GUILLERMINA J. LAUREDO, APPELLANT,
v.
FIDELITY & CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, APPELLEE
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Guillermina Lauredo was injured while driving her commercial van and sought Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage under her separate Chevrolet insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida's no-stacking statute limits PIP coverage to the policy on the vehicle actually occupied during the accident.
The no-stacking statute restricts PIP coverage to the policy on the specific vehicle the claimant was occupying at the time of the accident, regardless of whether other policies with PIP coverage exist on other vehicles owned by the insured.
[1] Personal Injury Protection (PIP) coverage is limited to the coverage provided by the policy on the vehicle involved in the accident, regardless of whether the insured occ…
[2] A "no-stacking" statute in insurance law prohibits the aggregation of coverage limits from multiple policies and restricts recovery to the coverage of the policy covering…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident”
Statement of the no-stacking statute requirement limiting coverage to the vehicle actually involved in the accident
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Lauredo was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving her 1970 Ford van, a commercial vehicle. She owned two vehicles with separate …
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, plaintiff in the trial court (Guillermina J. Lauredo), brings this appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant (appellee herein), Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York.
The appellant was injured while driving her 1970 Ford van (a commercial vehicle) when she was struck by a motor vehicle. The Ford van and a 1971 Chevrolet (also owned by the appellant) were both insured under separate policies by the appellee. Because the Ford van was a commercial vehicle its policy did not contain PIP coverage, but the policy for the Chevrolet did contain PIP coverage with a $5,000.00 limit.
Accordingly, the appellant sought recovery under the PIP coverage under her Chevrolet policy. Following the appellant’s notice and proof of claim, the insurance company denied coverage and refused to pay her medical expenses. Because of this denial, Ms. Lauredo instituted a declaratory action to determine her rights under the policy covering her Chevrolet. From cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion of the insurer and entered a final summary judgment for Fidelity, ruling that there was no coverage under the subject policy. This appeal ensued.
We affirm. The appellant seeks PIP coverage because she was injured while occupying a “commercial vehicle” and not a “motor vehicle”.
However, the appellant overlooks the wording of the “no-stack” statute [Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1976)] to the effect that “. . . the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident.” Accordingly, even though the appellant was not the occupant of a “motor vehicle”, she was the occupant of a “vehicle”. See: State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), for the proposition that the “no-stacking” statute has the twofold purpose of prohibiting stacking of coverages and restricting coverage to that contained in the policy covering the vehicle the claimant was occupying at the time of the accident.
Therefore, the final summary judgment here under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)