FCCI MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
CAYCE'S EXCAVATION, INC. AND RUSSELL RIKER, APPELLEES
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FCCI Mutual Insurance Company appealed a workers' compensation judge's decision awarding benefits to Russell Riker for a hand injury sustained while working on a barge in navigable waters. The court held that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, even when an insurer's representations allegedly led an employer to believe it had appropriate coverage, and reversed the judgment to allow proper determination of whether the injury falls under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, and the judge of compensation claims lacked authority to exercise jurisdiction over Riker's claim based on estoppel principles. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for the judge to make proper findings on whether the claim falls under the LHWCA's 'situs and status' elements.
[1] Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, consent, acquiescence, or waiver.
[2] A judge of compensation claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle that defeats the judge's reliance on estoppel to exercise jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRussell Riker, employed by Cayce's Excavation, Inc. in Marathon, Florida, injured his hand on February 6, 1992, while working on a barge in a canal fe…
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DAVIS, Judge.
Russell Riker, the claimant in this workers’ compensation appeal, was employed by Cayce’s Excavation, Inc., in Marathon, Florida.
On February 6, 1992, he injured his hand while working on a barge in a canal that fed into the Gulf of Mexico. The employer immediately provided medical treatment and other benefits to Riker.
However, when the employer filed a claim for reimbursement with FCCI Mutual Insurance Company, FCCI filed a notice of denial claiming the accident occurred on a navigable waterway and was therefore covered under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). The employer does not carry that insurance. Because we hold that the judge of compensation claims erred in concluding that subject matter jurisdiction could be conferred by operation of principles of estoppel, we reverse.
At the hearing at which Riker’s claim for benefits was ultimately heard, FCCI’s defense was that the judge lacked jurisdiction over the claim because it fell under the aegis of the LHWCA. By operation of section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1991),1 a judge of compensation claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction of a dispute that is covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Hernandez v. Mike Cruz Machine Shop, 389 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
In the order under review, the judge found that certain representations made by FCCI and reasonably relied on by the employer led the employer to believe that at all times pertinent to the claim, it had the appropriate coverage. The judge went on to rule that she could exercise jurisdiction over the cause “by the operation of coverage by estoppel,” which would preclude the raising of a lack of jurisdiction defense to prevent a substantial injustice. In so ruling, the judge expressly declined to make any findings on the issue of whether the facts of this case satisfied the “situs and status” elements of the LHWCA. It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel. Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).
Indeed, neither consent, acquiescence, nor waiver can confer jurisdiction of the subject matter, which is not within the power of the court to adjudicate. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied mem., 303 So. 2d 644 (Fla.1974); see also, Evans v. State, 647 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(“defendant cannot confer jurisdiction on court by waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, or consent, since jurisdiction is established solely by general law”); RHPC, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 509 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“estoppel does not operate to confer authority or power”).
While section 440.04, Florida Statutes (1991), does allow for waiver of chapter 440 exclusions and exemptions when coverage specifically has been secured for work contemplated by the act, section 440.09(2) works to expressly exclude coverage when the nature of the work is covered by the LHWCA. Thus, in this case, there is no legal basté for the judge’s ruling that “[a]n employee not covered by the Florida [Workers’ Compensation] Act can become covered by proving the elements of estoppel.”
Consequently, we reverse the judge’s order. Because the judge did not make any findings on the issue of whether Riker’s exclusive remedy is under the LHWCA, we remand this case for further proceedings. Our holding today obviates the need to address FCCI’s other points raised on appeal.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur. . Subsection 440.09(2) specifically provides as follows:
(2) No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, or the Jones Act.
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State v. Yaros, 728 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…es not apply to this case because “jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent or failure to object....” Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Luke, 156 Fla. 638, 24 So. 2d 310, 312 (1946). Accord FCCI Mutual Ins. v. Cayce’s Excavation, 675 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.”); see also Clayton v. Willis, 489 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (misdemeanor jurisdiction cannot be conferred on circuit court by…
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Ariston v. Allied Bldg. Crafts & Ulico Cas. Co., 825 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…hat the JCC erred in refusing, on jurisdictional grounds, to determine whether 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) preempts the collective bargaining procedure authorized by section 440.211, Ariston relies on FCCI Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cayce’s Excavation, Inc., 675 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), which addressed whether the claimant’s exclusive remedy for benefits was under the Longshore and Harbor [*438] Workers’ Compensation Act, rather than under chapter 440. The court in FCCI stated that the JCC had jurisdiction to d…
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Golden Cape of Fla., Inc. v. de Ospina, 324 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)…omplaint are repugnant to the findings contained within both the temporary injunction and dissolution judgment, it is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel. See FCCI Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cayce's Excavation, Inc., 675 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citation omitted). Consequently, although keenly aware that further litigation will necessarily result in the further expenditure of valuable and limited judicial resources, we are compelled to reverse that portion of…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (U.S. 1982)
- Ringling BROS.-BARNUM & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. State, 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Staggers v. Gateway Erectors, 303 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1974)
- RHPC, Inc. v. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 509 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Evans v. State, 647 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Hernandez v. Shop, 389 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)