LELAND WAYNE HARPOLD AND THOMAS HINZ, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1980-10-07
No. 79-712
Before SCHWARTZ and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ., and VANN, HAROLD R. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
389 So. 2d 279 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Harpold and Hinz appeal their convictions for drug possession, challenging whether police had probable cause to arrest Harpold and whether a valid stop occurred before the dog alert detected contraband in a suitcase. The case addresses whether constructive possession can be inferred when only one defendant was ever seen possessing the luggage.


Holding

The court assumes without deciding that a valid stop occurred. The court does not address whether probable cause existed for Harpold's arrest despite the lack of evidence he possessed the suitcase, focusing instead on the validity of the initial police encounter and the subsequent dog alert.


Headnotes

[1] A nolo contendere plea, reserving the right to appeal a suppression ruling, concedes the charge of possession, including constructive possession.

[2] A police officer's identification of himself and request for identification does not necessarily constitute a stop.

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Key Quotes

“The undisputed testimony is that Harpold was never seen in possession of this suitcase.”

Establishes the factual basis for Harpold's challenge to constructive possession and probable cause for his arrest.

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Facts & Procedural History

Hinz and Harpold arrived in Miami from Detroit. Hinz removed a gray suitcase from baggage and maintained possession of it throughout the day—keeping i…

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Opinion of the Court
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

. Only this gray molded suitcase contained contraband. Hinz (already under surveillance) removed it from the baggage carousel when the defendants arrived in Miami from Detroit earlier in the day. It remained with Hinz in the waiting taxicab when Harpold paid a quick visit to a Holiday Inn. It remained with Hinz when the taxicab dropped Harpold at the Arrowhead Hotel. Hinz took it with him into a residence where he remained for about five hours. Hinz exited the residence with the suitcase when Harpold picked him up ih another cab for their return trip to the airport. It was Hinz who carried the suitcase towards the airport when the defendants met up with the police officer. The undisputed testimony is that Harpold was never seen in possession of this suitcase. We do not, however, concern ourselves with the fact that although the dog sniff provided probable cause for the arrest of Hinz and the seizure of the suitcase, no probable cause existed for the arrest of Harpold. Harpold’s luggage was searched after his arrest, but no contraband was found therein.

Harpold’s lack of possession became the subject of a sworn motion to dismiss, which, however, Harpold later abandoned. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, both defendants entered nolo contendere pleas, reserving only the right to appeal the suppression ruling. By his nolo contendere plea, Harpold conceded the charge in the information that he . possessed (presumably, constructively) the contraband found in the suitcase.

. Our holding assumes, without deciding, that a stop occurred. The trial court based its mere encounter finding on the following evidence. Hinz approached the police officer, who was walking towards the terminal. Hinz engaged him in conversation about the officer’s dog. Hinz claimed he raised dogs, knew quite a bit about them, and commented on the beauty of the dog as the officer, dog and the two defendants walked along. They continued to chat innocuously until they reached the terminal sidewalk where the officer identified himself, showed the defendants his badge, and asked them “would they mind showing [him] some identification?” The defendants handed the officer their drivers’ licenses, and within seconds, the dog gave a positive alert to the presence of narcotics within the suitcase Hinz had set down.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Foster, 390 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …earch of Foster’s person revealed a bag of cocaine in each sock.1 The state appeals from a suppression order. We reverse. In general, a trained narcotics dog’s “alert” on luggage constitutes probable cause for a subsequent arrest. Harpold v. State, 389 So. 2d 279 (1980); State v. Good- [*470] ley, 381 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Whether, in this particular case, Le Dur’s “alert” furnished probable cause for Foster’s arrest depends upon several factors succinctly gathered at 13 San Diego L.Rev. 410, 416-1…
  • Cavalluzzi v. State, 409 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …supra, or, as in the present case, from the baggage area to the concourse of the airport 5; (3) the dog sniff of the suitcase after its removal from the baggage area was not a search, State v. Ricano, supra; State v. Mosier, supra; Harpold v. State, 389 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Goodley, supra, and the dog’s “alert” on the suitcase provided probable cause to open it and search its contents, Harpold v. State, supra; State v. Goodley, supra. Affirmed. .It appears that the state and the court und…
  • State v. Bankston, 435 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …ining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detention. [e.s.] [*271] - U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d at 239. See also Harpold v. State, 389 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 397 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1981); Myles v. State, 374 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); compare Horvitz v. State, 433 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). 2. Having thus properly restrained the defendant, the police then, with asto…

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