BERNARD ADAMS (A MISNOMER WHOSE CORRECT NAME IS BERNARD ABRAMS) ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
BRICKELL TOWNHOUSE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, JERRY A. GROSS AND LAURANS A. MENDELSON, APPELLEES
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Tenants appealed the dismissal of individual corporate officers from their tort and contract claims arising from disturbances caused by condominium renovation work. The court affirmed dismissal of contract claims against the officers but reversed the dismissal of tort claims, holding that corporate officers are personally liable for their tortious acts regardless of corporate status.
Individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable for tortious acts committed by them, even when performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers. The corporate fiction does not insulate officers from personal liability for their own tortious conduct, though it may protect stockholders. Contract claims against the individual officers were properly dismissed, but tort claims must proceed against them.
[1] Individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable for their tortious acts, even if performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate offi…
[2] Allegations to pierce the corporate veil are not necessary to hold corporate officers personally liable for their tortious acts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable to any third person even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents”
Establishes the core holding that officers cannot hide behind corporate status for personal tortious liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants were tenants at Brickell Townhouse during extensive renovation for condominium conversion. The renovation caused numerous inconveniences in…
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HENDRY, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a final order1 of the circuit court dismissing the individual appellees from plaintiffs’ (appellants’) action sounding in tort and contract. We affirm as to the counts stemming from the corporation’s contractual duties; we reverse the individual appellees’ dismissal as to the tort counts; finally, we remand to the trial court, with leave to appellants to amend their complaint.
Appellants are tenants at the Brickell Townhouse, formerly owned by the corporate appellee; the individual appellees are officers of the corporation. Suit arose from inconveniences imposed upon appellants by the process of extensive renovation instituted incident to condominium conversion. These inconveniences allegedly included
deprivation of water, electricity, air conditioning, elevator service, entrance into apartments without notice, breaking holes into apartment walls which are visible from common hallways, throwing about the tenant’s property, damaging the tenant’s personal property and performing work as early as 6:30 A.M.
Appellants’ Amended Complaint contained four counts, alleging nuisance, breach of lease, trespass with malicious injury to property, and retaliatory eviction. Motion to Dismiss as to the individual appellees was granted on all counts on the basis of their status as “merely officers of said corporation.”
This was error. Where a tort has been committed,
individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable to any third person even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents. See Dade Roofing and Insulation Corp. v. Torres, 369 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Bush v. Belenke, 381 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). CIC Leasing Corp. v. Dade County Linen and Furniture Co., 279 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
The ruling below is defended on the ground that facts necessary to disregard the corporate entity (“pierce the corporate veil”) were not alleged. It is true that no such allegations were made; however, none were necessary: One purpose of the corporate fiction is to insulate stockholders from liability for corporate acts; however, officers of a corporation are no less personally responsible for their tortious acts by virtue of those acts having been performed in the corporate name.
Reversed and remanded.
. Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
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Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Orlovsky v. Solid Surf, Inc., 405 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…eld liable for appellant’s injuries. We disagree. A corporate officer is potentially individually liable for his tortious acts even though such acts were committed in the scope of his employment by the corporation. Adams v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Company, 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla.2d DCA 1961), 8 Fla.Jur.2d Business Relationships § 339. 19 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, § 1382 succinctly sets forth this rule and its underlying rationale as follows: A…
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Littman v. Commercial Bank & Tr. Co., 425 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…agree. Individual officers and agents of a corporation are personally liable where they have committed a tort even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents. Adams v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); Bush v. Belenke, 381 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); CIC Leasing Corp. v. Dade Linen and Furniture Co., 279 So. 2d 73 (Fla.3d DCA 1973) and cases cited; see Dade Roofing and Insulation Corp. v. Torres, 369 So. 2d 98 (Fla.3d DCA…
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White-Wilson Med. Ctr. v. Dayta Consultants, Inc., 486 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…iable for their own torts even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers or agents. This is so even if no argument is advanced that the corporate form should be disregarded. Adams v. Brickell Townhouse, 388 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In McDaniel v. Sheffield, 431 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) we held that officers of a corporation did not individually owe a duty to an employee who was shot and killed during an armed robbery where they were not in poss…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- CIC Leasing Corp. v. Dade Linen & Furniture Co., 279 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Bush v. Burt Belenke, 381 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Dade Roofing & Insulation Corp. v. Torres, 369 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)