ruben Eady, a juvenile, was charged with armed robbery and attempted armed robbery, pursuant to Section 39.04(2)(e)4, Florida Statutes (1977), which permits the filing of an information against a child aged sixteen or seventeen at the time of the commission of the offense. Both informations alleged that he “did carry a weapon, to-wit [sic]: a knife.” Appellant pled nolo contendere to both charges. The court sentenced him as an adult to forty-five years in prison on the armed robbery offense, retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence, and five years in prison for the attempted armed robbery, to run concurrently.
Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in not sentencing him pursuant to Section 39.111(6)(c)1-6, Florida Statutes (1979). He also contends that his sentence is excessive. We agree on both points.
Section 39.111(6) requires that a trial court, when imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile, make findings of fact and evaluate the juvenile based on the criteria in Section 39.111(6)(c). State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980). In Cain, the court noted that because of the protection of Section 39.-111(6)(c) the direct filing of an information does not constitute an abandonment of rehabilitative efforts on behalf of the juvenile.
Failure to comply with the safeguards of Section 39.111(6) is harmful error. Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Appellant was not sentenced in conformance with that statute. Consequently, appellant’s sentences are invalid.
Appellant’s sentence for robbery with a weapon is, in any event, excessive. Robbery with a weapon is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term in prison not to exceed thirty years. §§ 812.13(2)(b) and 775.082(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979). Appellant’s sentence of forty-five years in prison exceeds this statutory maximum.
Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED, but the sentences are REVERSED and the cause REMANDED with instructions to resentence appellant pursuant to Section 39.111(6).
SCHEB, C. J., and BOARDMAN and OTT, JJ., concur.
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T.D.L. v. Chinault, 570 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…ns as required by section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes (1989). These provisions are mandatory for juveniles prosecuted as adults. Boudreau v. State, 546 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Reed v. State, 544 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Eady v. State, 388 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Even when the child reaches adulthood between the time of the offense and the date of disposition, such that he is not even a “juvenile” when before the court, the statute should be followed. Green v. State, 506 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2…
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Williams v. State, 407 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…committed error in not sentencing him pursuant to section 39.111(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1979). He also contends that his sentence is excessive. We agree. Failure to comply with the safeguards of section 39.111(6) is harmful error. Eady v. State, 388 So. 2d 9 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Appellant was not sentenced in conformance with that statute and, therefore, his sentences are invalid. Also, appellant’s sentences for attempted first degree murder are excessive. The maximum sentence for attempted first degree…
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Glenn v. State, 411 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…1 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Even where no objection was made in the trial court, our sister court has held the sentences invalid for failure to comply with section 39.111. See G. D. W. v. State, 395 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Eady v. State, 388 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In Rubasky, 401 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), we held the defendant could not argue for the first time on appeal non-compliance with section 39.111(6), where at sentencing the age of the defendant and possible sentencing as a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980)
- Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)