ALFONSO HERNANDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
MIKE CRUZ MACHINE SHOP, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a worker's compensation order, holding that a Deputy Commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claimant's injury fell under the exclusive coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), a federal statute that preempts state worker's compensation claims.
The Deputy Commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claimant's disability is covered by the federal LHWCA. The injury satisfied both the "situs" test (occurring upon navigable waters) and the "status" test (the employee was engaged in maritime employment—ship engine disassembly), placing the claim under federal jurisdiction where state worker's compensation statutes do not apply.
[1] Florida workers' compensation benefits are not payable for an employee covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).
[2] An employee injured while working on a barge afloat on navigable waters is covered by the LHWCA.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by . . . the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.”
Establishes that Florida law explicitly bars state worker's compensation for employees covered by federal LHWCA, the statutory basis for lack of jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn August 14, 1978, Hernandez was injured while disassembling a ship's engine aboard the "Rio Chagres," which was docked on navigable waters in front …
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THOMPSON, Judge.
The appellant challenges a worker’s compensation Order, contending in part that the Deputy Commissioner (“the Deputy”) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter that Order. We agree and reverse.
On August 14, 1978, the claimant was injured while he was disassembling a ship’s engine on board the “Rio Chagres,” which was docked on a navigable waterway in front of Biscayne Boulevard. A claim was filed on September 1, 1978, and a hearing was held on July 5, 1979. On October 3, 1979, the claimant moved to withdraw his claim until a determination could be made as to whether jurisdiction herein was within the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. On October 8, 1979, the Deputy entered his Order, finding inter alia that he had subject matter jurisdiction herein.
Section 440.09(2), Fla.Stat., provides that “[n]o compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by . . . the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act [‘The Act’].... ” See also City of Plantation v. Roberts, 342 So. 2d 69, 70-71 (Fla.1976). In this case, the claimant’s disability is covered by the Act.
Title 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) provides in part that
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).
Title 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) states that
The term “employee” means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.
Read in conjunction, these statutes provide a two-pronged test for compensation: the “situs” of the injury must occur upon navigable waters (including any adjoining pier, etc.), and the “status” of the injured person must be maritime in nature. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 264-65, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2357-58, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977).
In the case at bar, the injury occurred upon navigable waters; i. e., the waterway in front of Biscayne Boulevard. Additionally, the claimant was engaged in maritime employment; i. e., the activity of disassembling a ship’s engine so that it could be repaired. As pointed out in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F. 2d 533, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1976), under the Act, “an injured worker is a covered ‘employee’ if at the time of his injury (a) he was performing the work of ... repairing . . . or breaking a vessel, or (b) although he was not actually carrying out these specified functions, he was ‘directly involved’ in such work.” Finally, we note that the claimant was not a member of the vessel’s “crew,” since that term applies only to those who are naturally and primarily on board a vessel to aid in her navigation. “Crew” also signifies a permanent attachment to a vessel. See Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 571-73, 64 S.Ct. 747, 750-51, 88 L.Ed. 931 (1944). These elements are lacking herein. Thus, the claimant is an “employee” under the Act, and the disability at issue is within the coverage of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Deputy had no jurisdiction to enter his Order, and that Order is reversed.
MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
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Fcci Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cayce's Excavation, Inc., 675 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…eration of section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1991),1 a judge of compensation claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction of a dispute that is covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Hernandez v. Mike Cruz Machine Shop, 389 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In the order under review, the judge found that certain representations made by FCCI and reasonably relied on by the employer led the employer to believe that at all times pertinent to the claim, it had the appropriate coverage.…
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Smart v. Marathon Seafood & Am. Cas. Co., 444 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…quipment as part of routine maintenance); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Graham, 573 F. 2d 167 (4th Cir. 1978) (employees of submarine shop and foundry working on machine used in shipbuilding); Hernandez v. Mike Cruz Machine [*52] Shop, 389 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (employee disassembling a ship’s engine); Habrew Maritime International v. Williams, IRC Order 2-3673 (January 31, 1979) (forklift operator moving cargo from warehouse to ship).…
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Fcci Fund (Feisco) v. Cayce's Excavation, Inc., 726 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…d 48, 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (reversing deputy commissioner’s finding that the LHWCA precluded recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Law on grounds the LHWCA did not apply on the facts presented). Earlier, in Hernandez v. Mike Cruz Machine Shop, 389 So. 2d 1251, 1252-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we read section 440.09(2) as ousting state workers’ compensation jurisdiction whenever coverage was available under the LHWCA: In the case at bar, the injury occurred upon navigable waters.... Additionally, the claiman…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ne. Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (U.S. 1977)
- Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1944)
- Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976)
- City OF Plantation & Midland Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 342 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976)