SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
DULCIE CORENIA BRUMMITT, ETC., ET AL., AND HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad appeals the dismissal of its third-party complaint seeking contribution from Hartford Insurance Company for damages arising from a train-automobile collision. The court reverses, holding that Seaboard properly alleged standing and Hartford's proper joinder as the insurer of the negligent driver, and that technical pleading defects do not warrant dismissal with prejudice.
The court held that Seaboard adequately alleged Hartford's proper joinder and Seaboard's standing as a third-party beneficiary of Hartford's insurance policy, that the family immunity doctrine does not bar such contribution actions, and that Hartford's objections regarding insufficient description of policy coverage and failure to attach the policy do not constitute grounds for dismissal with prejudice.
[1] The family immunity doctrine does not bar an action for contribution against a parent.
[2] A third-party complaint alleging a party is an insurer and that the plaintiff claims the benefit of that insurance is sufficient to allege standing and proper joinder.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the decision of the Supreme Court in Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla.1977), must be construed to permit an action for contribution against a parent as well as against a spouse”
Establishes that family immunity doctrine does not bar contribution actions against parents, disposing of Hartford's primary motion to dismiss ground.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBurlie R. Brummitt, Sr. was killed in a collision between his automobile and a Seaboard train. His daughter Estelita was also killed and his son Burli…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Third Party Complaint cases and more on FLexlaw
ORFINGER, Judge.
Burlie R. Brummitt, Sr. was killed when an automobile he was driving collided with a Seaboard train. His daughter Estelita was also killed and a son, Burlie, Jr., was injured. When suit was filed against Seaboard by Dulcie Corenia Brummitt individually and as personal representative of the estate of both decedents, and also as next friend of her minor son Burlie, Jr., Seaboard filed a counterclaim against Dulcie as personal representative of Burlie Brummitt, Sr.’s estate, and also filed a third party complaint against Hartford, seeking contribution from Hartford as Burlie, Sr.’s insurer, alleging that Burlie, Sr. was negligent and that such negligence proximately caused the accident. On motion of Hartford, the third party complaint was dismissed with prejudice and this appeal followed.
We reverse.
The order dismissing the third party complaint does not state the grounds upon which it was based, so we must determine if any of the grounds stated in the motion will support the order. In so doing, we assume all facts in the third party complaint to be true. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1956).
One of the stated grounds in the motion to dismiss invokes the protection of the family immunity doctrine, but in a case not available to the trial judge at the time of the order appealed from, we have held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla.1977), must be construed to permit an action for contribution against a parent as well as against a spouse. Withrow v. Woods, 386 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The family immunity doctrine does not require a dismissal of the third party complaint here.
Those grounds which remain and which have not been withdrawn by appellee deal essentially with the form of the pleadings. Hartford is alleged to be the insurer of Burlie Brummitt, Sr. and Seaboard claims the benefit of that insurance as a third party beneficiary. This is sufficient to allege Seaboard’s standing and to show the proper joinder of Hartford. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), aff’d, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla.1969); Beta Eta House Corporation v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) aff’d 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla.1970).
Hartford’s contentions that the coverage of the insurance policy was not sufficiently described nor was a copy of the policy attached will not support the dismissal of the third party complaint with prejudice, because if the policy exists, Hartford is a party to it and will have knowledge of its contents as well as its coverage. While it would have been better for Seaboard to allege that it did not have a copy of the policy, we do not feel that the failure to so allege is so prejudicial as to be fatal to the cause, under the circumstances of this case. Sachse v. Tampa Music Co., Inc., 262 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
We find the remaining grounds of the motion insufficient to support the dismissal, so the final order dismissing the third party complaint is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and CO-WART, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Smith Barney Inc. v. Potter, 725 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…tores, Inc. v. Benton, 576 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 589 So. 2d 294 (Fla.1991) (on appeal all evidence and conflicts and all reasonable conclusions must be resolved in favor of prevailing party); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Brummitt, 390 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (when order does not state grounds on which it was based, reviewing court is required to determine if any grounds would support order and assume all necessary facts as true). We have applied these basic principles in this case an…
-
Legare v. Music & Worth Constr., Inc., 486 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…ppellees could prove such prejudice since, as parties to the contract, they can be said to have implicit knowledge of the contract’s various provisions. Conklin v. Cowen, 287 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla.1973); Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company v. Brummitt, 390 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Parkway General Hospital v. Allstate Insurance Company, 393 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). . Although the trial court does not purport to rely on this rule as a basis for his decision to grant Leon County’s motion to dismiss,…
Authorities Cited
- Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1956)
- Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Gulf Stream Motors, Inc. v. Christina Cook & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970)
- Beta ETA House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)
- Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977)
- Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)
- Sachse v. Tampa Music Co., Inc., 262 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Withrow v. Woods, 386 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)