LILLIAN M. BAUGHMAN AND JACK R. BAUGHMAN, HER HUSBAND, APPELLANTS,
v.
ERNEST WILLIAM VANN, L & M PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., A CORPORATION, AND HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., A CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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The appellate court reversed a jury verdict for the defendants in a rear-end collision case. The court found that the presumption of negligence for the following driver was not rebutted by inadmissible evidence, and thus, liability should have been directed in favor of the plaintiff.
The court held that the presumption of negligence was not rebutted by substantial and reasonable evidence. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability.
[1] Proof of a rear-end collision raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the overtaking vehicle when the leading vehicle is lawfully positioned on the highway.
[2] A presumption of negligence arising from a rear-end collision shifts the burden to the defendant to produce substantial and reasonable evidence to rebut the presumption.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a leading vehicle is located within its proper place on the highway, proof of a rear-end collision raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the overtaking vehicle.”
Establishes the legal presumption of negligence in rear-end collision cases.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLillian Baughman's vehicle was struck from the rear by a truck driven by Ernest Vann. Baughman moved for a directed verdict on liability, which was de…
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COWART, Judge.
Appellant Lillian Baughman was either stopping or had stopped at a traffic light when the vehicle she was driving was struck from the rear by a truck driven by appellee Vann and owned by appellee L & M Paving Co. and insured by appellee Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. Appellant filed suit and at trial her motion for a directed verdict as to liability was denied. Appellant takes this appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict for appellees. We reverse.
When a leading vehicle is located within its proper place on the highway, proof of a rear-end collision raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the overtaking vehicle. Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 207 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Rianhard v. Rice, 119 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). This presumption provides a prima facie case which shifts to the defendant the burden to come forward with evidence to contradict or rebut the presumed negligence. If the defendant produces evidence that fairly and reasonably shows that he was not negligent, the effect of the presumption disappears and negligence then becomes a jury question. Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965); Shaw v. York, 187 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). The burden on the defendant is not to come up with just any explanation, but one which is “substantial and reasonable.” Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The only explanation offered to rebut the presumption of negligence was the suggestion of the involvement of a “phantom vehicle;” this was based on an accident report, which was inadmissible under section 316.066, Florida Statutes, and on a police officer’s opinion based on hearsay, which was likewise inadmissible. State v. Inman, 347 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied 355 So. 2d 517 (Fla.1978); Smith v. Frisch’s Big Boy, Inc., 208 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a directed verdict for appellant on the issue of liability and for a new trial on the issue of damages.
REVERSED.
ORFINGER and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.
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Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. Gregoria Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)…ny based on the selective recollections of the surgeon and his staff would be considered “substantial” enough to “burst the bubble,” thus keeping the presumption from the jury. See Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965); see also Baughman v. Vann, 390 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Plaintiff could rarely prove negligence by a preponderance of the evidence when the presumption has given him nothing more than the self-serving testimony of the defenda…
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Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…. It is a sudden stop by the preceding driver at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by the following driver that creates the factual issue. Burton v. Powell, 547 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). As we said in Baughman v. Vann, 390 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980): When a leading vehicle is located within its proper place on the highway, proof of a rear-end collision raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the overtaking vehicle. Stephens v. Dichtenmueller, 207 So. 2d 718 (Fla.…1 / 2
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Gertrude Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…on” in the case at bar is, at best, a mere description of the nature of his distraction. It does not offer any substantial or reasonable explanation for his failure to avoid the collision. [Emphasis supplied.] Id. at 657. See also Baughman v. Vann, 390 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Stewart v. Scribner, 390 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Lee v. Dunnigan, 384 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Cowart v. Barnes, 370 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla.1979). After analyzing the above case…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
- Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Rianhard v. Rice, 119 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)
- Shaw v. Miles Bartow York, 187 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966)
- Smith v. Frisch's BIG BOY, Inc., 208 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- State v. Helman, 207 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Valarie v. Stephens, 207 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)
- State v. Inman, 347 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)