STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ESAU PERNELL, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1980-10-15
No. 80-417
Moore, J., Hersey, J., Glickstein, J.
388 So. 2d 1105 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Florida's appeal of a speedy trial discharge is reversed because the trial court relied on precedent that had been overruled by subsequent case law establishing different speedy trial standards.


Holding

A trial court's order discharging a defendant based on speedy trial violations must be reversed when the court relied on precedent that has been overruled by intervening appellate decisions.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's reliance on subsequently overruled precedent in granting a speedy trial discharge does not insulate the order from reversal on appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

Pernell was charged with delivery of cocaine on May 10, 1978. Between May 1978 and March 1979, he received five continuances, and the State received o…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This case involves an application of the speedy trial rule. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. From May 10, 1978, when appellee was charged with delivery of cocaine through March 26,1979, the appellee was granted no less than five requests for continuance. On May 14, 1979 the appellant, State of Florida, was granted a continuance because its chemist was not available for trial. On August 24, 1979 the original trial judge recused himself and the matter was set for trial before a successor judge. The appel-lee’s motion for discharge was heard on September 10, 1979 and granted on February 26, 1980. Speedy trial time was tolled by order of the court on August 24, 1979 and the appellee specifically waived speedy trial in each of his motions for continuance. The State now appeals the order granting the discharge and we reverse.

The trial court relied on Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974) and State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) in granting the discharge, and correctly so at that time. Each of those cases has been overruled. See, Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Van Johnson, 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Accordingly, the order granting the appellee’s discharge is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MOORE, HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gilbert v. State, 817 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …time of the theft beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. See Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104, 108 (Fla.1974) (overruling on other grounds recognized by State v. Van Johnson, 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and State v. Pernell, 388 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). In IT. v. State, 796 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), this court adopted a two pronged test for determining whether the evidence adduced at trial to prove the value of the stolen property is sufficient to withstand a motion fo…
  • State v. Leonetti, 393 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …and was correct in doing so at that time. However, those cases have now been disapproved and effectively overruled. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See also State v. Pernell, 388 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The order granting the appellee’s discharge is reversed, his motion for discharge is denied,3 and this cause is remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1)…

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