STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PAT THOMAS LEONETTI, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida reversed the trial court's discharge of a defendant based on speedy trial violations, holding that prior case law supporting the discharge had been overruled by subsequent Florida Supreme Court precedent.
A defendant's discharge based on speedy trial rule violations must be reversed when the precedent supporting that discharge has been overruled by subsequent appellate authority.
[1] A defendant's discharge on speedy trial grounds must be reconsidered when precedent supporting the discharge has been overruled by subsequent appellate authority.
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeonetti moved for a continuance while waiving his speedy trial rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. The State amended the informati…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discharge Of Defendant cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
Appellant, the accused in a criminal case, moved for a continuance specifically waiving his rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. Thereafter the State twice amended the information causing trial delay. More than 180 days1 after appellant was taken into custody and more than 90 days2 after the original trial date appellant moved for a discharge. The trial court granted the discharge citing State ex rel. Meredith v. Glickstein, 377 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Johnson v. State, 366 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 76 (Fla.1979); and State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 715 (Fla.1978), and was correct in doing so at that time. However, those cases have now been disapproved and effectively overruled. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See also State v. Pernell, 388 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The order granting the appellee’s discharge is reversed, his motion for discharge is denied,3 and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3).
. It should be noted that this opinion, when final, will itself be a denial of appellee’s motion for discharge and, under Butterworth, will commence the running of a new 90 day period within which appellee must be brought to trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Lopez, 402 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…e or within any period of time available to the defendant other than the period of time specified in rule 3.191(a)(1). Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971); State v. Leonetti, 393 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). SCHEB, C. J., and OTT, J., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Reese, 359 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- State v. van Johnson, 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Johnson v. State, 366 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- State v. Esau Pernell, 388 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Kenneth Thomas Meredith v. The Honorable Hugh S. Glickstein, 377 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)