BRIAN K. ORLOVSKY, APPELLANT,
v.
SOLID SURF, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION D/B/A SOLID SURF SKATEBOARD PARK AND ROBERT E. SPENCE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this personal injury action arising from a skateboard park injury, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the managing officer Robert Spence as a defendant, holding that corporate officers can be individually liable for their own tortious acts committed in the scope of employment, even when the corporation is also liable.
A corporate officer is potentially individually liable for his own tortious acts even though committed in the scope of his employment by the corporation. The complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action against Spence because it alleged he was personally involved in the tortious conduct, so the motion to dismiss should not have been granted.
[1] An order dismissing a party completely from a lawsuit is a final, appealable order.
[2] An order that does not completely dismiss a party from a lawsuit is not a final, appealable order.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A corporate officer is potentially individually liable for his tortious acts even though such acts were committed in the scope of his employment by the corporation.”
Establishes the central holding that corporate officers can have personal liability despite their representative status.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrian Orlovsky was injured at a skateboard park operated by Solid Surf, Inc. The complaint alleged that Spence, the managing officer, negligently oper…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Final Appealable Order cases and more on FLexlaw
MOORE, Judge.
In this personal injury action, the appellant, Brian Orlovsky, sued a corporation, Solid Surf, Inc., and its managing officer, Robert Spence, for negligence in the operation of a skateboard park. The appellant challenges an order dismissing all counts of his complaint against Spence and striking only his punitive damage claim against Solid Surf. The order did not dismiss appellant’s other claims against Solid Surf.
Initially, we must determine whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. As to appellee, Spence, the order completely dismissed him from the case. Consequently, the judicial labor in the suit against Spence has ended. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the dismissal as a final appealable order. See Let’s Help Florida v. DHS Films, Inc., 392 So. 2d 915 (Fla.3d DCA 1980).
As to appellee, Solid Surf, on the other hand, the trial court’s order did not completely dismiss it from the case. Accordingly, the order is not final as to Solid Surf and, as such, is not appealable. Weltz v. Mann, 383 So. 2d 324 (Fla.5th DCA 1980). See also Gibbs v. Reliance Insurance Company, 399 So. 2d 1108 (Fla.5th DCA 1981). We, therefore, will not review the propriety of the trial court order insofar as it struck appellant’s punitive damage claim.
After reviewing the order insofar as it dismissed Spence from the lawsuit, we reverse. Essentially, appellant’s complaint alleged that Spence negligently operated the skateboard park by renting defective equipment and failing to take precaution against injuries. Spence moved to dismiss the complaint against him alleging that it fails to state a cause of action because he could not, as a mere officer of Solid Surf, be held liable for appellant’s injuries.
We disagree. A corporate officer is potentially individually liable for his tortious acts even though such acts were committed in the scope of his employment by the corporation. Adams v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Company, 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla.2d DCA 1961), 8 Fla.Jur.2d Business Relationships § 339. 19 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, § 1382 succinctly sets forth this rule and its underlying rationale as follows:
A director or officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability for its torts merely by reason of his official character; he is not liable for torts committed by or for the corporation unless he has participated in the wrong.
Accordingly, directors not parties to a wrongful act on the part of other directors are not liable therefor. If, however, a director or officer commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not it is also by or for the corporation, he is liable to third persons injured thereby, and it does not matter what liability attaches to the corporation for the tort. A contrary rule would enable a director or officer of a corporation to perpetrate flagrant injuries and escape liability behind the shield of his representative character, even though the corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible. (Footnotes omitted.)
Applying this rule, we find that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Spence. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, all facts of the complaint are accepted as true. Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Carter v. Sterling Finance Company, 132 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961); Nunez v. Alford, 117 So. 2d 208 (Fla.2d DCA 1960). A motion to dismiss should not be granted if the pleader sets forth facts in his complaint upon which relief can be granted on any theory. Martin v. Highway Equipment Supply Co., 172 So. 2d 246 (Fla.2d DCA 1965). The appellant’s complaint clearly alleged that Spence was personally involved in the tortious conduct resulting in appellant’s injuries.
Thus, a legal basis exists for Spence’s individual liability and the trial court erred in dismissing Spence from the case.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Spence as a party defendant and dismiss this appeal as it relates to the punitive damage claim against Solid Surf.
REVERSED.
ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (42 total)
-
Hillman Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…e we assess not the ultimate merits of the contractor’s claim but merely whether he can plead it. The test for pleading is whether the contractor could theoretically offer evidence that would support the cause of action. Orlovsky v. Solid Surf Inc., 405 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Complaints should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless the movant can establish beyond any doubt that the claimant could prove no set of facts whatever in support of his claim. Martin v. Highway Equipme…
-
LA Pesca Grande Charters, Inc. v. Moran, 704 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…agents of a corporation may be personally liable, even if such acts are performed within the scope of their employment or as corporate officers. Littman v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 425 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Orlovsky v. Solid Surf, Inc., 405 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). A suit for fraud in inducing the contract and suit for breach of contract are two different causes of action and are not mutually exclusive. Williams, supra. However, the identical damages are claimed in Count VI for the alleged…
-
Littman v. Commercial Bank & Tr. Co., 425 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…2d 98 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). Since Irving Littman personally handled the purchase and resale of the fork lift, he is individually liable for the tort alleged herein and the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss. Orlovsky v. Solid Surf, Inc., 405 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.4th DCA 1981). III The third and final contention raised alleges that the trial court erred in using the unpaid balance under the security agreement as the measure of damages. As appellants have cited no authority for their assertion that fai…
Previewing 3 of 42 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ramel v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., Inc., 135 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Fletcher v. Williams, 153 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Martin v. Hwy. Equip. Supply Co., Inc., 172 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Bernard Adams (a misnomer whose correct name is Bernard Abrams) v. Brickell Townhouse, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Let's Help Florida v. DHS Films, Inc., 392 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Nunez v. Alford, 117 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Carter v. Sterling Fin. Co., 132 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Graham Trucking Lines, Inc. v. C & D Trucking Serv., Inc., 383 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Gertrude Gibbs v. Reliance Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)