EDGAR RAY BRANNON, APPELLANT,
v.
MARION COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Edgar Ray Brannon challenged a workers' compensation order, arguing that the Deputy Commissioner erred in determining the basis for his compensation rate. The court agreed and reversed, holding that the compensation rate should be based on Brannon's average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976, pursuant to Florida Statute § 440.15(5)(c).
The Deputy Commissioner erred in determining the basis for compensation. The rate of compensation should be based on the appellant's average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976, as required by § 440.15(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (1975). Additionally, the court denied the appellant's request for appellate attorney's fees because it was presented in the brief rather than by separate motion.
[1] A worker's compensation rate of compensation should be based on the average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976, pursuant to § 440.15(5)(c), Fla.Stat. …
[2] An award of attorney's fees for representation on appeal in a worker's compensation case must be presented by a separate motion, not within the appellant's brief.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“pursuant to § 440.15(5)(c), Fla.Stat. (1975), the rate of compensation should be based on the appellant's average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976”
States the controlling statutory standard for calculating workers' compensation rates
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrannon was a workers' compensation claimant whose case was heard by the Deputy Commissioner for Marion County Sheriff's Office and Associated Indemni…
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THOMPSON, Judge.
The appellant challenges a worker’s compensation order, contending in part that the Deputy Commissioner (“the Deputy”) erred in determining the basis for the appellant’s rate of compensation. We agree and reverse. Upon consideration of the briefs and the record, we find that pursuant to § 440.15(5)(c), Fla.Stat. (1975), the rate of compensation should be based on the appellant’s average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976.
The appellant has requested an award of attorney’s fees for representation on this appeal. This request was presented in the appellant’s brief, rather than by filing a separate motion, and therefore it must be denied. See Fla. Dept. of Comm., Div. of Risk Management v. Davies, 379 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Wallace v. Walton Context Building, 383 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Munroe Memorial Hospital v. Thompson, 388 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Parenthetically, we note that although the Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure do contain provisions regarding appellate proceedings, those Rules are not all inclusive on this subject. To the extent to which those Rules are silent with respect to appellate procedure, the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure are fully applicable to proceedings before this court. See, e. g., Davies, 379 So. 2d at 1313; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Scott, 386 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Cf. Malyn v. Atlantic Federal S & L Ass'n, 384 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
The Deputy’s Order is reversed and this cause is remanded with instructions to base the appellant’s rate of compensation on his average weekly wage as of September 1, 1976.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., and WOOD-IE A. LILES (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
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Lehigh Corp. & U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Byrd, 397 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…p.P. 9.400(b) explicitly states that a motion for attorney’s fees “shall state the grounds upon which recovery is sought.” This rule is applicable to workers’ compensation proceedings before this court, see Brannon v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 391 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and in this instance, compliance with the rule would have greatly facilitated the court’s consideration of the claimant’s request. There should be compliance with all rules governing proceedings before this court, including Fla…
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Hines Elec. & Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. McCLURE, 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…Florida Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure are silent with respect to questions of appellate procedure, the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure are fully applicable to proceedings before this court. Brannon v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 391 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). . We would also urge the Workers’ Compensation Rules Committee to revisit the rules in question in an effort to alleviate the substantive and procedural problems discussed in this opinion. See footnote 5 herein.…
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S. Fruit Distribs., Inc. v. Molina, 399 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…t we award him an attorney’s fee. The original request for [*365] attorney’s fees on appeal was made in the appellee’s brief instead of by separately-filed motion. Therefore, the request must be denied. See Brannon v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 391 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) and cases cited therein. Accordingly, Petition for Rehearing is DENIED. SHIVERS, WENTWORTH, JJ, and LILES, WOODIE A. (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Munroe Mem'l Hosp. & All Risk Corp. of Fla. v. Thompson, 388 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Cavanaugh v. State, 386 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Fla. Dep't of Commerce v. Davies, 379 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- William v. Gruman, 379 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Wallace v. Walton Context Bldg. & United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 383 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Malyn v. Atl. Fed. Sav. & Loan Association/Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 384 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)