GITTLIN COMPANIES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID & DASH, INC., APPELLEE
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Affirmed summary judgment for David & Dash where sales of $597.08 in violation of an exclusive distribution clause did not constitute material breach justifying contract rescission by Gittlin.
A breach involving $597.08 in direct sales in violation of an exclusive distribution provision is not material or substantial enough to justify rescission of a contract worth over $100,000.
[1] A breach of contract is not material or substantial when the amount of the breach is negligible in relation to the total value of the contract and the parties' overall ob…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGittlin and David & Dash had a distribution agreement with an exclusive sales provision. David & Dash's employees made $597.08 in direct sales of wall…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Purportedly because the appellee David & Dash’s employees made $597.08 in direct sales of wallpaper, in violation of the exclusive distribution provision of the parties’ agreement, the appellant, Gittlin, repudiated the entire contract, and thus refused to honor its undertaking to purchase well over $100,000 of the material from the appellee. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that David & Dash’s breach was not a material or substantial one and therefore did not justify the recission of the contract by the appellant. See Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla.1954); Steak House, Inc. v. Barnett, 65 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1953); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853, 857-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts § 504 (1964); 12 Williston, Contracts § 1455 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
We entirely agree with that determination. Cincinnati Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminating Co. v. Western Siemens-Lungren Co., 152 U.S. 200, 14 S.Ct. 523, 38 L.Ed. 411 (1894); McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F.Supp. 1232 (E.D.Mich.1978).
Accordingly, the order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability for breach of contract in favor of David & Dash, now under review pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), is
Affirmed.
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KEN v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…, this case is for rescission of the entire contract, the $85,000 fraud may be considered a "material or substantial” breach in light of all the amounts involved, so as to justify that arguably harsh remedy, Gittlin Cos., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Cenal v. Jaramillo, 576 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); (c) whether rescission requires that the premium be first refunded or proffered, First Nat'I Fire Ins. Co. v. Burnett, 79 Fla. 424, 84 So. 382 (1920), or whether it m…
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Schneer v. Allstate Indem. Co., 767 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…ntract, the $50,000 fraud as to the contents claim should not be considered a material or substantial breach in light of all the amounts involved, so as to justify granting that acknowl-edgedly harsh remedy. Gittlin Cos., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Cenal v. Jaramillo, 576 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The court’s decision means that the insureds must return — read “forfeit”' — all of the sums for which they duly paid premiums and to which they were entitled for th…
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Cenal v. Jaramillo, 576 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…1972), a minor breach does not discharge performance. Beefy Trail, Inc., 267 So. 2d at 857. Here, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Cenal’s actions constituted a minor breach of the agreement. See Gittlin Companies, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Because the court erred in entering a judgment discharging the Jaramillos’ obligation to pay the note, we reverse the final judgment. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cincinnati Siemens-Lungren Gas Illuminating Co. v. W. Siemens-Lungren Co., 152 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1894)
- Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954)
- Maounis v. Igor Shamis (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)
- Steak House, Inc. v. Barnett, 65 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1953)
- Abelardo Cruz v. Lizzie Griffin Beckham, 267 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)