RUBEN CENAL, APPELLANT,
v.
LUIS B. JARAMILLO AND LEONOR JARAMILLO, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-03-19
No. 90-1431
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and LEVY, JJ.
576 So. 2d 418 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The appellate court reversed a trial court's judgment for the Jaramillos, finding that Ruben Cenal's minor breach of a contract did not justify their nonpayment of a promissory note. The court held that a minor breach does not discharge the other party's performance obligations.


Holding

No, Cenal's actions constituted a minor breach of the contract, not a material breach. Therefore, the Jaramillos were not excused from their obligation to pay the promissory note.


Headnotes

[1] A minor breach of a contract does not discharge the other party's obligation to perform.

[2] A party's minor breach of a contract does not justify the other party's cessation of performance under a related promissory note.

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Key Quotes

“The evidence showed that Plaintiff violated the terms of this agreement ..., [tjhere was no compliance, hence there are no sums due under the note.”

The trial court's finding that Cenal's actions excused the Jaramillos' payment obligation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Cenal sold stock and real property to the Jaramillos, evidenced by a $40,000 promissory note. The contract included a non-competition clause with a se…

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Opinion of the Court
BASKIN, Judge.

BASKIN, Judge.

Ruben Cenal filed an action against Luis and Leonor Jaramillo to recover a debt evidenced by a $40,000 promissory note. The note was subject to compliance with the terms of a contract in which Cenal sold his stock in a corporation to Luis Jaramillo, the remaining stockholder, and his interest in certain real property to the Jaramillos. The Jaramillos raised as a defense Cenal’s breach of some of the terms of the agreement as justification for their nonpayment of the note. Following a non-jury trial, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the Jaramillos. We reverse.

The Cenal-Jaramillo contract contained a non-competition clause which provided, in pertinent part, that in developing land adjacent to the Jaramillos’ project, Cenal would not engage in specified advertising for a period of seven months.

The evidence demonstrated that Cenal distributed several fliers, landscaped the construction trailer, and provided floor plans to several potential customers. The court ruled that because “[t]he evidence showed that Plaintiff violated the terms of this agreement ..., [tjhere was no compliance, hence there are no sums due under the note.” That ruling is an incorrect conclusion of law. Although it is true that “[wjhenever there is a total breach of a contract by one party ..., the other is at liberty to treat the contract as broken and desist from any further effort on his part to perform it,” Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla.1954); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int’l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), a minor breach does not discharge performance. Beefy Trail, Inc., 267 So. 2d at 857. Here, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Cenal’s actions constituted a minor breach of the agreement. See Gittlin Companies, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

Because the court erred in entering a judgment discharging the Jaramillos’ obligation to pay the note, we reverse the final judgment.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.


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Citator

Cited By

  • KEN v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 685 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …000 fraud may be considered a "material or substantial” breach in light of all the amounts involved, so as to justify that arguably harsh remedy, Gittlin Cos., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Cenal v. Jaramillo, 576 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); (c) whether rescission requires that the premium be first refunded or proffered, First Nat'I Fire Ins. Co. v. Burnett, 79 Fla. 424, 84 So. 382 (1920), or whether it may be deducted from the amount the insured must return to the c…
  • Schneer v. Allstate Indem. Co., 767 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
    …be considered a material or substantial breach in light of all the amounts involved, so as to justify granting that acknowl-edgedly harsh remedy. Gittlin Cos., Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 390 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Cenal v. Jaramillo, 576 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The court’s decision means that the insureds must return — read “forfeit”' — all of the sums for which they duly paid premiums and to which they were entitled for their structure claim, including the $3,500 paid by the carrier f…

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