CENTRAL OIL CO. AND PENINSULAR FIRE INS. CO., APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
FREDERICK E. CAMPEN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Central Oil Co. and its insurer appealed a worker's compensation order requiring them to pay for the claimant's examination at a pain clinic. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the Deputy Commissioner lacked statutory authority to order the pain clinic examination sua sponte and without showing good cause, and that the order was defective for lacking a proper decretal clause.
The court reversed the order, holding that the Deputy Commissioner lacked statutory authority to order the pain clinic examination without good cause being shown, and that the order was defective for failing to mandate the rights and responsibilities of the parties in light of its findings outside the invalid pain clinic provision.
[1] A deputy commissioner errs by ordering relief on an issue not framed by the parties, thereby denying due process.
[2] A deputy commissioner lacks statutory authority to sua sponte order an examination at a pain clinic at employer expense absent a conflict in medical evidence or a showing…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“due process problems arise when the deputy commissioner undertakes to rule on issues not framed by the parties”
Establishes the due process violation at the heart of the court's reversal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn February 1977, the claimant suffered a work-related accident. The appellants paid temporary total disability benefits until October 1978, when they…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
The appellants challenge a worker’s compensation Order, contending in part that: (1)the Deputy Commissioner (“the Deputy”) erred in ordering the appellants to provide for the claimant’s examination at a pain clinic; and (2) the Order lacks a decretal clause or mandate. We agree and reverse.
In February 1977, the claimant was involved in a work-related accident. The appellants paid temporary total disability benefits until October 1978, when they began paying permanent partial disability benefits. On July 31, 1979, a hearing was held. The claimant’s application for this hearing made no reference to any request or need for the services of a pain clinic. The same is true of the Notice of Hearing. Nor was any testimony presented on this issue. The Deputy subsequently entered his Order, finding in part that the appellants should provide for the claimant’s examination at a pain clinic.
This court has recognized that “due process problems arise when the deputy commissioner undertakes to rule on issues not framed by the parties.” Farm Stores v. Dyrda, 384 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In this case, the Deputy, by ordering that the appellants furnish the claimant with the services of a pain clinic, ruled on an issue which was neither raised nor anticipated by the parties herein. Thus, the appellants properly complain of a lack of adequate notice regarding this issue, thereby resulting in a denial of their rights to due process.
Additionally, the Deputy had no statutory authority to sua sponte order that the claimant be examined at a pain clinic with the costs to be borne by the appellants. Section 440.25(3)(b), Fla.Stat., is inapplicable, since there was no conflict in the medical evidence. Section 440.25(6), Fla.Stat., is inapplicable because it does not provide for the assessment of costs, while § 440.29(1), Fla.Stat., is inapplicable for the same reason. See Lu-Mar Enterprises, Inc. v. Mazur, 8 FCR 248, 249 (1974).
We recognize that treatment at a pain clinic may constitute remedial treatment pursuant to § 440.13(1), Fla.Stat. See Planning Research Co. v. Shy, 379 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Also, § 440.13(2), Fla. Stat., provides that a Deputy “may at any time, for good cause shown, .. . order a change in such remedial attention, care, or attendance.” (emphasis supplied) Here, however, there was no showing of good cause: the Deputy simply ordered an examination based on his own observations of the claimant. Accordingly, he acted without authority.
The appellants also argue that the Order is devoid of a decretal clause and is therefore invalid. We note that although the Order does sufficiently mandate that the appellants provide for an examination at a pain clinic, this portion of the Order is invalid, as discussed above. Outside of this provision, the Order makes certain other findings, but does not mandate the rights and responsibilities of the parties in light of those findings. Therefore, the Order is defective. See Dade Paper Co. v. Farrell, IRC Order 2-3708 (Feb. 19, 1979). See also § 440.25(3)(c), Fla.Stat. We have considered the remaining point raised by the appellants, as well as the claimant’s point on cross-appeal, and find them both to be without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the Deputy’s Order and remand this cause for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
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Vill. INN Rest. & Gallagher-Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Aridi, 543 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…not in the notice of hearing. Thus, the DC’s award of future medical benefits must be reversed as the issue was not properly placed in controversy. Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Jackson, 418 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Central Oil Company v. Campen, 390 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). All involved parties must have notice of the issues to be disputed and determined. Allman v. Meredith Corp., 451 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We reject the claimant’s contention that because the E/C did not object to future…
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Se. Recycling & Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Cottongim, 639 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…issue, such as the need for chiropractic care, based upon his own personal beliefs in the matter, where there is no conflict in the medical evidence and no evidence demonstrating good cause for change of medical treatment. Central Oil Co. v. Campen, 390 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Due process concerns preclude a ruling on matters which have not been placed at issue, since the parties are entitled to notice so that they may fairly present their case. Florida Power Corp. v. Hamilton, 617 So. 2d 333, 334 (F…
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Wash. Square Assocs., Ltd. v. Honey Bourne, 408 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…nal funds, and that employer/carrier’s advance payments are to “be on compensation.” Insofar as the order does not adequately adjudicate the rights and responsibilities of the parties, it is deficient and must be remanded. Central Oil Co. v. Campen, 390 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). While we find that employer/carrier has shown error requiring reversal in part and remand of the order appealed, we note that such error might more readily have been corrected by application to the deputy before the order was…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Farm Stores & Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau v. Dyrda, 384 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Planning Research Co. & Hartford Ins. Grp. v. SHY, 379 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Panzavecchia v. Crockett, 379 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)